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only a handful of al Qaeda operatives who, according to KSM, was aware of
the full details of the planned planes operation. Abu Turab taught the opera-
tives how to conduct hijackings, disarm air marshals, and handle explosives. He
also trained them in bodybuilding and provided them with a few basic Eng-
lish words and phrases.
108
According to KSM,Abu Turab even had the trainees butcher a sheep and a
camel with a knife to prepare to use knives during the hijackings.The recruits
learned to focus on storming the cockpit at the earliest opportunity when the
doors first opened, and to worry about seizing control over the rest of the plane
later. The operatives were taught about other kinds of attack as well, such as
truck bombing, so that they would not be able to disclose the exact nature of
their operation if they were caught. According to KSM, the muscle did not
learn the full details--including the plan to hijack planes and fly them into
buildings--before reaching the United States.
109
After training in Afghanistan, the operatives went to a safehouse maintained
by KSM in Karachi and stayed there temporarily before being deployed to the
United States via the UAE.The safehouse was run by al Qaeda operative Abd
al Rahim Ghulum Rabbani, also known as Abu Rahmah, a close associate of
KSM who assisted him for three years by finding apartments and lending logis-
tical support to operatives KSM would send.
According to an al Qaeda facilitator, operatives were brought to the safe-
house by a trusted Pakistani al Qaeda courier named Abdullah Sindhi, who
also worked for KSM. The future hijackers usually arrived in groups of two
or three, staying at the safe house for as long as two weeks.The facilitator has
identified each operative whom he assisted at KSM's direction in the spring
of 2001. Before the operatives left Pakistan, each of them received $10,000
from KSM for future expenses.
110
From Pakistan, the operatives transited through the UAE en route to the
United States. In the Emirates they were assisted primarily by al Qaeda oper-
atives Ali Abdul Aziz Ali and Mustafa al Hawsawi. Ali apparently assisted nine
future hijackers between April and June 2001 as they came through Dubai. He
helped them with plane tickets, traveler's checks, and hotel reservations; he also
taught them about everyday aspects of life in the West, such as purchasing
clothes and ordering food. Dubai, a modern city with easy access to a major
airport, travel agencies, hotels, and Western commercial establishments, was an
ideal transit point.
111
Ali reportedly assumed the operatives he was helping were involved in a big
operation in the United States, he did not know the details.
112
When he asked
KSM to send him an assistant, KSM dispatched Hawsawi, who had worked on
al Qaeda's media committee in Kandahar. Hawsawi helped send the last four
operatives (other than Mihdhar) to the United States from the UAE. Hawsawi
would consult with Atta about the hijackers' travel schedules to the United
States and later check with Atta to confirm that each had arrived. Hawsawi told
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