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but they had been limited by their abilities and "by our beliefs and laws we
have to respect."
126
Schroen and "Mike" were impressed by the tribals' reaction. Schroen cabled
that the tribals were not in it for the money but as an investment in the future
of Afghanistan. "Mike" agreed that the tribals' reluctance to kill was not a
"showstopper." "From our view," he wrote, "that seems in character and fair
enough."
127
Policymakers in the Clinton administration, including the President and his
national security advisor, told us that the President's intent regarding covert
action against Bin Ladin was clear: he wanted him dead.This intent was never
well communicated or understood within the CIA. Tenet told the Commis-
sion that except in one specific case (discussed later), the CIA was authorized
to kill Bin Ladin only in the context of a capture operation. CIA senior man-
agers, operators, and lawyers confirmed this understanding."We always talked
about how much easier it would have been to kill him," a former chief of the
Bin Ladin unit said.
128
In February 1999, another draft Memorandum of Notification went to Pres-
ident Clinton. It asked him to allow the CIA to give exactly the same guidance
to the Northern Alliance as had just been given to the tribals: they could kill
Bin Ladin if a successful capture operation was not feasible. On this occasion,
however, President Clinton crossed out key language he had approved in
December and inserted more ambiguous language. No one we interviewed
could shed light on why the President did this. President Clinton told the Com-
mission that he had no recollection of why he rewrote the language.
129
Later in 1999, when legal authority was needed for enlisting still other col-
laborators and for covering a wider set of contingencies, the lawyers returned
to the language used in August 1998, which authorized force only in the con-
text of a capture operation. Given the closely held character of the document
approved in December 1998, and the subsequent return to the earlier language,
it is possible to understand how the former White House officials and the CIA
officials might disagree as to whether the CIA was ever authorized by the Pres-
ident to kill Bin Ladin.
130
The dispute turned out to be somewhat academic, as the limits of available
legal authority were not tested. Clarke commented to Berger that "despite
`expanded' authority for CIA's sources to engage in direct action, they have
shown no inclination to do so." He added that it was his impression that the
CIA thought the tribals unlikely to act against Bin Ladin and hence relying on
them was "unrealistic."
131
Events seemed to bear him out, since the tribals did
not stage an attack on Bin Ladin or his associates during 1999.
The tribals remained active collectors of intelligence, however, providing
good but not predictive information about Bin Ladin's whereabouts.The CIA
also tried to improve its intelligence reporting on Bin Ladin by what Tenet's
assistant director for collection, the indefatigable Charles Allen, called an "all-
out, all-agency, seven-days-a-week" effort.
132
The effort might have had an
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