SOVIET STAFF STUDY
THE FAILURE-OF THE SOVJET=TUOQSUV. RAPPROCHEMENT (Reference Titles^ CAESARnd
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Genesis of Party
Yugoslavia's Role in New Soviet
Achievements and Obstacles in the First
Mounting Crisis in tho
The Effect of8
The Yugoslav Party
Intensification of the
This studyorking; paper circulated to analysts of Soviet affairsontribution to current Interpretation of Soviet policy. This particular study is parteriesunder the general title "Projectesigned to ensure the systematic examination of information on the leading members of the Soviet hierarchy, their political associations, and the policies with which they have been identified.
THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT
The breakdown of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in recent months can best be approachedeview of Moscow's expectations when the rapprochement began and the uneven course of relations since that time. The difficulties that beset the rapprochement and that have led to its failure resulted from Nikita Khrushchev's policy of trying to establish party relations with and toYugoslavia into the bloc. If Moscow had been content to accept Yugoslavia as':an independent neutral, and thohad refrained from meddling too actively in satellite affairs, Belgrade's demonstrated willingness tooreign policy close to that of the USSR would have precluded sorious conflicts between the two states.
For over three years, even before Khrushchevoviet delegation to Belgrade inhe aim of restoring it to tbe bloc underlay Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. Essentially, this was Khrushchev's policy, apparently originated by him and publicly associated with him ever since his visit to Belgrade. It contrasted with the views of Molotov, and perhaps other Soviet leaders: to treat Yugoslavia simplyeutral and thus to avoid the risks of seeking its ro-entry into "tho Soviet camp."
After the party breakhrushchev,peechune at the Bulgarian party congress,lear description of these two different objectives.
It is not disputed that those who struggle for socialism consistently struggle for the'*cause of peace. But many leaders who do not support the principles of socialism also struggle forhus in the struggle for peace, forces and organizations of various views and political opinions can bo united. It is another question when we speak of the struggle for the victory oft is necessary to strengthen in every way cooperation between all states in the struggle for peace and for the security of nations. We want to maintain such relations with theFederal Republic. But we, as Communists, would like more. We would like to reach mutual understanding and cooperation on the party plane.
Although when Khrushchev spoke he had in fact given up the hope of party ties with Tito, thisood description of the views he had held
The fact that Khrushchev was closely identified with the policy toward Yugoslavia wasajor reason why that policy remained unchanged-for so long despite the evidence that Tito would not associate himself with the bloc on Moscow's terms. There was speculation that Soviet criticism of Yugoslavia after the Hungarian revolution indicated thatime Khrushchev did not have complete control over this aspect ofut, on the other hand, the improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations later7 was attributed to his efforts.
Therefore, the change in Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia in April and8 inevitably raised speculation that Khrushchev's leadership was again being challenged or that he was under heavy pressure from other leaders to shift his policy. eview of Soviet-Yugoslav relations suggests, however, that while such pressure on Khrushchevossibility it is not necessary as an explanation for the reversal of Soviet policy. Khrushchevumber of occasions in the last three years has expressed views concerning relations with Belgrade that were clearly in conflict with Yugoslav concepts.
The break with Yugoslaviay-product of the decision to impose much stricter standards of conformity on the bloc. ajor step In that direction was the meeting ln Moscownh anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and thepartyocument not signed by the Yugoslav party. Soviet-Yugoslav relations cooled noticeably after that.
The break was precipitated by the Yugoslav party congress in8 and the party program drawn up for approval by the congress. The DSSR was forced to decide whether or not to send delegates. It feltustification of its negative decision was necessary, particularly in order to assure complete blocwith the decision. Moreover, it felt that tho Yugoslav party program was an ideological threat to the bloc. Vhenon the program failed to move the Yugoslavsthe Soviet leaders finally recognized that Belgrade could not be shaken from its insistence on independence. Moscow then decided that Belgrade must be discredited to destroy its influence, existing or potential. In the bloc. While Soviet dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia and concern over bloc discipline had been growingong time, the Yugoslav party congressirmregarding relations with Yugoslavia.
