al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was
supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.The two suicide opera-
tives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as
Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khal-
lad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Ladin that the new operatives were
already trained and ready to conduct the attack. Prior to departing, Nashiri gave
Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S. warship
that entered the port of Aden.
gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. Quso did not arrive at the
apartment in time to film the attack.
first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventu-
ally back to Kandahar. In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences,
spending one night at each residence. In addition, he sent his senior advisor,
Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al
Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack.
Bin Ladin) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked.
According to the source, Bin Ladin wanted the United States to attack, and if
it did not he would launch something bigger.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a
reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps
and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kash-
mir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin
Ladin, and the video was widely disseminated. Portions were aired on Al
Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. It was also disseminated among
many young men in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and caused many extremists to
travel to Afghanistan for training and jihad.Al Qaeda members considered the
video an effective tool in their struggle for preeminence among other Islamist
and jihadist movements.