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authorities in the near future. Finally, according to an uncorroborated witness
account, early on the morning of September 10, Abdullah, Osama Awadallah,
Omar Bakarbashat, and others behaved suspiciously at the gas station.Accord-
ing to the witness, after the group met, Awadallah said "it is finally going to
happen" as the others celebrated by giving each other high fives.
175
Dissent within the al Qaeda Leadership
While tactical preparations for the attack were nearing completion, the entire
operation was being questioned at the top, as al Qaeda and the Taliban argued
over strategy for 2001. Our focus has naturally been on the specifics of the
planes operation. But from the perspective of Bin Ladin and Atef, this opera-
tion was only one, admittedly key, element of their unfolding plans for the year.
Living in Afghanistan, interacting constantly with the Taliban, the al Qaeda
leaders would never lose sight of the situation in that country.
Bin Ladin's consistent priority was to launch a major attack directly against
the United States. He wanted the planes operation to proceed as soon as pos-
sible. Mihdhar reportedly told his cousin during the summer of 2001 that Bin
Ladin was reputed to have remarked,"I will make it happen even if I do it by
myself."
176
According to KSM, Bin Ladin had been urging him to advance the date of
the attacks. In 2000, for instance, KSM remembers Bin Ladin pushing him to
launch the attacks amid the controversy after then-Israeli opposition party
leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. KSM claims Bin
Ladin told him it would be enough for the hijackers simply to down planes
rather than crash them into specific targets. KSM says he resisted the pressure.
177
KSM claims to have faced similar pressure twice more in 2001. According
to him, Bin Ladin wanted the operation carried out on May 12, 2001, seven
months to the day after the Cole bombing. KSM adds that the 9/11 attacks had
originally been envisioned for May 2001. The second time he was urged to
launch the attacks early was in June or July 2001, supposedly after Bin Ladin
learned from the media that Sharon would be visiting the White House. On
both occasions KSM resisted, asserting that the hijacking teams were not ready.
Bin Ladin pressed particularly strongly for the latter date in two letters stress-
ing the need to attack early.The second letter reportedly was delivered by Bin
Ladin's son-in-law, Aws al Madani.
178
Other evidence corroborates KSM's account. For instance, Mihdhar told
his cousin that the attacks were to happen in May, but were postponed twice,
first to July, then to September. Moreover, one candidate hijacker remembers
a general warning being issued in the al Qaeda camps in July or early August,
just like the warnings issued two weeks before the Cole bombing and ten days
before the eventual 9/11 attacks. During the midsummer alert, al Qaeda
members dispersed with their families, security was increased, and Bin Ladin
disappeared for about 30 days, until the alert was canceled.
179
While the details of the operation were strictly compartmented, by the time
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