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above deputy chief of a section within the Counterterrorism Division at FBI
headquarters.
One of the Cole case agents read the lead with interest, and contacted "Jane"
to obtain more information."Jane" argued, however, that because the agent was
designated a "criminal" FBI agent, not an intelligence FBI agent, the wall kept
him from participating in any search for Mihdhar. In fact, she felt he had to
destroy his copy of the lead because it contained NSA information from reports
that included caveats ordering that the information not be shared without
OIPR's permission.The agent asked "Jane" to get an opinion from the FBI's
National Security Law Unit (NSLU) on whether he could open a criminal
case on Mihdhar.
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"Jane" sent an email to the Cole case agent explaining that according to the
NSLU, the case could be opened only as an intelligence matter, and that if
Mihdhar was found, only designated intelligence agents could conduct or even
be present at any interview. She appears to have misunderstood the complex
rules that could apply to this situation.
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The FBI agent angrily responded:
Whatever has happened to this--someday someone will die--and wall
or not--the public will not understand why we were not more effective
and throwing every resource we had at certain "problems."
Let's hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their
decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL, is get-
ting the most "protection."
"Jane" replied that she was not making up the rules; she claimed that they
were in the relevant manual and "ordered by the [FISA] Court and every office
of the FBI is required to follow them including FBI NY."
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It is now clear that everyone involved was confused about the rules govern-
ing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels.
Because Mihdhar was being sought for his possible connection to or knowl-
edge of the Cole bombing, he could be investigated or tracked under the exist-
ing Cole criminal case. No new criminal case was needed for the criminal agent
to begin searching for Mihdhar. And as NSA had approved the passage of its
information to the criminal agent, he could have conducted a search using all
available information. As a result of this confusion, the criminal agents who
were knowledgeable about al Qaeda and experienced with criminal investiga-
tive techniques, including finding suspects and possible criminal charges, were
thus excluded from the search.
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The search was assigned to one FBI agent, and it was his very first coun-
terterrorism lead. Because the lead was "routine," he was given 30 days to open
an intelligence case and make some unspecified efforts to locate Mihdhar. He
started the process a few days later. He checked local New York databases for
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
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