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official in the Counterterrorist Center told us that he and a colleague were con-
sidering resigning in order to go public with their concerns.
31
The Calm Before the Storm
On July 27, Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in intelligence
about a near-term al Qaeda attack had stopped. He urged keeping readiness
high during the August vacation period, warning that another report suggested
an attack had just been postponed for a few months "but will still happen."
32
On August 1, the FBI issued an advisory that in light of the increased vol-
ume of threat reporting and the upcoming anniversary of the East Africa
embassy bombings, increased attention should be paid to security planning. It
noted that although most of the reporting indicated a potential for attacks on
U.S. interests abroad, the possibility of an attack in the United States could not
be discounted.
33
On August 3, the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding
that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefi-
nitely. Citing threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, the
advisory suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in
security before moving forward with the planned attacks.
34
During the spring and summer of 2001, President Bush had on several occa-
sions asked his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States.
Reflecting on these questions, the CIA decided to write a briefing article sum-
marizing its understanding of this danger. Two CIA analysts involved in prepar-
ing this briefing article believed it represented an opportunity to communicate
their view that the threat of a Bin Ladin attack in the United States remained
both current and serious.
35
The result was an article in the August 6 Presiden-
tial Daily Brief titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." It was the 36th
PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and
the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the United States.
The President told us the August 6 report was historical in nature. President
Bush said the article told him that al Qaeda was dangerous, which he said he
had known since he had become President. The President said Bin Ladin had
long been talking about his desire to attack America. He recalled some oper-
ational data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70
investigations were under way.As best he could recollect, Rice had mentioned
that the Yemenis' surveillance of a federal building in New York had been
looked into in May and June, but there was no actionable intelligence.
He did not recall discussing the August 6 report with the Attorney General
or whether Rice had done so. He said that if his advisers had told him there
was a cell in the United States, they would have moved to take care of it. That
never happened.
36
Although the following day's SEIB repeated the title of this PDB, it did not
contain the reference to hijackings, the alert in New York, the alleged casing
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