background image
That same day, the State Department notified all embassies of the terrorist
threat and updated its worldwide public warning. In June, the State Depart-
ment initiated the Visa Express program in Saudi Arabia as a security measure,
in order to keep long lines of foreigners away from vulnerable embassy spaces.
The program permitted visa applications to be made through travel agencies,
instead of directly at the embassy or consulate.
13
A terrorist threat advisory distributed in late June indicated a high proba-
bility of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casu-
alties. Other reports' titles warned,"Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent" and
"Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats." The latter reported
multiple attacks planned over the coming days, including a "severe blow"
against U.S. and Israeli "interests" during the next two weeks.
14
On June 21, near the height of the threat reporting, U.S. Central Command
raised the force protection condition level for U.S. troops in six countries to
the highest possible level, Delta.The U.S. Fifth Fleet moved out of its port in
Bahrain, and a U.S. Marine Corps exercise in Jordan was halted. U.S. embassies
in the Persian Gulf conducted an emergency security review, and the embassy
in Yemen was closed.The CSG had foreign emergency response teams, known
as FESTs, ready to move on four hours' notice and kept up the terrorism alert
posture on a "rolling 24 hour basis."
15
On June 25, Clarke warned Rice and Hadley that six separate intelligence
reports showed al Qaeda personnel warning of a pending attack.An Arabic tel-
evision station reported Bin Ladin's pleasure with al Qaeda leaders who were
saying that the next weeks "will witness important surprises" and that U.S. and
Israeli interests will be targeted.Al Qaeda also released a new recruitment and
fund-raising tape. Clarke wrote that this was all too sophisticated to be merely
a psychological operation to keep the United States on edge, and the CIA
agreed.The intelligence reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks
as occurring on a calamitous level, indicating that they would cause the world
to be in turmoil and that they would consist of possible multiple--but not nec-
essarily simultaneous--attacks.
16
On June 28, Clarke wrote Rice that the pattern of al Qaeda activity indi-
cating attack planning over the past six weeks "had reached a crescendo." "A
series of new reports continue to convince me and analysts at State, CIA, DIA
[Defense Intelligence Agency], and NSA that a major terrorist attack or series
of attacks is likely in July," he noted. One al Qaeda intelligence report warned
that something "very, very, very, very" big was about to happen, and most of
Bin Ladin's network was reportedly anticipating the attack. In late June, the
CIA ordered all its station chiefs to share information on al Qaeda with their
host governments and to push for immediate disruptions of cells.
17
The headline of a June 30 briefing to top officials was stark:"Bin Ladin Plan-
ning High-Profile Attacks." The report stated that Bin Ladin operatives
expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic pro-
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
257
Final 8-9.5pp 7/17/04 1:24 PM Page 257