in April 2001. The CIA did not know who Mukhtar was at the time--only
that he associated with al Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah and that, based on
the nature of the information, he was evidently involved in planning possible
terrorist activities.
people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where col-
leagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out
terrorist-related activities for Bin Ladin. CIA headquarters presumed from the
details of the reporting that this person was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In July,
the same source was shown a series of photographs and identified a photograph
of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the Khaled he had previously discussed.
connection to the reports about Mukhtar that had been circulated in the
spring. This connection might also have underscored concern about the June
reporting that KSM was recruiting terrorists to travel, including to the United
States. Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Muhktar/KSM had com-
municated with a phone that was used by Binalshibh, and that Binalshibh had
used the same phone to communicate with Moussaoui, as discussed in chap-
ter 7.As in the Moussaoui situation already described, the links to Binalshibh
might not have been an easy trail to find and would have required substantial
cooperation from the German government. But time was short, and running
out.
As Tenet told us, "the system was blinking red" during the summer of 2001.
Officials were alerted across the world. Many were doing everything they pos-
sibly could to respond to the threats.
being briefed to the President. Thus, these individual cases did not become
national priorities.As the CIA supervisor "John" told us, no one looked at the
bigger picture; no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the
thundercloud to the ground.
made by al Qaeda.Time ran out.