background image
plete and that little additional warning could be expected. The briefing
addressed only threats outside the United States.
23
The next day, the CIA representative told the CSG that al Qaeda members
believed the upcoming attack would be "spectacular," qualitatively different
from anything they had done to date.
24
Apparently as a result of the July 5 meeting with Clarke, the interagency
committee on federal building security was tasked to examine security meas-
ures. This committee met on July 9, when 37 officials from 27 agencies and
organizations were briefed on the "current threat level" in the United States.
They were told that not only the threat reports from abroad but also the recent
convictions in the East Africa bombings trial, the conviction of Ahmed
Ressam, and the just-returned Khobar Towers indictments reinforced the need
to "exercise extreme vigilance." Attendees were expected to determine
whether their respective agencies needed enhanced security measures.
25
On July 18, 2001, the State Department provided a warning to the public
regarding possible terrorist attacks in the Arabian Peninsula.
26
Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard told us he had one of his periodic con-
ference calls with all special agents in charge on July 19. He said one of the
items he mentioned was the need, in light of increased threat reporting, to have
evidence response teams ready to move at a moment's notice, in case of an
attack.
27
He did not task field offices to try to determine whether any plots
were being considered within the United States or to take any action to dis-
rupt any such plots.
In mid-July, reporting started to indicate that Bin Ladin's plans had been
delayed, maybe for as long as two months, but not abandoned. On July 23, the
lead item for CSG discussion was still the al Qaeda threat, and it included men-
tion of suspected terrorist travel to the United States.
28
On July 31, an FAA circular appeared alerting the aviation community to
"reports of possible near-term terrorist operations . . . particularly on the Ara-
bian Peninsula and/or Israel." It stated that the FAA had no credible evidence
of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation, though it noted that some of the
"currently active" terrorist groups were known to "plan and train for hijack-
ings" and were able to build and conceal sophisticated explosive devices in lug-
gage and consumer products.
29
Tenet told us that in his world "the system was blinking red." By late July,
Tenet said, it could not "get any worse."
30
Not everyone was convinced. Some
asked whether all these threats might just be deception. On June 30, the SEIB
contained an article titled "Bin Ladin Threats Are Real." Yet Hadley told Tenet
in July that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz questioned the report-
ing. Perhaps Bin Ladin was trying to study U.S. reactions.Tenet replied that he
had already addressed the Defense Department's questions on this point; the
reporting was convincing.To give a sense of his anxiety at the time, one senior
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
259
Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 259