The Genesis of Party Rapprochement: The normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav governmental relations started soon after Stalin's death and gained momentum in the last half Although
public Soviet statements in this period centered on the need for improving state relations, there vere indications that intalks the Russians were alreadyarty rapprochement. Yugoslav Vice President KardelJestern Journalist that, in numerous socrot talksoviet officials had sounded the Yugoslavs out on the prospect for renewed party relations, had recognized tbe Yugoslav principle of "many roads tond had sought ways of drawing Yugoslavia back into the bloc. Tito said privately in5 that the Russians wantedback In the Cominform. The Yugoslavs insisted to Wost-erners that they were rebuffing such approaches.
The Soviot Interestarty accord with Yugoslavia was made public inhen Khrushchev arrived at Belgrade airport tolea for the "re-establishment of mutualbetween the two parties. Placing primary blame one wont as far as could have been expected in admitting Soviet responsibility for the breakdown In relations. Khrushchev apparently considered that this apology was the major prerequisite to re-establishing party contacts. How much this subject wasduring the visit is not known. The Yugoslavs, whoto Westerners that they had resisted Soviet approaches for party contacts, were probably overstating tbeir case. Theaccepted an important Yugoslav thesis by agreeing ln the Joint communique that "different forms of development ofare the exclusive business of tho peoples of tbo roBpoctive countries." The communique said nothing specifically, however, about establishing party relations although thereeference to cooperation between "social organizations."
During the Belgrade meeting, outstanding Soviet-Yugoslav differences were not settled but appear to have been Ignored by mutual agreement. Khrusbchev told tho Bulgarian party congress8 that Tito agreed to forget past differences andew basis for relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Khrushchev said that the Soviot party was willing to do this even though it recognized that there remainedumber of Important questions." His statement makes it clear tbat he expected the Yugoslavs gradually to conform to the Soviet viewpoint on these Issues.
* Subsequently it has been reported that Khrushchev originally proposed that both DJilas and Beria be blamed for the break.
Khrushchev has claimedpeech to the East German party congress in Berlin on that during the Belgradethe Soviet leaders made it clear that they felt8 Cominform criticisms of Yugoslavia bad been correct. There Is other evldeoce that within the Soviet party at least, thiswas maintained at that time. In accord with the agreement to ignore past differences, however, this question was apparently not stressed and was ignored in public statements. The Soviet leadership does appear to have been concerned at tbe Belgrade meeting with the problem of American aid to Yugoslavia and is believed to have asked unsuccessfully for Yugoslav assurances that this would soon end.
Yugoslavia's Role in New Soviet Bloc: Khrushchev's decision openly lo seek Yugoslav "membership in "the socialist camp"old move and perhaps an Impetuous one which he had not thoroughly considered ln all its implications. Khrushchev recognized that Tito did not want to become dependent on the Vest and did not feel comfortable ln his Vestern alignment. He seems, however, to have underestimated Yugoslavia's passion for independence. He overestimated the attractions for Yugoslavia to return to the "socialist" fold. An optimistic and militant Communist,believed there was no place for "socialist" states outside "the socialist camp." ravda editorial onis views.
Adherence to the necessary socialist foreign and domestic policy, the expansion and strengthening of political and economic ties, and cooperation on the part of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies are of greatto the further development of Yugoslavia along the road of socialism.
Khrushchev's alms with regard to Yugoslavia cannot beexcept in the context of his plans for replacing themethods of control over the satellites. He Intended toore loosely knit bloc, with control based less on force and economic exploitation. He apparently had not carefully thought out his plans, however, or clarified his intentions enough so that other bloc leaders knew what to expect. He had certainly not fully appreciated the risks of the new policy.
