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Zacarias Moussaoui
On August 15, 2001, the Minneapolis FBI Field Office initiated an intelligence
investigation on Zacarias Moussaoui.As mentioned in chapter 7, he had entered
the United States in February 2001, and had begun flight lessons at Airman
Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. He resumed his training at the Pan Am
International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, starting on August 13. He
had none of the usual qualifications for flight training on Pan Am's Boeing 747
flight simulators. He said he did not intend to become a commercial pilot but
wanted the training as an "ego boosting thing." Moussaoui stood out because,
with little knowledge of flying, he wanted to learn how to "take off and land"
a Boeing 747.
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The agent in Minneapolis quickly learned that Moussaoui possessed jihadist
beliefs. Moreover, Moussaoui had $32,000 in a bank account but did not pro-
vide a plausible explanation for this sum of money. He had traveled to Pakistan
but became agitated when asked if he had traveled to nearby countries while
in Pakistan (Pakistan was the customary route to the training camps in
Afghanistan). He planned to receive martial arts training, and intended to pur-
chase a global positioning receiver. The agent also noted that Moussaoui
became extremely agitated whenever he was questioned regarding his religious
beliefs.The agent concluded that Moussaoui was "an Islamic extremist prepar-
ing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist goals." He also
believed Moussaoui's plan was related to his flight training.
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Moussaoui can be seen as an al Qaeda mistake and a missed opportunity.
An apparently unreliable operative, he had fallen into the hands of the FBI. As
discussed in chapter 7, Moussaoui had been in contact with and received
money from Ramzi Binalshibh. If Moussaoui had been connected to al
Qaeda, questions should instantly have arisen about a possible al Qaeda plot
that involved piloting airliners, a possibility that had never been seriously ana-
lyzed by the intelligence community.
The FBI agent who handled the case in conjunction with the INS repre-
sentative on the Minneapolis Joint Terrorism Task Force suspected that Mous-
saoui might be planning to hijack a plane. Minneapolis and FBI headquarters
debated whether Moussaoui should be arrested immediately or surveilled to
obtain additional information. Because it was not clear whether Moussaoui
could be imprisoned, the FBI case agent decided the most important thing was
to prevent Moussaoui from obtaining any further training that he could use to
carry out a potential attack.
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As a French national who had overstayed his visa, Moussaoui could be
detained immediately. The INS arrested Moussaoui on the immigration viola-
tion.A deportation order was signed on August 17, 2001.
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The agents in Minnesota were concerned that the U.S.Attorney's Office in
Minneapolis would find insufficient probable cause of a crime to obtain a crim-
inal warrant to search Moussaoui's laptop computer.
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Agents at FBI headquar-
ters believed there was insufficient probable cause. Minneapolis therefore
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
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