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and the ascending battalion chief kept their radios on repeater channel 7. For
the first 15 minutes of the operations, communications among them and the
ladder company climbing with the battalion chief worked well. Upon learn-
ing from a company security official that the impact zone began at the 78th
floor, a ladder company transmitted this information, and the battalion chief
directed an engine company staged on the 40th floor to attempt to find an ele-
vator to reach that upper level.
121
To our knowledge, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that
the repeater channel was functioning and being used by units in that tower.
The senior chief in the South Tower lobby was initially unable to communi-
cate his requests for more units to chiefs either in the North Tower lobby or
at the outdoor command post.
122
From approximately 9:21 on, the ascending battalion chief was unable to
reach the South Tower lobby command post because the senior chief in the
lobby had ceased to communicate on repeater channel 7. The vast majority of
units that entered the South Tower did not communicate on the repeater chan-
nel.
123
The first FDNY fatality of the day occurred at approximately 9:30, when
a civilian landed on and killed a fireman near the intersection of West and Lib-
erty streets.
124
By 9:30, chiefs in charge of the South Tower still were in need of additional
companies. Several factors account for the lag in response. First, only two units
that had been dispatched to the North Tower prior to 9:03 reported immedi-
ately to the South Tower. Second, units were not actually sent until approxi-
mately five minutes after the FDNY Chief of Department ordered their
dispatch. Third, those units that had been ordered at 8:53 to stage at the
Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel--and thus very close to the WTC complex--were
not dispatched after the plane hit the South Tower. Fourth, units parked fur-
ther north on West Street, then proceeded south on foot and stopped at the
overall FDNY command post on West Street, where in some cases they were
told to wait. Fifth, some units responded directly to the North Tower. (Indeed,
radio communications indicated that in certain cases some firemen believed
that the South Tower was 1 WTC when in fact it was 2 WTC.) Sixth, some
units couldn't find the staging area (at West Street south of Liberty) for the
South Tower. Finally, the jumpers and debris that confronted units attempting
to enter the South Tower from its main entrance on Liberty Street caused some
units to search for indirect ways to enter that tower, most often through the
Marriott Hotel, or simply to remain on West Street.
125
A chief at the overall outdoor command post was under the impression that
he was to assist in lobby operations of the South Tower, and in fact his aide
already was in that lobby. But because of his lack of familiarity with the WTC
complex and confusion over how to get to there, he instead ended up in the
Marriott at about 9:35. Here he came across about 14 units, many of which
had been trying to find safe access to the South Tower. He directed them to
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