of his deputies with the Predator. Such strikes would be acts of self-defense that
would not violate the ban on assassinations in Executive Order 12333.The big
issues--who would pay for what, who would authorize strikes, and who would
pull the trigger--were left for the principals to settle.The Defense Department
representatives did not take positions on these issues.
lin sent it back with a handwritten comment on the cost-sharing: "we ques-
tion whether it is advisable to make such an investment before the decision is
taken on flying an armed Predator." For Clarke, this came close to being a final
straw. He angrily asked Rice to call Tenet."Either al Qida is a threat worth act-
ing against or it is not," Clarke wrote."CIA leadership has to decide which it
is and cease these bi-polar mood swings."
cers and engineers. General John Jumper had commanded U.S. air forces in
Europe and seen Predators used for reconnaissance in the Balkans. He started
the program to develop an armed version and, after returning in 2000 to head
the Air Combat Command, took direct charge of it.
missile testing needed to continue and modifications needed to be made
during the summer. Even then, Jumper told us, problems with the equipment
persisted. Nevertheless, the Air Force was moving at an extraordinary pace."In
the modern era, since the 1980s," Jumper said to us,"I would be shocked if you
found anything that went faster than this."
The Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4.
On the day of the meeting, Clarke sent Rice an impassioned personal note. He
criticized U.S. counterterrorism efforts past and present. The "real question"
before the principals, he wrote, was "are we serious about dealing with the
al Qida threat? . . . Is al Qida a big deal? . . . Decision makers should imagine them-
selves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qida attacks and
hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the US," Clarke wrote.
"What would those decision makers wish that they had done earlier? That
future day could happen at any time."
"Many in al Qida and the Taliban may have drawn the wrong lesson from the
Cole: that they can kill Americans without there being a US response, with-
out there being a price. . . . One might have thought that with a $250m hole