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nis also had identified Nashiri, whose links to al Qaeda and the 1998 embassy
bombings were even more well-known.
133
In other words, the Yemenis provided strong evidence connecting the Cole
attack to al Qaeda during the second half of November, identifying individ-
ual operatives whom the United States knew were part of al Qaeda. During
December the United States was able to corroborate this evidence. But the
United States did not have evidence about Bin Ladin's personal involvement
in the attacks until Nashiri and Khallad were captured in 2002 and 2003.
Considering a Response
The Cole attack prompted renewed consideration of what could be done about
al Qaeda. According to Clarke, Berger upbraided DCI Tenet so sharply after the
Cole attack--repeatedly demanding to know why the United States had to put
up with such attacks--that Tenet walked out of a meeting of the principals.
134
The CIA got some additional covert action authorities, adding several other
individuals to the coverage of the July 1999 Memorandum of Notification that
allowed the United States to develop capture operations against al Qaeda lead-
ers in a variety of places and circumstances. Tenet developed additional
options, such as strengthening relationships with the Northern Alliance and the
Uzbeks and slowing recent al Qaeda­related activities in Lebanon.
135
On the diplomatic track, Berger agreed on October 30, 2000, to let the State
Department make another approach to Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul
Jalil about expelling Bin Ladin.The national security advisor ordered that the
U.S. message "be stern and foreboding." This warning was similar to those issued
in 1998 and 1999. Meanwhile, the administration was working with Russia on
new UN sanctions against Mullah Omar's regime.
136
President Clinton told us that before he could launch further attacks on al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, or deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban threatening strikes
if they did not immediately expel Bin Ladin, the CIA or the FBI had to be sure
enough that they would "be willing to stand up in public and say, we believe
that he [Bin Ladin] did this." He said he was very frustrated that he could not
get a definitive enough answer to do something about the Cole attack.
137
Sim-
ilarly, Berger recalled that to go to war, a president needs to be able to say that
his senior intelligence and law enforcement officers have concluded who is
responsible. He recalled that the intelligence agencies had strong suspicions, but
had reached "no conclusion by the time we left office that it was al Qaeda."
138
Our only sources for what intelligence officials thought at the time are
what they said in informal briefings. Soon after the Cole attack and for the
remainder of the Clinton administration, analysts stopped distributing writ-
ten reports about who was responsible.The topic was obviously sensitive, and
both Ambassador Bodine in Yemen and CIA analysts in Washington presumed
that the government did not want reports circulating around the agencies that
FROM THREAT TO THREAT
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