Khrushchev's plan for the Soviet bloc both permitted and necessitated the reincorporation of Yugoslavia. ore loosely knit bloc, it would be possible to permitat least tcmporarlly--an extraordinary degree of freedom of action. Conversely,eriod of liberalization, Yugoslavia
mightource of dissension if lt were permitted to remain as an Independent center of Communism. Khrushchev was taking the risk that Yugoslavia mightreater unsettling effect if lt wore encouraged to expand its contacts with the satellites while tbe party rapprochement was in process and Yugoslavia was Still largely independent. Parenthetically, lt should be noted that Khrushchev's revised concept of the bloc was not only in-tended to accommodate Yugoslavia but to recognize the fact of China's more Independent position. Tbo trip to Belgrade ln5 followed Khrushchev's and Bulganln's visit to Peiping in the autumn
The Soviet leaders had other roasons forapproche ment with Tito. Their action, showing tbat Stalinism was dead, contributed to the general Soviet campaign for reduced tensions and Improved relations with the West. This had an Important, but only temporary, effect on world opinion. As tho Sovietbecame more clearly one of drawing Yugoslavia back into the bloc, lt appeared monacing rather than reassuring to the West. Tho ontiro campaign stimulated Western distrust ofand consequently woakened Yugoslavia's ties with the West, making Belgrade more dependent on the USSR.
Achievements and Obstacles in the First Year: In the year that followed the Belgrade visit inoviet-Yugoslav governmental relations boomed. There were agreements on trade, loans, and nuclear cooperation. Ideological differences were not apparent In the press. Although Yugoslavia sent notoh party congress, Tito didordial message. While Informal talks may have occurred, there were no formal contacts or discussions at the party level during this first year. The Yugoslavs warmly welcomed the decisions of the party congress which pointed to further liberalization inpolicies and seemed to cater to Yugoslav principles. The attack on Stalin revealed later was especially welcome to Tbe dissolution of the Comlnform in6 was also consldored tooncession to Tito.
Tho first year was climaxed by Tito's visit to the Soviet Union ln early Khrushchev and Tito signed acalling for tho "further developmont of relations and cooperation" between the two parties, implying thero had boon some previous unpubliclzed relations. Tbo communique listed some specific forms ofexchange ofand meetings of partyit spelled out In more detail tbe principles of the Belgrade declaration drawnear earlier which were dear to the Yugoslavs.
The ways of socialist development vary incountries and conditions, the wealthof the development of socialismto its
should be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the contentious issues between our parties.
Behind this facade of agreement, however, certain major disagreements continued to exist between Tito and Khrushchev, some of which were suggested by events during the Moscow The fundamental difference Involved the question ofparticipation in the bloc. In tho final speeches in Moscow, Khrushchev spokemonolithic closing of ranks and unity among tho socialist countries." He stressed the paramountof unity among the bloc states and the role that inter-party cooperation played in creating such unity; he implied that Yugoslav-Soviet party relations were essential ln order toimilar unity between the two states. He asserted that Western "friendship" for Yugoslavia was false, intended only for the malicious purpose of winning Yugoslavia away fromito, by contrast, emphasized that there were different "roads to socialism" and that "our way, too, differs somewhat from the road you traversed." He stressed Yugoslavia's interest lngood relations with nonbloc countries.
There were numerous reports, some of them not received until later, of specific differences that underlay these contrasting speeches. The USSR was critical of Yugoslav dependence on trade and aid from the West. There were sharp ideological debates in Moscow. The USSR allegedly pressed Yugoslavia toew international Communist organization. Moscow also reportedly criticized Yugoslavia's failure to recognize East Germany.
Tito disclosed later in his Pula speech oo6 that differences over formulations on party relations in the Moscow declaration were
a little difficult to settle. Here we could not completely agree but, nevertheless, the declaration was issued which, in our opinion, is intendedider circle than Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We warned that those tendencies which once provoked such strongin Yugoslavia existed in all countries, and that one day they might find expression in other countries, too, when this would be far more difficult to correct.
Tito also claimed to have argued that
Rakosi's regime and Rakosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state and to bring about inner unity, but that, on the contrary, their actions could only bring about grave consequences. the Soviet comrades did not believehe Soviet comrades said ho (Rakosi) was prudent, that he was going to succeed, and that they knew of no one else on whom they could rely in that country.
