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mat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan rad-
icals offered a counterbalance to "Iranian dangers" in the region, but he also
noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States.
167
Looking for New Partners
Although not all CIA officers had lost faith in the tribals' capabilities--many
judged them to be good reporters--few believed they would carry out an
ambush of Bin Ladin.The chief of the Counterterrorist Center compared rely-
ing on the tribals to playing the lottery.
168
He and his associates, supported by
Clarke, pressed for developing a partnership with the Northern Alliance, even
though doing so might bring the United States squarely behind one side in
Afghanistan's long-running civil war.
The Northern Alliance was dominated by Tajiks and drew its strength
mainly from the northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. In contrast,Taliban
members came principally from Afghanistan's most numerous ethnic group, the
Pashtuns, who are concentrated in the southern part of the country, extending
into the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan.
169
Because of the Taliban's behavior and its association with Pakistan, the
Northern Alliance had been able at various times to obtain assistance from
Russia, Iran, and India.The alliance's leader was Afghanistan's most renowned
military commander,Ahmed Shah Massoud. Reflective and charismatic, he had
been one of the true heroes of the war against the Soviets. But his bands had
been charged with more than one massacre, and the Northern Alliance was
widely thought to finance itself in part through trade in heroin. Nor had Mas-
soud shown much aptitude for governing except as a ruthless warlord. Never-
theless, Tenet told us Massoud seemed the most interesting possible new ally
against Bin Ladin.
170
In February 1999,Tenet sought President Clinton's authorization to enlist
Massoud and his forces as partners. In response to this request, the President
signed the Memorandum of Notification whose language he personally
altered.Tenet says he saw no significance in the President's changes. So far as
he was concerned, it was the language of August 1998, expressing a preference
for capture but accepting the possibility that Bin Ladin could not be brought
out alive."We were plowing the same ground,"Tenet said.
171
CIA officers described Massoud's reaction when he heard that the United
States wanted him to capture and not kill Bin Ladin. One characterized Mas-
soud's body language as "a wince." Schroen recalled Massoud's response as "You
guys are crazy--you haven't changed a bit." In Schroen's opinion, the capture
proviso inhibited Massoud and his forces from going after Bin Ladin but did
not completely stop them.
172
The idea, however, was a long shot. Bin Ladin's
usual base of activity was near Kandahar, far from the front lines of Taliban oper-
ations against the Northern Alliance.
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
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