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A second cause of this disparity in response is that domestic agencies did
not know what to do, and no one gave them direction. Cressey told us that the
CSG did not tell the agencies how to respond to the threats. He noted that the
agencies that were operating overseas did not need direction on how to
respond; they had experience with such threats and had a "playbook." In con-
trast, the domestic agencies did not have a game plan. Neither the NSC (includ-
ing the CSG) nor anyone else instructed them to create one.
45
This lack of direction was evident in the July 5 meeting with representa-
tives from the domestic agencies.The briefing focused on overseas threats.The
domestic agencies were not questioned about how they planned to address the
threat and were not told what was expected of them. Indeed, as noted earlier,
they were specifically told they could not issue advisories based on the brief-
ing.
46
The domestic agencies' limited response indicates that they did not per-
ceive a call to action.
Clarke reflected a different perspective in an email to Rice on September
15, 2001. He summarized the steps taken by the CSG to alert domestic agen-
cies to the possibility of an attack in the United States. Clarke concluded that
domestic agencies, including the FAA, knew that the CSG believed a major al
Qaeda attack was coming and could be in the United States.
Although the FAA had authority to issue security directives mandating new
security procedures, none of the few that were released during the summer of
2001 increased security at checkpoints or on board aircraft. The information
circulars mostly urged air carriers to "exercise prudence" and be alert. Prior to
9/11, the FAA did present a CD-ROM to air carriers and airport authorities
describing the increased threat to civil aviation. The presentation mentioned
the possibility of suicide hijackings but said that "fortunately, we have no indi-
cation that any group is currently thinking in that direction."
47
The FAA con-
ducted 27 special security briefings for specific air carriers between May 1,
2001, and September 11, 2001.Two of these briefings discussed the hijacking
threat overseas. None discussed the possibility of suicide hijackings or the use
of aircraft as weapons. No new security measures were instituted.
48
Rice told us she understood that the FBI had tasked its 56 U.S. field offices
to increase surveillance of suspected terrorists and to reach out to informants
who might have information about terrorist plots. An NSC staff document at
the time describes such a tasking as having occurred in late June but does not
indicate whether it was generated by the NSC or the FBI. Other than the pre-
viously described April 13 communication sent to all FBI field offices, how-
ever, the FBI could not find any record of having received such a directive.The
April 13 document asking field offices to gather information on Sunni
extremism did not mention any possible threat within the United States and
did not order surveillance of suspected operatives. The NSC did not specify
what the FBI's directives should contain and did not review what had been
issued earlier.
49
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 264