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on the battlefield against the Northern Alliance--and criminalize giving them
arms and providing military "advisers," which Pakistan had been doing.
94
Yet
the passage of the resolution had no visible effect on Omar, nor did it halt the
flow of Pakistani military assistance to the Taliban.
95
U.S. authorities had continued to try to get cooperation from Pakistan in
pressing the Taliban to stop sheltering Bin Ladin. President Clinton contacted
Sharif again in June 1999, partly to discuss the crisis with India but also to urge
Sharif, "in the strongest way I can," to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin
Ladin.
96
The President suggested that Pakistan use its control over oil supplies
to the Taliban and over Afghan imports through Karachi. Sharif suggested
instead that Pakistani forces might try to capture Bin Ladin themselves.
Though no one in Washington thought this was likely to happen, President
Clinton gave the idea his blessing.
97
The President met with Sharif in Washington in early July. Though the
meeting's main purpose was to seal the Pakistani prime minister's decision to
withdraw from the Kargil confrontation in Kashmir, President Clinton com-
plained about Pakistan's failure to take effective action with respect to the Tal-
iban and Bin Ladin. Sharif came back to his earlier proposal and won approval
for U.S. assistance in training a Pakistani special forces team for an operation
against Bin Ladin. Then, in October 1999, Sharif was deposed by General Per-
vez Musharraf, and the plan was terminated.
98
At first, the Clinton administration hoped that Musharraf 's coup might cre-
ate an opening for action on Bin Ladin. A career military officer, Musharraf
was thought to have the political strength to confront and influence the Pak-
istani military intelligence service, which supported the Taliban. Berger spec-
ulated that the new government might use Bin Ladin to buy concessions from
Washington, but neither side ever developed such an initiative.
99
By late 1999, more than a year after the embassy bombings, diplomacy with
Pakistan, like the efforts with the Taliban, had, according to Under Secretary
of State Thomas Pickering,"borne little fruit."
100
4.4 COVERT ACTION
As part of the response to the embassy bombings, President Clinton signed a
Memorandum of Notification authorizing the CIA to let its tribal assets use
force to capture Bin Ladin and his associates. CIA officers told the tribals that
the plan to capture Bin Ladin, which had been "turned off " three months ear-
lier, was back on.The memorandum also authorized the CIA to attack Bin Ladin
in other ways. Also, an executive order froze financial holdings that could be
linked to Bin Ladin.
101
The counterterrorism staff at CIA thought it was gaining a better under-
standing of Bin Ladin and his network. In preparation for briefing the Senate
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