Mounting Crisis in the Satellites: In the last halfwhile Yugoslavia was resisting Soviet efforts to curb its independence and avoiding incorporation in "the socialistito also increased his pressure on Moscow for liberalization in the satellites. Yugoslavia did not want to be bound byloc member, but it was eager to assert theof advising Moscow on satellite problems. This conflict over the satellitesery serious obstacle to improving Soviet-Yugoslav relations.
Tito later charged that Moscow had failed to apply theof the Belgrade and Moscow declarations to its relations with the satellites. It is certain that Moscow had no intention of extending to the satellites the dogree of freedom of action it was willing to extend, at least temporarily, to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav demands for liberalization ln Eastern Europe coincided with the first spark of revolt in the satellites, the Poznan riots in Poland late in These and other signs of unrest in the satellites, andesser extent the chaos in Western Communist parties following the denigration of Stalin,eries of Impassioned edicts by Moscow for unity ln the Communist ranks.
A central committee resolution Issued in Moscow on6 warned that bourgeois ideologists were seeking to sowin international Communist ranks. Onuly, Pravda denounced "national Communism." Bulganin, speaking in Warsaw onuly, warned that opportunists in some "socialist"were aiding the imperialists in attempts to weaken"socialism under the banner of so-called 'national peculiarities.'" Moscow realized that it had underestimated the centrifugal forces at work within the bloc and consequently the dangerous results both of its own steps to relax controls and of the theories advocated by Yugoslavia and given some lip service by Moscow.
The repeated Soviot attacks on national Communism and the stern demands for unity and uniformity were viewed in Belgrade with serious concern. The final strawecret circular letter which the Russians sent to the satellites ln earlywarning them against following the Yugoslav example aod citing the OSSR as the proper model.
These difficultieswo-stage meeting between Khrushchev and Tito lnirst in Yugoslavia and then In the Crimea. The satellites were presumably the mainof conversation. Tito later said publicly that Yugoslavia was advocating further liberalization while the Soviet loaders resisted. The serious differences which had led to tbe meeting clearly persisted at its end. Tito suggested In bis Pula speech that during this meeting "Stalinistnotinfluential ln tho Soviet leadership. There is no evidence, however, that Khrushchev bad lost control of policy toward Yugoslavia at that date. On the contrary, lt seemstbat Khrushchev was Just as concerned over developments ln tho satellites and just as reluctant to take Tito's advice as were other Soviet leaders.
The Effect of Hungary: The upheaval In Poland and especially tbe revolution in Hungary at the end of October shook thoof Soviet-Yugoslav relations. There followed several months of polemics, primarily lo the press, between tho two These arguments revealed more clearly the underlying differences between Moscow and Belgrade which had been aggravated by the upheavals in Eastern Europe.
Tito's frank speech at Pula on6 laid bare the disputes over conditions in tho satellites that had preceded tbe Polish and Hungarian upheavals. He charged Soviet andleaders with timidity in making reforms, continuedto Stalinist principles, and consequentlyfor the upheavals. He claimed that changes in the Soviet system itself were necessaryevival of Stalinism was to be prevented. He questioned Soviet willingness to carry out the principles of the Belgrade and Moscow declarations as they applied to the satellites. Other Yugoslav leaders emphasized tbat the primary issue was the Soviet insistence on bringing Yugoslavia into "the socialist camp" and Belgrade's determination to remain independent.
of newspaper editorials andhe Soviet leadership spelled out its policies toward the bloc and Yugoslavia Morco.
fa WMChth Ihe Kelpies:socialist" countries and "national variations,"gave greater emphasis to the former
Given unity of purposeiew tothe victory of socialism, varying forms and methods of the solution of the concrete problems of Socialism may be applied in various countries, in accordance with historic andpeculiarities. (Pravda,
He who, like Rakosi and Gero, cannot and will not correctly and creatively apply the basic principles of Communism to national stateinflicts .great harm on our cause. He who puts national state differences in first place forgets the basic principles of tbeof tbe proletariat and inflicts no less harm on the cause of socialism. (Pravda,
Concrete and objective conditions determine the creative variety of the only road toprogress ln different countries. (Pravda,
Pravda denied that the USSR demanded submission from anyone and it asserted tbat mistakes In relations vith the satellites and Yugoslavia had been corrected. But unity remained the strongest thomo in the Soviet argument.
