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us he asked Tenet whether the CIA could kill Bin Ladin, and Tenet replied that
killing Bin Ladin would have an effect but would not end the threat. President
Bush told us Tenet said to him that the CIA had all the authority it needed.
158
In December, Bush met with Clinton for a two-hour, one-on-one discus-
sion of national security and foreign policy challenges. Clinton recalled saying
to Bush,"I think you will find that by far your biggest threat is Bin Ladin and
the al Qaeda." Clinton told us that he also said,"One of the great regrets of my
presidency is that I didn't get him [Bin Ladin] for you, because I tried to."
159
Bush told the Commission that he felt sure President Clinton had mentioned
terrorism, but did not remember much being said about al Qaeda. Bush recalled
that Clinton had emphasized other issues such as North Korea and the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process.
160
In early January, Clarke briefed Rice on terrorism. He gave similar presen-
tations--describing al Qaeda as both an adaptable global network of jihadist
organizations and a lethal core terrorist organization--to Vice President­elect
Cheney, Hadley, and Secretary of State­designate Powell. One line in the brief-
ing slides said that al Qaeda had sleeper cells in more than 40 countries, includ-
ing the United States.
161
Berger told us that he made a point of dropping in
on Clarke's briefing of Rice to emphasize the importance of the issue. Later
the same day, Berger met with Rice. He says that he told her the Bush admin-
istration would spend more time on terrorism in general and al Qaeda in par-
ticular than on anything else. Rice's recollection was that Berger told her she
would be surprised at how much more time she was going to spend on ter-
rorism than she expected, but that the bulk of their conversation dealt with the
faltering Middle East peace process and North Korea. Clarke said that the new
team, having been out of government for eight years, had a steep learning curve
to understand al Qaeda and the new transnational terrorist threat.
162
Organizing a New Administration
During the short transition, Rice and Hadley concentrated on staffing and
organizing the NSC.
163
Their policy priorities differed from those of the Clin-
ton administration. Those priorities included China, missile defense, the col-
lapse of the Middle East peace process, and the Persian Gulf.
164
Generally aware
that terrorism had changed since the first Bush administration, they paid par-
ticular attention to the question of how counterterrorism policy should be
coordinated. Rice had asked University of Virginia history professor Philip
Zelikow to advise her on the transition.
165
Hadley and Zelikow asked Clarke
and his deputy, Roger Cressey, for a special briefing on the terrorist threat and
how Clarke's Transnational Threats Directorate and Counterterrorism Security
Group functioned.
166
In the NSC during the first Bush administration, many tough issues were
addressed at the level of the Deputies Committee. Issues did not go to the prin-
cipals unless the deputies had been unable to resolve them. Presidential Deci-
FROM THREAT TO THREAT
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