General Musharraf on a number of matters. He emphasized that Bin Ladin and
al Qaeda were "a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must
be addressed." He urged Musharraf to use his influence with the Taliban on
Bin Ladin and al Qaeda.
ative view of Pakistan on Capitol Hill, the idea of lifting sanctions may have
seemed far-fetched, but perhaps no more so than the idea of persuading
Musharraf to antagonize the Islamists in his own government and nation.
recalled thinking that the Pakistani diplomat seemed to have heard it all before.
Sattar urged senior U.S. policymakers to engage the Taliban, arguing that such
a course would take time but would produce results. In late June, the deputies
agreed to review U.S. objectives. Clarke urged Hadley to split off all other issues
in U.S.-Pakistani relations and just focus on demanding that Pakistan move vig-
orously against terrorism--to push the Pakistanis to do before an al Qaeda attack
what Washington would demand that they do after. He had made similar
requests in the Clinton administration; he had no more success with Rice than
he had with Berger.
al Qaeda.The new administration was again registering its concerns, just as its
predecessor had, but it was still searching for new incentives to open up diplo-
matic possibilities. For its part, Pakistan had done little. Assistant Secretary of
State Christina Rocca described the administration's plan to break this logjam
as a move from "half engagement" to "enhanced engagement." The adminis-
tration was not ready to confront Islamabad and threaten to rupture relations.
Deputy Secretary Armitage told us that before 9/11, the envisioned new
approach to Pakistan had not yet been attempted.
Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in
preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom. Secre-
tary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11.They dis-
cussed topics like Iraq, not al Qaeda. U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001
were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli-
Palestinian violence, not about Bin Ladin.
The confirmation of the Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process.
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secre-