Uoscow emphasized occasionally the leading role of the USSR In the bloc. Koamwinist said that all Communist parties looked to the historical experience of the Soviet Union as an example to follow but tbat some Yugoslavs took Just the opposite attitude. According to Pravda of
In the mutual relations of socialistrelations vith the Soviet Union as tbo first country of victorious socialism,tate vhlch has accumulated the richest experience ln socialist building duringears of its history, are of no small
Moscow's few referencosto "national Communism" were in critical terms. In7 Khrushchev calledivisive tool used by the enemies of the working class. He warned*.that the legitimate variations in socialism ln different countries must not bo given priority and could not Invalidate tho "basic laws of tho Socialist Revolution." The communique signed In
Budapestanuary by loaders of tho USSR and four satellites (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria) warned that the "false slogan of the so-called 'national Communism'" was being used by imperialists to undermine international Communist unity.
In addition to these general pronouncements with obvious implications for tho Yugoslavs, Moscow directed some .attacks specifically at Belgrade. Inravda charged Yugoslavia with claiming that its "road toas tbe correct one. Interfering in the internal affairs of otherstates, and trying to divide "the socialistravda criticized some aspects of tho "Yugoslav road,"its dependence on Western aid, which Moscow claimed was an unstable basis on which to "build socialism." The newspaper also said that some Yugoslav leaders were guilty of deviations from Marxist-Leninist theory and the principles of proletarian internationalism but said that Moscow would be tolerant and patient in reaching agreement on such questions.
The line that Moscow wasublicly during the winterasow one. But as long as these principles had not been made explicit, they did not have aeffect on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. When the Hungarian revolt split tbe USSR and Yugoslavia, these underlying issues rose to the surface and made lt difficult to repair the break. The views expressed in Moscow endorsing unity and criticizing "national" Communism probably reflected rather accuratelyviews in that period. All of the Soviet leaders obviously thought it necessary to discredit Yugoslavia in tbe Communist world and to isolate it from the East European satellites as much as possible. At the same time governmental relations cooled, and ln7 promised Soviet loans werepostponed.
Although it seems likely that Khrushchev agreed with the direction of this policyemporary tactic, lt seemsthat he was responsible for the full intensity of tbe anti-Yugoslav campaign. Thisime when there wore reports that Khrushchev was under fire within the Soviet leadership from such men as Molotov because of the apparent failure of his policy toward the satellites and Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's later policy suggests he was probably still determined to heal the breach with Yugoslavia and make another attempt to restore it to the bloc. Some of the Soviet tactics after the Hungarian revolt, however, seemed calculated to destroy the prospects for abetween Moscow and Belgrade. The polemics against Yugoslavia lasted as long as Moscow appeared seriously worried about re-establishing stability ln tho bloc and nearly as long
as Molotovlace on the presidium. Vith tho easing of the crisis ln the bloc, Khrushchev began again to talk of better relations with Yugoslavia.
A Pragmatic Rapprochement: During the visit of Albanian leaders to Moscow inhrushchev emphasized the Soviet desireestoration of good relations with He thought this could be accomplished by emphasizing points of agreement rather than differences; the latter he thought were greatest ln the Ideological field. Pravda echoed this themeune. This was the principle that was to guide the revival of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Theoreticalwere Ignored rather than resolved. Polemics ln the newspapers of both countries cameirtual halt. In mid-May Moscow allegedlyirective to the satellites advising thorn for the time'.being to Improve their relations withdespite Ideological differences.
The dismissal of Molotov from the party presidium in7ew spur to the rapprochement. The central committee statement on the June purge of the "anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich in Moscow cited Molotov's mistakes in policy toward Yugoslavia. Shortly afterward, Khrushchev made an Impromptu speech in Czechoslovakia tbatlear description of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia.
