On December 4, as news came in about the discoveries in Jordan, National
Security Council (NSC) Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke
wrote Berger,"If George's [Tenet's] story about a planned series of UBL attacks
at the Millennium is true, we will need to make some decisions NOW." He
told us he held several conversations with President Clinton during the crisis.
He suggested threatening reprisals against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the
event of any attacks on U.S. interests, anywhere, by Bin Ladin. He further
proposed to Berger that a strike be made during the last week of 1999 against
al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan--a proposal not adopted.
chemical weapons, the Principals Committee met on the night of Decem-
ber 8 and decided to task Clarke's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) to
develop plans to deter and disrupt al Qaeda plots.
al Qaeda attacks."Mike was not diplomatic," Clarke reported to Berger.With
virtually no evidence of a Taliban response, a new approach was made to Pak-
istan.
General Musharraf to "take whatever action you deem necessary to resolve the
Bin Laden problem at the earliest possible time." But Zinni came back empty-
handed. As Ambassador William Milam reported from Islamabad, Musharraf
was "unwilling to take the political heat at home."
counterparts. Disruption and arrest operations were mounted against terrorists
in eight countries.
proxies to detain Bin Ladin lieutenants, without having to transfer them to U.S.
custody. The authority was to capture, not kill, though lethal force might be
used if necessary.
to disrupt UBL's plans. . . .The American people are counting on you and me
to take every appropriate step to protect them during this period."The State
Department issued a worldwide threat advisory to its posts overseas.
Ahmed Ressam, 23, had illegally immigrated to Canada in 1994. Using a fal-
sified passport and a bogus story about persecution in Algeria, Ressam entered