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able targets were not promising. The experience of the previous week, he
wrote, "has only confirmed the importance of defining a clearly articulated
rationale for military action" that was effective as well as justified. But Slocombe
worried that simply striking some of these available targets did not add up to
an effective strategy.
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Defense officials at a lower level, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, tried to meet Slocombe's
objections.They developed a plan that, unlike Clarke's, called not for particu-
lar strikes but instead for a broad change in national strategy and in the insti-
tutional approach of the Department of Defense, implying a possible need for
large-scale operations across the whole spectrum of U.S. military capabilities.
It urged the department to become a lead agency in driving a national coun-
terterrorism strategy forward, to "champion a national effort to take up the
gauntlet that international terrorists have thrown at our feet." The authors
expressed concern that "we have not fundamentally altered our philosophy or
our approach" even though the terrorist threat had grown. They outlined an
eight-part strategy "to be more proactive and aggressive." The future, they
warned, might bring "horrific attacks," in which case "we will have no choice
nor, unfortunately, will we have a plan."The assistant secretary, Allen Holmes,
took the paper to Slocombe's chief deputy, Jan Lodal, but it went no further.
Its lead author recalls being told by Holmes that Lodal thought it was too
aggressive. Holmes cannot recall what was said, and Lodal cannot remember
the episode or the paper at all.
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4.3 DIPLOMACY
After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed
no more promising than military options.The United States had issued a for-
mal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly
responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out
by the Bin Ladin network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to
it.
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For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have
shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Ladin. On August 22, the
reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the
strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue
with the United States on Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan.
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Meeting in
Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan,Taliban dele-
gates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but
asked what would happen to Bin Ladin should he be sent to Saudi Arabia.
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Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mul-
lah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Ladin, the
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
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