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need for formal meetings. If, however, he decided that an event or an issue called
for action, Rice would typically call on Hadley to have the Deputies Commit-
tee develop and review options.The President said that this process often tried
his patience but that he understood the necessity for coordination.
171
Early Decisions
Within the first few days after Bush's inauguration, Clarke approached Rice in
an effort to get her--and the new President--to give terrorism very high pri-
ority and to act on the agenda that he had pushed during the last few months
of the previous administration. After Rice requested that all senior staff iden-
tify desirable major policy reviews or initiatives, Clarke submitted an elaborate
memorandum on January 25, 2001. He attached to it his 1998 Delenda Plan
and the December 2000 strategy paper."We urgently need . . . a Principals level
review on the al Qida network," Clarke wrote.
172
He wanted the Principals Committee to decide whether al Qaeda was "a
first order threat" or a more modest worry being overblown by "chicken lit-
tle" alarmists. Alluding to the transition briefing that he had prepared for Rice,
Clarke wrote that al Qaeda "is not some narrow, little terrorist issue that needs
to be included in broader regional policy." Two key decisions that had been
deferred, he noted, concerned covert aid to keep the Northern Alliance alive
when fighting began again in Afghanistan in the spring, and covert aid to the
Uzbeks. Clarke also suggested that decisions should be made soon on messages
to the Taliban and Pakistan over the al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan, on pos-
sible new money for CIA operations, and on "when and how . . . to respond
to the attack on the USS Cole."
173
The national security advisor did not respond directly to Clarke's memo-
randum. No Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda was held until Sep-
tember 4, 2001 (although the Principals Committee met frequently on other
subjects, such as the Middle East peace process, Russia, and the Persian
Gulf ).
174
But Rice and Hadley began to address the issues Clarke had listed.
What to do or say about the Cole had been an obvious question since inaugu-
ration day. When the attack occurred, 25 days before the election, candidate
Bush had said to CNN,"I hope that we can gather enough intelligence to fig-
ure out who did the act and take the necessary action.There must be a conse-
quence."
175
Since the Clinton administration had not responded militarily,
what was the Bush administration to do?
On January 25,Tenet briefed the President on the Cole investigation.The writ-
ten briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA
had told the Clinton White House in November.This included the "preliminary
judgment" that al Qaeda was responsible, with the caveat that no evidence had
yet been found that Bin Ladin himself ordered the attack.Tenet told us he had
no recollection of a conversation with the President about this briefing.
176
In his January 25 memo, Clarke had advised Rice that the government
should respond to the Cole attack, but "should take advantage of the policy that
FROM THREAT TO THREAT
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