pressures from the air carriers to control security costs and to "limit the impact
of security requirements on aviation operations, so that the industry could con-
centrate on its primary mission of moving passengers and aircraft. . . . [T]hose
counterpressures in turn manifested themselves as significant weaknesses in
security."A longtime FAA security official described the air carriers' approach
to security regulation as "decry, deny and delay" and told us that while "the air
carriers had seen the enlightened hand of self-interest with respect to safety,
they hadn't seen it in the security arena."
elaborated over decades of experience with scores of hijackings, beginning in
the 1960s. It taught flight crews that the best way to deal with hijackers was to
accommodate their demands, get the plane to land safely, and then let law
enforcement or the military handle the situation. According to the FAA, the
record had shown that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was
to end peacefully. The strategy operated on the fundamental assumption that
hijackers issue negotiable demands (most often for asylum or the release of pris-
oners) and that, as one FAA official put it,"suicide wasn't in the game plan" of
hijackers. FAA training material provided no guidance for flight crews should
violence occur.
a hijacking.As the chairman of the Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots
Association observed when proposals were made in early 2001 to install rein-
forced cockpit doors in commercial aircraft,"Even if you make a vault out of
the door, if they have a noose around my flight attendant's neck, I'm going to
open the door." Prior to 9/11, FAA regulations mandated that cockpit doors
permit ready access into and out of the cockpit in the event of an emergency.
Even so, rules implemented in the 1960s required air crews to keep the cock-
pit door closed and locked in flight.This requirement was not always observed
or vigorously enforced.
when in transit to provide security on international departures. This policy
reflected the FAA's view that domestic hijacking was in check--a view held
confidently as no terrorist had hijacked a U.S. commercial aircraft anywhere in
the world since 1986.
ership focused elsewhere, including on operational concerns and the
ever-present issue of safety. FAA Administrator Garvey recalled that "every day
in 2001 was like the day before Thanksgiving." Heeding calls for improved air