was coming. KSM notes that it was generally well known by the summer of
2001 that he was planning some kind of operation against the United States.
Many were even aware that he had been preparing operatives to go to the
United States, leading some to conclude that al Qaeda was planning a near-
term attack on U.S. soil. Moreover, Bin Ladin had made several remarks that
summer hinting at an upcoming attack and generating rumors throughout the
worldwide jihadist community. Bin Ladin routinely told important visitors to
expect significant attacks against U.S. interests soon and, during a speech at the
al Faruq camp, exhorted trainees to pray for the success of an attack involving
20 martyrs. Others have confirmed hearing indications of an impending attack
and have verified that such news, albeit without specific details, had spread
across al Qaeda.
sis on the year's military offensive against the Northern Alliance, an offensive
that ordinarily would begin in the late spring or summer.They certainly hoped
that this year's offensive would finally finish off their old enemies, driving them
from Afghanistan. From the Taliban's perspective, an attack against the United
States might be counterproductive. It might draw the Americans into the war
against them, just when final victory seemed within their grasp.
word spreading of a coming attack, a schism emerged among the senior lead-
ership of al Qaeda. Several senior members reportedly agreed with Mullah
Omar. Those who reportedly sided with Bin Ladin included Atef, Sulayman
Abu Ghayth, and KSM. But those said to have opposed him were weighty fig-
ures in the organization--including Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, Sheikh Saeed
al Masri, and Sayf al Adl. One senior al Qaeda operative claims to recall Bin
Ladin arguing that attacks against the United States needed to be carried out
immediately to support insurgency in the Israeli-occupied territories and
protest the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Beyond these rhetorical
appeals, Bin Ladin also reportedly thought an attack against the United States
would benefit al Qaeda by attracting more suicide operatives, eliciting greater
donations, and increasing the number of sympathizers willing to provide logis-
tical assistance.
ferred for al Qaeda to attack Jews, not necessarily the United States. KSM
contends that Omar faced pressure from the Pakistani government to keep
al Qaeda from engaging in operations outside Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's chief
financial manager, Sheikh Saeed, argued that al Qaeda should defer to the Tali-
ban's wishes. Another source says that Sheikh Saeed opposed the operation,
both out of deference to Omar and because he feared the U.S. response to an