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accounts.
120
Charities were a source of money and also provided significant
cover, which enabled operatives to travel undetected under the guise of work-
ing for a humanitarian organization.
It does not appear that any government other than the Taliban financially
supported al Qaeda before 9/11, although some governments may have con-
tained al Qaeda sympathizers who turned a blind eye to al Qaeda's fund-
raising activities.
121
Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source
of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi govern-
ment as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organ-
ization. (This conclusion does not exclude the likelihood that charities with
significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda.)
122
Still, al Qaeda found fertile fund-raising ground in Saudi Arabia, where
extreme religious views are common and charitable giving was both essential
to the culture and subject to very limited oversight.
123
Al Qaeda also sought
money from wealthy donors in other Gulf states.
Al Qaeda frequently moved the money it raised by hawala, an informal and
ancient trust-based system for transferring funds.
124
In some ways, al Qaeda had
no choice after its move to Afghanistan in 1996: first, the banking system there
was antiquated and undependable; and second, formal banking was risky due
to the scrutiny that al Qaeda received after the August 1998 East Africa embassy
bombings, including UN resolutions against it and the Taliban.
125
Bin Ladin
relied on the established hawala networks operating in Pakistan, in Dubai, and
throughout the Middle East to transfer funds efficiently. Hawaladars associated
with al Qaeda may have used banks to move and store money, as did various
al Qaeda fund-raisers and operatives outside of Afghanistan, but there is little
evidence that Bin Ladin or core al Qaeda members used banks while in
Afghanistan.
126
Before 9/11, al Qaeda spent funds as quickly as it received them.Actual ter-
rorist operations represented a relatively small part of al Qaeda's estimated $30
million annual operating budget. Al Qaeda funded salaries for jihadists, train-
ing camps, airfields, vehicles, arms, and the development of training manuals.
Bin Ladin provided approximately $10­$20 million per year to the Taliban in
return for safe haven. Bin Ladin also may have used money to create alliances
with other terrorist organizations, although it is unlikely that al Qaeda was
funding an overall jihad program. Rather, Bin Ladin selectively provided start-
up funds to new groups or money for specific terrorist operations.
127
Al Qaeda has been alleged to have used a variety of illegitimate means, par-
ticularly drug trafficking and conflict diamonds, to finance itself.While the drug
trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose
for al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in
or made his money through drug trafficking.
128
Similarly, we have seen no per-
suasive evidence that al Qaeda funded itself by trading in African conflict dia-
monds.
129
There also have been claims that al Qaeda financed itself through
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