Marxist convictions demand that we advance with all revolutionary forces. The front of the revolutionary working class must be broadened, and Yugoslavia must not beof this front. So we did everything to achieve that. onsider tbat at present conditions aro forming between us andthat will improve relations bothour countries and between our parties, and we will make every effort to reach complete, so to say, unity and ideological understanding and unanimity of action of the revolutionary force and Communist parties of the whold world, includinghat do wc want? ant unity, closed ranks, and rallied forces. Ve acknowledge different paths, comrades. But among the different paths, there is one general path, and tho others are, as you know, ig river withe must develop friendly relations between tho socialistbetween our Communist and workers'parties,
and strengthen our socialist camp in every way. Of course, it is true that our friends, the Yugoslavs, somehow badly pronounce the words "socialist camp." However, Yugoslaviaocialist country and this fact remains.
Khrushchev warned that the two countries should avoid criticism of each other's Internal policies and he again cautionedabout its dependence on American aid.
The next major step ln the rapprochement was tbe meeting between Khrushchev and Tito in Rumania early inow much agreement resulted from this meeting is not clear; the press statement following It was vague, shedding no light on the outcome of the talks. Soviet propaganda concerning tbe meeting stressed the Importance of the unity of aims andbetween the two countries and said that the prospects for cooperation had been improved by the ouster of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. The frequently well-informed Italian Communist paper L'OnIta said that the two leaders discussed Yugoslavia's relations with "the socialist camp" and Belgrade's economic ties with tbe West. Yugoslav officials confirmed to Westerners that Yugoslavia's relations with the blocubject of debate and also said that there were differences over the statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting.
Later, Khrushchev8 speech in Sofia) claimed that the Bucharest meeting left certain ideological questions unsettled. He asserted, however, that the Yugoslavs agreed to attend the7 party meeting in Moscov and toIn drawing up tbe party declaration there. It alsolikely that the Yugoslav agreement to recognize East Germany, announced in mid-October, was reached at the Bucharost meeting. There have been reports that tho two sides agreed to avoid polemics and keep any future disagreements from becoming public. Khrushchev said in his Sofia speech that ho warned the Yugoslavs that Moscow would reply to any Yugoslav criticisms of bloc countries or parties. onsiderable time after the Bucharest meeting, the two sides did avoid bitter public exchanges.
Moscow's Satellite Policy: Soviet policy toward tbeEuropean satellites hasajor determinant of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's liberalization ofover tbe satellites made possible the originalwith Tito; the Hungarian revolt caused the firstIn relations with Belgrade; and the effort to intensify controls in the satellites hasrimary cause of the most recent breakdown.
Whilo the USSR had been trying to establish stability and unity in the satellites ever since tho Hungarian revolt, tbeformal and Important step taken in that direction was the7 conference in Moscow. On this occasion, the USSR succeeded ln winning bloc-wide acknowledgment of the necessity of bloc unity. Moreover, It created the precedent for similar meetings ln theas that held In Maya technique for ensuring unity. At that time, also, thedecision vas taken toheoreticalit did not appear until While the USSR vouldhaveore formal organization, this apparently vas resisted by somo Communisteries of ad hochovever, should serve most of Moscow's purposes.
Marshal Tito's decision not to attend the Novemberln Moscov and the Yugoslav refusal to participate in talks onparty declaration or to sign lt undermined tho nevly reborn Moscov-Bel grade rapproenment. At the East German party congress in Berlin <onhrushchev said tho Yugoslavs had seen an advance copy of the party declaration. The Yugoslavs have recently confided tbat this draft vas so bitterly anti-Western that at the time they realized thoy could notsign lt, since this vould commit them completely to tho bloc. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union subsequently modified certain formulations for the benefit of the Yugoslavs, but these modifications vere nullified by Mao's proposals at the November meeting vhlch vere unacceptable to the Yugoslavs. There vere also rumors that Soviet leaders hadpeech Tito proposed to make in Moscov, vhlcb so provoked the Yugoslav leader that he refused to attend. Whatever the reason for the Yugoslav abstention, the apparent lack of Soviet interest in negotiating revisions in the declaration to suit Yugoslaviahov much groater was the priority.Moscow attached to solidifying bloc unity. The dismissal of Marshal Zhukov on his return from Yugoslavia shortly before the Moscow conference had also Increased the friction betveen Moscov and Belgrade.
