Despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened U.S. security, the
planning for attacks was continuing.
tion regarding threats from Bin Ladin. It warned that there was an increased
volume of threat reporting, indicating a potential for attacks against U.S. tar-
gets abroad from groups "aligned with or sympathetic to Usama Bin Ladin."
Despite the general warnings, the message further stated, "The FBI has no
information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States."
However, it went on to emphasize that the possibility of attack in the United
States could not be discounted. It also noted that the July 4 holiday might
heighten the threats.The report asked recipients to "exercise extreme vigilance"
and "report suspicious activities" to the FBI. It did not suggest specific actions
that they should take to prevent attacks.
governments, possibly disrupting operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps
averting attacks against two or three U.S. embassies. Clarke and others told us
of a particular concern about possible attacks on the Fourth of July. After it
passed uneventfully, the CSG decided to maintain the alert.
terparts, while Clarke worked with senior officials in the Gulf. In late July,
because of threats, Italy closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiair-
craft batteries at the Genoa airport during the G-8 summit, which President
Bush attended.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the
Secret Service, Customs, the CIA, and the FBI met with Clarke to discuss the
current threat. Attendees report that they were told not to disseminate the
threat information they received at the meeting. They interpreted this direc-
tion to mean that although they could brief their superiors, they could not send
out advisories to the field.An NSC official recalls a somewhat different empha-
sis, saying that attendees were asked to take the information back to their home
agencies and "do what you can" with it, subject to classification and distribu-
tion restrictions. A representative from the INS asked for a summary of the
information that she could share with field offices. She never received one.
told that preparations for multiple attacks were in late stages or already com-