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sion Directive 62 of the Clinton administration had said specifically that
Clarke's Counterterrorism Security Group should report through the Deputies
Committee or, at Berger's discretion, directly to the principals. Berger had in
practice allowed Clarke's group to function as a parallel deputies committee,
reporting directly to those members of the Principals Committee who sat on
the special Small Group.There, Clarke himself sat as a de facto principal.

Rice decided to change the special structure that had been built to coordi-

nate counterterrorism policy. It was important to sound policymaking, she felt,
that Clarke's interagency committee--like all others--report to the principals
through the deputies.

167

Rice made an initial decision to hold over both Clarke and his entire coun-

terterrorism staff, a decision that she called rare for a new administration. She
decided also that Clarke should retain the title of national counterterrorism
coordinator, although he would no longer be a de facto member of the Prin-
cipals Committee on his issues.The decision to keep Clarke, Rice said, was "not
uncontroversial," since he was known as someone who "broke china," but she
and Hadley wanted an experienced crisis manager. No one else from Berger's
staff had Clarke's detailed knowledge of the levers of government.

168

Clarke was disappointed at what he perceived as a demotion. He also wor-

ried that reporting through the Deputies Committee would slow decisionmak-
ing on counterterrorism.

169

The result, amid all the changes accompanying the transition, was signifi-

cant continuity in counterterrorism policy. Clarke and his Counterterrorism
Security Group would continue to manage coordination. Tenet remained
Director of Central Intelligence and kept the same chief subordinates, includ-
ing Black and his staff at the Counterterrorist Center. Shelton remained chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs, with the Joint Staff largely the same. At the FBI,
Director Freeh and Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Dale Watson
remained.Working-level counterterrorism officials at the State Department and
the Pentagon stayed on, as is typically the case.The changes were at the cabi-
net and subcabinet level and in the CSG's reporting arrangements.At the sub-
cabinet level, there were significant delays in the confirmation of key officials,
particularly at the Defense Department.

The procedures of the Bush administration were to be at once more formal

and less formal than its predecessor's. President Clinton, a voracious reader,
received his daily intelligence briefings in writing. He often scrawled questions
and comments in the margins, eliciting written responses.The new president,
by contrast, reinstated the practice of face-to-face briefings from the DCI. Pres-
ident Bush and Tenet met in the Oval Office at 8:00

., with Vice President

Cheney, Rice, and Card usually also present.The President and the DCI both
told us that these daily sessions provided a useful opportunity for exchanges on
intelligence issues.

170

The President talked with Rice every day, and she in turn talked by phone

at least daily with Powell and Rumsfeld.As a result, the President often felt less

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