the special agents in charge of field offices during their annual performance
review discussions. In speaking with agents around the country, we found lit-
tle evidence that any such concerns had reached FBI personnel beyond the
New York Field Office.
expected an attack on July 4. Watson said he felt deeply that something was
going to happen. But he told us the threat information was "nebulous." He
wished he had known more. He wished he had had "500 analysts looking at
Usama Bin Ladin threat information instead of two."
in late June, through July, and twice in August. There is a dispute regarding
Ashcroft's interest in Pickard's briefings about the terrorist threat situation.
Pickard told us that after two such briefings Ashcroft told him that he did not
want to hear about the threats anymore. Ashcroft denies Pickard's charge.
Pickard says he continued to present terrorism information during further
briefings that summer, but nothing further on the "chatter" the U.S. govern-
ment was receiving.
he replied that he could not assure Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in
the United States, although the reports of threats were related to overseas tar-
gets. Ashcroft said he therefore assumed the FBI was doing what it needed to
do. He acknowledged that in retrospect, this was a dangerous assumption. He
did not ask the FBI what it was doing in response to the threats and did not
task it to take any specific action. He also did not direct the INS, then still part
of the Department of Justice, to take any specific action.
were not hardened.Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic sur-
veillance was not targeted against a domestic threat.
not warned.
nity to disrupt the plot. As seen in chapter 7, al Qaeda's operatives made mis-
takes. At least two such mistakes created opportunities during 2001, especially
in late August.