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set a bomb in an attempt to kill U.S. troops in Aden in 1992. State Department
sources even saw suspicious links with Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind
Sheikh" in the New York area, commenting that Bin Ladin seemed "commit-
ted to financing `Jihads' against `anti Islamic' regimes worldwide." After the
department designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, it put Bin
Ladin on its TIPOFF watchlist, a move that might have prevented his getting
a visa had he tried to enter the United States. As late as 1997, however, even
the CIA's Counterterrorist Center continued to describe him as an "extrem-
ist financier."
1
In 1996, the CIA set up a special unit of a dozen officers to analyze intelli-
gence on and plan operations against Bin Ladin. David Cohen, the head of the
CIA's Directorate of Operations, wanted to test the idea of having a "virtual
station"--a station based at headquarters but collecting and operating against
a subject much as stations in the field focus on a country.Taking his cue from
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who expressed special interest in ter-
rorist finance, Cohen formed his virtual station as a terrorist financial links unit.
He had trouble getting any Directorate of Operations officer to run it; he finally
recruited a former analyst who was then running the Islamic Extremist Branch
of the Counterterrorist Center.This officer, who was especially knowledgeable
about Afghanistan, had noticed a recent stream of reports about Bin Ladin and
something called al Qaeda, and suggested to Cohen that the station focus on
this one individual. Cohen agreed.Thus was born the Bin Ladin unit.
2
In May 1996, Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan. A few months later, as
the Bin Ladin unit was gearing up, Jamal Ahmed al Fadl walked into a U.S.
embassy in Africa, established his bona fides as a former senior employee of Bin
Ladin, and provided a major breakthrough of intelligence on the creation, char-
acter, direction, and intentions of al Qaeda. Corroborating evidence came from
another walk-in source at a different U.S. embassy. More confirmation was sup-
plied later that year by intelligence and other sources, including material gath-
ered by FBI agents and Kenyan police from an al Qaeda cell in Nairobi.
3
By 1997, officers in the Bin Ladin unit recognized that Bin Ladin was more
than just a financier.They learned that al Qaeda had a military committee that
was planning operations against U.S. interests worldwide and was actively try-
ing to obtain nuclear material. Analysts assigned to the station looked at the
information it had gathered and "found connections everywhere," including
links to the attacks on U.S. troops in Aden and Somalia in 1992 and 1993 and
to the Manila air plot in the Philippines in 1994­1995.
4
The Bin Ladin station was already working on plans for offensive opera-
tions against Bin Ladin.These plans were directed at both physical assets and
sources of finance. In the end, plans to identify and attack Bin Ladin's money
sources did not go forward.
5
In late 1995, when Bin Ladin was still in Sudan, the State Department and
the CIA learned that Sudanese officials were discussing with the Saudi gov-
RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS
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