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Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the

plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been
able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow
use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or
FAA personnel.We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijack-
ers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats
in first class, and they seem to have used them.We believe it is more likely that
Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and
inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not
have been visible to the passengers.

At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the follow-

ing announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:"Ladies and Gentlemen: Here
the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on board.
So, sit." The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then
instructed the plane's autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east.

The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight

attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the
hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.

Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from

GTE airphones and cellular phones. These calls between family, friends, and
colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on the
ground with firsthand accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical
information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into the World
Trade Center.

At 9:39, the FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard

a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board, that the
plane was returning to the airport, and that they should remain seated.

While

it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on
Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earlier,
may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how
to operate the radio and the intercom. To our knowledge none of them had
ever flown an actual airliner before.

At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that pas-

sengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible Jarrah
knew of the success of the assault on the World Trade Center. He could have
learned of this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of
its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit intrusion
and telling of the New York attacks. But even without them, he would cer-
tainly have understood that the attacks on the World Trade Center would
already have unfolded, given Flight 93's tardy departure from Newark. If Jar-
rah did know that the passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred
to him that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York, thereby
defeating his attempts at deception.

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

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