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The logistics of fire operations were directed by Fire Dispatch Operations
Division, which had a center in each of the five boroughs. All 911 calls concern-
ing fire emergencies were transferred to FDNY dispatch.
22
As of September 11, FDNY companies and chiefs responding to a fire used
analog, point-to-point radios that had six normal operating channels.Typically,
the companies would operate on the same tactical channel, which chiefs on
the scene would monitor and use to communicate with the firefighters. Chiefs
at a fire operation also would use a separate command channel. Because these
point-to-point radios had weak signal strength, communications on them
could be heard only by other FDNY personnel in the immediate vicinity. In
addition, the FDNY had a dispatch frequency for each of the five boroughs;
these were not point-to-point channels and could be monitored from around
the city.
23
The FDNY's radios performed poorly during the 1993 WTC bombing for
two reasons. First, the radios signals often did not succeed in penetrating the
numerous steel and concrete floors that separated companies attempting to
communicate; and second, so many different companies were attempting to use
the same point-to-point channel that communications became unintelligible.
24
The Port Authority installed, at its own expense, a repeater system in 1994
to greatly enhance FDNY radio communications in the difficult high-rise
environment of the Twin Towers. The Port Authority recommended leaving
the repeater system on at all times. The FDNY requested, however, that the
repeater be turned on only when it was actually needed because the channel
could cause interference with other FDNY operations in Lower Manhattan.
The repeater system was installed at the Port Authority police desk in 5 WTC,
to be activated by members of the Port Authority police when the FDNY units
responding to the WTC complex so requested. However, in the spring of 2000
the FDNY asked that an activation console for the repeater system be placed
instead in the lobby fire safety desk of each of the towers, making FDNY per-
sonnel entirely responsible for its activation.The Port Authority complied.
25
Between 1998 and 2000, fewer people died from fires in New York City
than in any three-year period since accurate measurements began in 1946. Fire-
fighter deaths--a total of 22 during the 1990s--compared favorably with the
most tranquil periods in the department's history.
26
Office of Emergency Management and Interagency Preparedness.
In
1996, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani created the Mayor's Office of Emergency Man-
agement, which had three basic functions. First, OEM's Watch Command was
to monitor the city's key communications channels--including radio frequen-
cies of FDNY dispatch and the NYPD--and other data.A second purpose of
the OEM was to improve New York City's response to major incidents, includ-
ing terrorist attacks, by planning and conducting exercises and drills that would
involve multiple city agencies, particularly the NYPD and FDNY. Third, the
OEM would play a crucial role in managing the city's overall response to an
HEROISM AND HORROR
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