to justice. He favored going after Bin Ladin as part of a larger air strike, simi-
lar to what had been done in the 1986 U.S. strike against Libya. General Myers
emphasized the Predator's value for surveillance, perhaps enabling broader air
strikes that would go beyond Bin Ladin to attack al Qaeda's training infrastruc-
ture.
the military to consider along with its other options.The CIA should consider
flying reconnaissance-only missions.The principals--including the previously
reluctant Tenet--thought that such reconnaissance flights were a good idea,
combined with other efforts to get actionable intelligence. Tenet deferred an
answer on the additional reconnaissance flights, conferred with his staff after
the meeting, and then directed the CIA to press ahead with them.
galow near the Tajikistan border with two men whom the Northern Alliance
leader had been told were Arab journalists.The supposed reporter and camera-
man--actually al Qaeda assassins--then set off a bomb, riddling Massoud's chest
with shrapnel. He died minutes later.
ership.
draft presidential directive. Hadley also directed Tenet to prepare a separate sec-
tion "authorizing a broad range of other covert activities, including authority
to capture or to use lethal force" against al Qaeda command-and-control ele-
ments. This section would supersede the Clinton-era documents. Hadley
wanted the authorities to be flexible and broad enough "to cover any additional
UBL-related covert actions contemplated."
were largely uninvolved. But the pieces were coming together for an integrated
policy dealing with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Pakistan.