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that Bin Ladin likely agreed to meet with him because of the renown of his
nephew,Yousef.
10
At the meeting, KSM briefed Bin Ladin and Atef on the first World Trade
Center bombing, the Manila air plot, the cargo carriers plan, and other activi-
ties pursued by KSM and his colleagues in the Philippines. KSM also presented
a proposal for an operation that would involve training pilots who would crash
planes into buildings in the United States. This proposal eventually would
become the 9/11 operation.
11
KSM knew that the successful staging of such an attack would require per-
sonnel, money, and logistical support that only an extensive and well-funded
organization like al Qaeda could provide. He thought the operation might
appeal to Bin Ladin, who had a long record of denouncing the United States.
12
From KSM's perspective, Bin Ladin was in the process of consolidating his
new position in Afghanistan while hearing out others' ideas, and had not yet
settled on an agenda for future anti-U.S. operations.At the meeting, Bin Ladin
listened to KSM's ideas without much comment, but did ask KSM formally to
join al Qaeda and move his family to Afghanistan.
13
KSM declined. He preferred to remain independent and retain the option
of working with other mujahideen groups still operating in Afghanistan,
including the group led by his old mentor, Sayyaf. Sayyaf was close to Ahmed
Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Therefore working with
him might be a problem for KSM because Bin Ladin was building ties to the
rival Taliban.
After meeting with Bin Ladin, KSM says he journeyed onward to India,
Indonesia, and Malaysia, where he met with Jemaah Islamiah's Hambali. Ham-
bali was an Indonesian veteran of the Afghan war looking to expand the jihad
into Southeast Asia. In Iran, KSM rejoined his family and arranged to move
them to Karachi; he claims to have relocated by January 1997.
14
After settling his family in Karachi, KSM tried to join the mujahid leader Ibn
al Khattab in Chechnya. Unable to travel through Azerbaijan, KSM returned to
Karachi and then to Afghanistan to renew contacts with Bin Ladin and his col-
leagues.Though KSM may not have been a member of al Qaeda at this time, he
admits traveling frequently between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1997 and the first
half of 1998, visiting Bin Ladin and cultivating relationships with his lieutenants,
Atef and Sayf al Adl, by assisting them with computer and media projects.
15
According to KSM, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam marked a watershed in the evolution of the 9/11 plot.
KSM claims these bombings convinced him that Bin Ladin was truly com-
mitted to attacking the United States. He continued to make himself useful,
collecting news articles and helping other al Qaeda members with their out-
dated computer equipment. Bin Ladin, apparently at Atef 's urging, finally
decided to give KSM the green light for the 9/11 operation sometime in late
1998 or early 1999.
16
AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND
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