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equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic
about redeployment.
237
The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for
reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that the Taliban had spotted a Predator in
the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until
the armed version was ready. "I do not believe the possible recon value out-
weighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by
the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote. Military
officers in the Joint Staff shared this concern.
238
There is some dispute as to
whether or not the Deputies Committee endorsed resuming reconnaissance
flights at its April 30, 2001, meeting. In any event, Rice and Hadley ultimately
went along with the CIA and the Pentagon, holding off on reconnaissance
flights until the armed Predator was ready.
239
The CIA's senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as
well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to mini-
mize. One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money.A Preda-
tor cost about $3 million. If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance
or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force,
but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went
down. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA
should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed.
240
Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central
Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator."This was new ground," he told
us.Tenet ticked off key questions:What is the chain of command? Who takes
the shot? Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going
outside of normal military command and control? Charlie Allen told us that
when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency's execu-
tive director, A. B. "Buzzy" Krongard, had said that either one of them would
be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had
no authority to do it, nor did he.
241
Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work. It had
been built to hit tanks, not people. It needed to be designed to explode in a
different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision. In the
configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator's mis-
sile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle.
242
White House officials had seen the Predator video of the "man in white."
On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system. He
directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard
Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1.
He also directed that they have cost-sharing arrangements in place by August
1. Rice told us that this attempt by Hadley to dictate a solution had failed and
that she eventually had to intervene herself.
243
On August 1, the Deputies Committee met again to discuss the armed
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