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picture also seemed discouraging. Several disruptions and renditions aimed
against the broader al Qaeda network had succeeded.

187

But covert action

efforts in Afghanistan had not been fruitful.

In mid-1999, new leaders arrived at the Counterterrorist Center and the

Bin Ladin unit. The new director of CTC, replacing "Jeff," was Cofer Black.
The new head of the section that included the Bin Ladin unit was "Richard."
Black, "Richard," and their colleagues began working on a new operational
strategy for attacking al Qaeda; their starting point was to get better intelli-
gence, relying more on the CIA's own sources and less on the tribals.

188

In July 1999, President Clinton authorized the CIA to work with several

governments to capture Bin Ladin, and extended the scope of efforts to Bin
Ladin's principal lieutenants.The President reportedly also authorized a covert
action under carefully limited circumstances which, if successful, would have
resulted in Bin Ladin's death.

189

Attorney General Reno again expressed con-

cerns on policy grounds. She was worried about the danger of retaliation.The
CIA also developed the short-lived effort to work with a Pakistani team that
we discussed earlier, and an initiative to work with Uzbekistan.The Uzbeks
needed basic equipment and training. No action could be expected before
March 2000, at the earliest.

190

In fall 1999, DCI Tenet unveiled the CIA's new Bin Ladin strategy. It was

called, simply,"the Plan."The Plan proposed continuing disruption and rendi-
tion operations worldwide. It announced a program for hiring and training bet-
ter officers with counterterrorism skills, recruiting more assets, and trying to
penetrate al Qaeda's ranks. The Plan aimed to close gaps in technical intelli-
gence collection (signal and imagery) as well. In addition, the CIA would
increase contacts with the Northern Alliance rebels fighting the Taliban.

191

With a new operational strategy, the CIA evaluated its capture options. None

scored high marks.The CIA had no confidence in the Pakistani effort. In the
event that Bin Ladin traveled to the Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan,
the tribal network there was unlikely to attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin; the
Counterterrorist Center rated the chance of success at less than 10 percent.To
the northwest, the Uzbeks might be ready for a cross-border sortie in six
months; their chance of success was also rated at less than 10 percent.

192

In the northeast were Massoud's Northern Alliance forces--perhaps the

CIA's best option. In late October, a group of officers from the Counterter-
rorist Center flew into the Panjshir Valley to meet up with Massoud, a haz-
ardous journey in rickety helicopters that would be repeated several times in
the future. Massoud appeared committed to helping the United States collect
intelligence on Bin Ladin's activities and whereabouts and agreed to try to cap-
ture him if the opportunity arose. The Bin Ladin unit was satisfied that its
reporting on Bin Ladin would now have a second source. But it also knew that
Massoud would act against Bin Ladin only if his own interests and those of the

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