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and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential reper-
cussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to
take the shot from Washington and walk away from it.We had to live there."
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Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism
capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that
he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from
Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial govern-
ments.
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After the decision--in which fear of collateral damage was an important fac-
tor--not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton
and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship
instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the
version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky" can fly in fast or from high altitude,
undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electron-
ics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projec-
tiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise
missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving
Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed
Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations
Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Ladin's head-
quarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan.The Joint Staff prepared a decision
paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft.
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Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the
AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed
their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed
that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option.
He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never
thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into
position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option
feasible.
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The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is
that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would
require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle
East or South Asia.The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unre-
fueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles.They needed search-and-rescue
backup, which would have still less range.Thus an AC-130 deployment had to
be embedded in a wider political and military concept involving Pakistan or
other neighboring countries to address issues relating to basing and overflight.
No one ever put such an initiative on the table. Zinni therefore cautioned about
simply ordering up AC-130 deployments for a quick strike; Schoomaker
planned for what he saw as a practical strike option; and the underlying issues
were not fully engaged. The Joint Staff decision paper was never turned into
an interagency policy paper.
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
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