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attack. Abu Hafs the Mauritanian reportedly even wrote Bin Ladin a message
basing opposition to the attacks on the Qur'an.
183
According to KSM, in late August, when the operation was fully planned,
Bin Ladin formally notified the al Qaeda Shura Council that a major attack
against the United States would take place in the coming weeks.When some
council members objected, Bin Ladin countered that Mullah Omar lacked
authority to prevent al Qaeda from conducting jihad outside Afghanistan.
Though most of the Shura Council reportedly disagreed, Bin Ladin persisted.
The attacks went forward.
184
The story of dissension within al Qaeda regarding the 9/11 attacks is prob-
ably incomplete.The information on which the account is based comes from
sources who were not privy to the full scope of al Qaeda and Taliban planning.
Bin Ladin and Atef, however, probably would have known, at least, that
· The general Taliban offensive against the Northern Alliance would
rely on al Qaeda military support.
· Another significant al Qaeda operation was making progress during
the summer--a plot to assassinate the Northern Alliance leader,
Ahmed Shah Massoud. The operatives, disguised as journalists, were
in Massoud's camp and prepared to kill him sometime in August.Their
appointment to see him was delayed.
185
But on September 9, the Massoud assassination took place.The delayed Tal-
iban offensive against the Northern Alliance was apparently coordinated to
begin as soon as he was killed, and it got under way on September 10.
186
As they deliberated earlier in the year, Bin Ladin and Atef would likely have
remembered that Mullah Omar was dependent on them for the Massoud assas-
sination and for vital support in the Taliban military operations. KSM remem-
bers Atef telling him that al Qaeda had an agreement with the Taliban to
eliminate Massoud, after which the Taliban would begin an offensive to take
over Afghanistan. Atef hoped Massoud's death would also appease the Taliban
when the 9/11 attacks happened. There are also some scant indications that
Omar may have been reconciled to the 9/11 attacks by the time they
occurred.
187
Moving to Departure Positions
In the days just before 9/11, the hijackers returned leftover funds to al Qaeda
and assembled in their departure cities.They sent the excess funds by wire trans-
fer to Hawsawi in the UAE, about $26,000 altogether.
188
The hijackers targeting American Airlines Flight 77, to depart from Dulles,
migrated from New Jersey to Laurel, Maryland, about 20 miles from Washing-
ton, D.C.They stayed in a motel during the first week in September and spent
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