ident into a corner.
ocating in assigning responsibility to al Qaeda, he wrote Berger on November
7 that the analysts had described their case by saying that "it has web feet, flies,
and quacks." On November 10, CIA analysts briefed the Small Group of prin-
cipals on their preliminary findings that the attack was carried out by a cell of
Yemeni residents with some ties to the transnational mujahideen network.
According to the briefing, these residents likely had some support from al
Qaeda. But the information on outside sponsorship, support, and direction of
the operation was inconclusive.The next day, Berger and Clarke told President
Clinton that while the investigation was continuing, it was becoming increas-
ingly clear that al Qaeda had planned and directed the bombing.
Bin Ladin. General Shelton tasked General Tommy Franks, the new com-
mander of CENTCOM, to look again at the options. Shelton wanted to
demonstrate that the military was imaginative and knowledgeable enough to
move on an array of options, and to show the complexity of the operations.
He briefed Berger on the "Infinite Resolve" strike options developed since
1998, which the Joint Staff and CENTCOM had refined during the summer
into a list of 13 possibilities or combinations. CENTCOM added a new
"phased campaign" concept for wider-ranging strikes, including attacks against
the Taliban. For the first time, these strikes envisioned an air campaign against
Afghanistan of indefinite duration. Military planners did not include contin-
gency planning for an invasion of Afghanistan. The concept was briefed to
Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick on December 20, and to
other officials.
sion, they believed the investigations would soon conclude that the attack had
been carried out by a large cell whose senior members belonged to al Qaeda.
Most of those involved had trained in Bin Ladinoperated camps in
Afghanistan, Berger continued. So far, Bin Ladin had not been tied person-
ally to the attack and nobody had heard him directly order it, but two intel-
ligence reports suggested that he was involved. When discussing possible
responses, though, Berger referred to the premise--al Qaeda responsibility--
as an "unproven assumption."
oping the idea with specific demands: immediate extradition of Bin Ladin and
his lieutenants to a legitimate government for trial, observable closure of all ter-