background image
disco in Berlin, killing two American soldiers. Intelligence clearly linked the
bombing to Libya's Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. President Reagan ordered air
strikes against Libya.The operation was not cost free: the United States lost two
planes. Evidence accumulated later, including the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
103, clearly showed that the operation did not curb Qadhafi's interest in ter-
rorism. However, it was seen at the time as a success.The lesson then taken from
Libya was that terrorism could be stopped by the use of U.S. air power that
inflicted pain on the authors or sponsors of terrorist acts.
This lesson was applied, using Tomahawk missiles, early in the Clinton
administration. George H.W. Bush was scheduled to visit Kuwait to be hon-
ored for his rescue of that country in the Gulf War of 1991. Kuwaiti security
services warned Washington that Iraqi agents were planning to assassinate the
former president. President Clinton not only ordered precautions to protect
Bush but asked about options for a reprisal against Iraq.The Pentagon proposed
12 targets for Tomahawk missiles. Debate in the White House and at the CIA
about possible collateral damage pared the list down to three, then to one--
Iraqi intelligence headquarters in central Baghdad. The attack was made at
night, to minimize civilian casualties.Twenty-three missiles were fired. Other
than one civilian casualty, the operation seemed completely successful: the
intelligence headquarters was demolished. No further intelligence came in
about terrorist acts planned by Iraq.
94
The 1986 attack in Libya and the 1993 attack on Iraq symbolized for the
military establishment effective use of military power for counterterrorism--
limited retaliation with air power, aimed at deterrence.What remained was the
hard question of how deterrence could be effective when the adversary was a
loose transnational network.
3.6 . . . AND IN THE WHITE HOUSE
Because coping with terrorism was not (and is not) the sole province of any
component of the U.S. government, some coordinating mechanism is neces-
sary.When terrorism was not a prominent issue, the State Department could
perform this role. When the Iranian hostage crisis developed, this procedure
went by the board: National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski took charge
of crisis management.
The Reagan administration continued and formalized the practice of hav-
ing presidential staff coordinate counterterrorism. After the killing of the
marines in Beirut, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 138,
calling for a "shift . . . from passive to active defense measures" and reprogram-
ming or adding new resources to effect the shift. It directed the State Depart-
ment "to intensify efforts to achieve cooperation of other governments" and
the CIA to "intensify use of liaison and other intelligence capabilities and also
98
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 98