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deployed abroad.They involved a number of defensive measures, including cau-
tion not only about strange cars and trucks but also about unknown aircraft
overhead. "Force protection" became a significant claim on the time and
resources of the Department of Defense.
A decade later, the military establishment had another experience that
evoked both Desert One and the withdrawal from Beirut.The first President
Bush had authorized the use of U.S. military forces to ensure humanitarian
relief in war-torn Somalia.Tribal factions interfered with the supply missions.
By the autumn of 1993, U.S. commanders concluded that the main source of
trouble was a warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aidid. An Army special force
launched a raid on Mogadishu to capture him. In the course of a long night,
two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, 73 Americans were wounded,
18 were killed, and the world's television screens showed images of an Amer-
ican corpse dragged through the streets by exultant Somalis. Under pressure
from Congress, President Clinton soon ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
"Black Hawk down" joined "Desert One" as a symbol among Americans in
uniform, code phrases used to evoke the risks of daring exploits without max-
imum preparation, overwhelming force, and a well-defined mission.
In 1995­1996, the Defense Department began to invest effort in planning
how to handle the possibility of a domestic terrorist incident involving
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The idea of a domestic command for
homeland defense began to be discussed in 1997, and in 1999 the Joint Chiefs
developed a concept for the establishment of a domestic Unified Command.
Congress killed the idea. Instead, the Department established the Joint Forces
Command, located at Norfolk, Virginia, making it responsible for military
response to domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made.
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Pursuant to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program,
the Defense Department began in 1997 to train first responders in 120 of the
nation's largest cities.As a key part of its efforts, Defense created National Guard
WMD Civil Support Teams to respond in the event of a WMD terrorist inci-
dent. A total of 32 such National Guard teams were authorized by fiscal year
2001. Under the command of state governors, they provided support to civil-
ian agencies to assess the nature of the attack, offer medical and technical advice,
and coordinate state and local responses.
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The Department of Defense, like the Department of State, had a coordina-
tor who represented the department on the interagency committee concerned
with counterterrorism. By the end of President Clinton's first term, this offi-
cial had become the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and
low-intensity conflict.
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The experience of the 1980s had suggested to the military establishment
that if it were to have a role in counterterrorism, it would be a traditional mil-
itary role--to act against state sponsors of terrorism.And the military had what
seemed an excellent example of how to do it. In 1986, a bomb went off at a
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