preparations for the 9/11 operation, KSM worked with and eventually led al
Qaeda's media committee. But KSM states he refused to swear a formal oath
of allegiance to Bin Ladin, thereby retaining a last vestige of his cherished
autonomy.
he continued to consider other possibilities for terrorist attacks. For example,
he sent al Qaeda operative Issa al Britani to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to learn
about the jihad in Southeast Asia from Hambali.Thereafter, KSM claims, at Bin
Ladin's direction in early 2001, he sent Britani to the United States to case
potential economic and "Jewish" targets in New York City. Furthermore, dur-
ing the summer of 2001, KSM approached Bin Ladin with the idea of recruit-
ing a Saudi Arabian air force pilot to commandeer a Saudi fighter jet and attack
the Israeli city of Eilat. Bin Ladin reportedly liked this proposal, but he
instructed KSM to concentrate on the 9/11 operation first. Similarly, KSM's
proposals to Atef around this same time for attacks in Thailand, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Maldives were never executed, although Hambali's Jemaah
Islamiah operatives did some casing of possible targets.
Co-workers describe him as an intelligent, efficient, and even-tempered man-
ager who approached his projects with a single-minded dedication that he
expected his colleagues to share. Al Qaeda associate Abu Zubaydah has
expressed more qualified admiration for KSM's innate creativity, emphasiz-
ing instead his ability to incorporate the improvements suggested by others.
Nashiri has been similarly measured, observing that although KSM floated
many general ideas for attacks, he rarely conceived a specific operation him-
self.
relationships.
Al Qaeda's success in fostering terrorism in Southeast Asia stems largely from
its close relationship with Jemaah Islamiah (JI). In that relationship, Hambali
became the key coordinator. Born and educated in Indonesia, Hambali moved
to Malaysia in the early 1980s to find work.There he claims to have become
a follower of the Islamist extremist teachings of various clerics, including one
named Abdullah Sungkar. Sungkar first inspired Hambali to share the vision of
establishing a radical Islamist regime in Southeast Asia, then furthered Ham-
bali's instruction in jihad by sending him to Afghanistan in 1986.After under-
going training at Rasul Sayyaf 's Sada camp (where KSM would later train),
Hambali fought against the Soviets; he eventually returned to Malaysia after 18