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methods. Like their predecessors, the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and
Richard Clarke, the National Security Council (NSC) counterterrorism coor-
dinator, all received the SEIB, not the PDB.
3
Clarke and his staff had extensive
access to terrorism reporting, but they did not have access to internal, nondis-
seminated information at the National Security Agency (NSA), CIA, or FBI.
The Drumbeat Begins
In the spring of 2001, the level of reporting on terrorist threats and planned
attacks increased dramatically to its highest level since the millennium alert.At
the end of March, the intelligence community disseminated a terrorist threat
advisory, indicating a heightened threat of Sunni extremist terrorist attacks
against U.S. facilities, personnel, and other interests.
4
On March 23, in connection with discussions about possibly reopening
Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, Clarke warned National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that domestic or foreign terrorists might
use a truck bomb--their "weapon of choice"--on Pennsylvania Avenue.That
would result, he said, in the destruction of the West Wing and parts of the res-
idence.
5
He also told her that he thought there were terrorist cells within the
United States, including al Qaeda.
The next week, Rice was briefed on the activities of Abu Zubaydah and on
CIA efforts to locate him.As pointed out in chapter 6,Abu Zubaydah had been
a major figure in the millennium plots.Over the next few weeks,the CIA repeat-
edly issued warnings--including calls from DCI Tenet to Clarke--that Abu
Zubaydah was planning an operation in the near future.One report cited a source
indicating that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack in a country that CIA ana-
lysts thought might be Israel, or perhaps Saudi Arabia or India. Clarke relayed
these reports to Rice.
6
In response to these threats, the FBI sent a message to all its field offices on
April 13, summarizing reporting to date. It asked the offices to task all
resources, including human sources and electronic databases, for any informa-
tion pertaining to "current operational activities relating to Sunni extremism."
It did not suggest that there was a domestic threat.
7
The interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that Clarke
chaired discussed the Abu Zubaydah reports on April 19.The next day, a brief-
ing to top officials reported "Bin Ladin planning multiple operations." When
the deputies discussed al Qaeda policy on April 30, they began with a briefing
on the threat.
8
In May 2001, the drumbeat of reporting grew louder with reports to top
officials that "Bin Ladin public profile may presage attack" and "Bin Ladin net-
work's plans advancing." In early May, a walk-in to the FBI claimed there was
a plan to launch attacks on London, Boston, and New York.Attorney General
John Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA on May 15 regarding al Qaeda gener-
ally and the current threat reporting specifically. The next day brought a report
"THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"
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