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threat to the United States and to friendly governments." It called for a multi-
year effort involving diplomacy, covert action, economic measures, law
enforcement, public diplomacy, and if necessary military efforts. The State
Department was to work with other governments to end all al Qaeda sanctu-
aries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist
financing.The CIA was to develop an expanded covert action program includ-
ing significant additional funding and aid to anti-Taliban groups.The draft also
tasked OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds to support this program were
found in U.S. budgets from fiscal years 2002 to 2006.

201

Rice viewed this draft directive as the embodiment of a comprehensive new

strategy employing all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Qaeda
threat. Clarke, however, regarded the new draft as essentially similar to the pro-
posal he had developed in December 2000 and put forward to the new admin-
istration in January 2001.

202

In May or June, Clarke asked to be moved from

his counterterrorism portfolio to a new set of responsibilities for cybersecu-
rity. He told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an administration
that he considered not "serious about al Qaeda."

203

If Clarke was frustrated, he

never expressed it to her, Rice told us.

204

Diplomacy in Blind Alleys
Afghanistan.

The new administration had already begun exploring possible

diplomatic options, retracing many of the paths traveled by its predecessors. U.S.
envoys again pressed the Taliban to turn Bin Ladin "over to a country where
he could face justice" and repeated, yet again, the warning that the Taliban
would be held responsible for any al Qaeda attacks on U.S. interests.

205

The

Taliban's representatives repeated their old arguments. Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage told us that while U.S. diplomats were becoming more
active on Afghanistan through the spring and summer of 2001, "it would be
wrong for anyone to characterize this as a dramatic shift from the previous
administration."

206

In deputies meetings at the end of June,Tenet was tasked to assess the prospects

for Taliban cooperation with the United States on al Qaeda.The NSC staff was
tasked to flesh out options for dealing with the Taliban. Revisiting these issues
tried the patience of some of the officials who felt they had already been down
these roads and who found the NSC's procedures slow."We weren't going fast
enough," Armitage told us. Clarke kept arguing that moves against the Taliban
and al Qaeda should not have to wait months for a larger review of U.S. pol-
icy in South Asia."For the government," Hadley said to us,"we moved it along
as fast as we could move it along."

207

As all hope in moving the Taliban faded, debate revived about giving covert

assistance to the regime's opponents. Clarke and the CIA's Cofer Black
renewed the push to aid the Northern Alliance. Clarke suggested starting with
modest aid, just enough to keep the Northern Alliance in the fight and tie
down al Qaeda terrorists, without aiming to overthrow the Taliban.

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FROM THREAT TO THREAT

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