background image
August 13 through August 20. Moussaoui also purchased two knives and
inquired of two manufacturers of GPS equipment whether their products
could be converted for aeronautical use--activities that closely resembled those
of the 9/11 hijackers during their final preparations for the attacks.
158
On August 10, shortly after getting the money from Binalshibh, Moussaoui
left Oklahoma with a friend and drove to Minnesota.Three days later, Mous-
saoui paid the $6,800 balance owed for his flight simulator training at Pan Am
in cash and began his training. His conduct, however, raised the suspicions of
his flight instructor. It was unusual for a student with so little training to be
learning to fly large jets without any intention of obtaining a pilot's license
or other goal. On August 16, once the instructor reported his suspicion to the
authorities, Moussaoui was arrested by the INS on immigration charges.
159
KSM denies ever considering Moussaoui for the planes operation. Instead
he claims that Moussaoui was slated to participate in a "second wave" of attacks.
KSM also states that Moussaoui had no contact with Atta, and we are unaware
of evidence contradicting this assertion.
160
Yet KSM has also stated that by the summer of 2001, he was too busy with
the planes operation to continue planning for any second-wave attacks. More-
over, he admits that only three potential pilots were ever recruited for the
alleged second wave, Moussaoui plus two others who, by midsummer of 2001,
had backed out of the plot.
161
We therefore believe that the effort to push
Moussaoui forward in August 2001 lends credence to the suspicion that he was
being primed as a possible pilot in the immediate planes operation.
Binalshibh says he assumed Moussaoui was to take his place as another pilot
in the 9/11 operation. Recounting a post-9/11 discussion with KSM in Kan-
dahar, Binalshibh claims KSM mentioned Moussaoui as being part of the 9/11
operation. Although KSM never referred to Moussaoui by name, Binalshibh
understood he was speaking of the operative to whom Binalshibh had wired
money. Binalshibh says KSM did not approve of Moussaoui but believes KSM
did not remove him from the operation only because Moussaoui had been
selected and assigned by Bin Ladin himself.
162
KSM did not hear about Moussaoui's arrest until after September 11.
According to Binalshibh, had Bin Ladin and KSM learned prior to 9/11 that
Moussaoui had been detained, they might have canceled the operation.When
Binalshibh discussed Moussaoui's arrest with KSM after September 11, KSM
congratulated himself on not having Moussaoui contact the other operatives,
which would have compromised the operation. Moussaoui had been in con-
tact with Binalshibh, of course, but this was not discovered until after 9/11.
163
As it turned out, Moussaoui was not needed to replace Jarrah. By the time
Moussaoui was arrested in mid-August, Jarrah had returned to the United
States from his final trip to Germany, his disagreement with Atta apparently
resolved.The operatives began their final preparations for the attacks.
164
THE ATTACK LOOMS
247
Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 247