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also gave Binalshibh the email address of Zacarias Moussaoui for future con-
tact. Binalshibh then left for Kuala Lumpur.
142
Binalshibh contacted Atta upon arriving in Malaysia and found a change in
plan. Atta could not travel because he was too busy helping the new arrivals
settle in the United States.After remaining in Malaysia for approximately three
weeks, Binalshibh went to Bangkok for a few days before returning to Ger-
many. He and Atta agreed to meet later at a location to be determined.
143
In early July, Atta called Binalshibh to suggest meeting in Madrid, for rea-
sons Binalshibh claims not to know. He says he preferred Berlin, but that he
and Atta knew too many people in Germany and feared being spotted
together. Unable to buy a ticket to Madrid at the height of the tourist season,
Binalshibh booked a seat on a flight to Reus, near Barcelona, the next day.Atta
was already en route to Madrid, so Binalshibh phoned Shehhi in the United
States to inform him of the change in itinerary.
144
Atta arrived in Madrid on July 8. He spent the night in a hotel and made
three calls from his room, most likely to coordinate with Binalshibh.The next
day, Atta rented a car and drove to Reus to pick up Binalshibh; the two then
drove to the nearby town of Cambrils. Hotel records show Atta renting rooms
in the same area until July 19, when he returned his rental car in Madrid and
flew back to Fort Lauderdale. On July 16, Binalshibh returned to Hamburg,
using a ticket Atta had purchased for him earlier that day. According to Binal-
shibh, they did not meet with anyone else while in Spain.
145
Binalshibh says he told Atta that Bin Ladin wanted the attacks carried out
as soon as possible. Bin Ladin, Binalshibh conveyed, was worried about hav-
ing so many operatives in the United States.Atta replied that he could not yet
provide a date because he was too busy organizing the arriving hijackers and
still needed to coordinate the timing of the flights so that the crashes would
occur simultaneously. Atta said he required about five to six weeks before he
could provide an attack date. Binalshibh advised Atta that Bin Ladin had
directed that the other operatives not be informed of the date until the last
minute.Atta was to provide Binalshibh with advance notice of at least a week
or two so that Binalshibh could travel to Afghanistan and report the date per-
sonally to Bin Ladin.
146
As to targets, Atta understood Bin Ladin's interest in striking the White
House.Atta said he thought this target too difficult, but had tasked Hazmi and
Hanjour to evaluate its feasibility and was awaiting their answer. Atta said that
those two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights
near the Pentagon.Atta explained that Hanjour was assigned to attack the Pen-
tagon, Jarrah the Capitol, and that both Atta and Shehhi would hit the World
Trade Center. If any pilot could not reach his intended target, he was to crash
the plane. If Atta could not strike the World Trade Center, he planned to crash
his aircraft directly into the streets of New York.Atta told Binalshibh that each
pilot had volunteered for his assigned target, and that the assignments were sub-
ject to change.
147
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THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
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