The Soviet position on lntrabloc relations was spoiled out io Khrushchev's spoechovember and inpartyofovember: unity and agreement on fundamentals are essential vlthin the bloc. The variations to be permitted are in the details of executing policy. The Soviet Union, vith the help of "other socialist" countries, has alroady established the "high road toor each country to start looking for "some kind of completely nev, artificial road to socialism" vould play into the hands of the imperialists vho arc trying to promote divisive theories of "national Communism." "Revisionism" is the greatest danger in the bloc, although in some bloc partiesmayore pressing problemiven time. lntrabloc
relations are based,on equality, independence, noninterference ln internal affairs, and mutual aid. All "socialist" countries must accept certain basic laws, Including tbe leadership of the Communist party, public ownership of the basic means ofgradual socialization of agriculture, and "proletarian internationalism." All the signers of the Moscow Declaration also accepted the pre-eminence of the DSSR ln "the socialist camp."
Following the7 meeting ln Moscow the DSSRits efforts to keep tho satellites In line, and its propaganda lino reflected strong concern with the problem of "revisionism." Several of the satellites stepped up their efforts to collectivize agriculture, and ln April Kommunlst urged that these efforts be further Intensified, especially In those satellites which are furthest advanced In socialization. The Soviet bloc Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) met ln December andigh-level meeting ln May as the USSR sought to effect an increase ln economic Integration andspecialization ln the bloc that would serve political as well as economic ends. eeting in May of bloc party and governmental leaders also appeared aimed at achieving greater political unity in the bloc. Thereeries of visits within the bloc by various bloc leaders, including Khrushchev--who went to Hungary in April, to Bulgaria ln June, and to East Germany in July. In June the execution of Nagy et al andof subsequent trials ln Hungary provided even stronger evidence of Soviet intentions to Impose conformity on the bloc. Even if the Hungarian trials are not duplicated elsewhere, thoy have servedtern warning to other Eastern European states. The bloc is likely to continue holding more frequentas the USSR seeks to minimize political and economicamong the satellites and to obtain recognition of Soviet hegemony in principle.
Period of Watchful Waiting: From tbe7 conference in Moscow untl1 tbe Yugoslav party platform was published inoviet-Yugoslav relations appeared to be at a There were no major steps toward improving relations, such as high-level visits or publicly announcedalthough on International questions the Yugoslav Foreignappeared to echo every Soviet position. On the other hand, there were no outbursts of polemics. The Soviet press and radio studiously ignoredtactic which Tito finally complained of in mid-March.
Khrushchev'6 remark, however, at the East German partythat the bloc parties "drew their own conclusions" from the Yugoslav behavior at the time of the November conference Is supported.by other reports? Khrushchev clearly set great store by tbe November conference, and by Yugoslav participation ln it. He had tried patiently but unsuccessfully for well over two years to bring Tito back Into the bloc, even to the point of risking the unity of "the socialist camp." Tbe Novemberaccordingly represented the culmination of all his long-drawn-out efforts, and he apparently had had reason to believe from Tito's assurances ln Bucharest three months earlier tbat Yugoslavia would participate in some way in the bloc Thus, his disappointment was the more extreme and, asby his reported romark to KardelJ, his attitude toward Yugoslavia perceptibly hardened. Tito's unwillingness to abandon his independence and elthor join tbe bloc on favorable terms or break his links with the West was not clear. Tito's reluctance to forego Western aid was particularly offensive to Khrushchev, and Pravda's emphasis on it as an issue when the break occurred in8 suggests that it was one of the major reasons for Soviet frustration with Yugoslavia. The announcement inthat Yugoslavia would not receive further military aid wasimited concession because it did not apply to economic aid.
Despite tbe hardening in the Soviet attitude toward Tito which resulted from tho events in November, the Soviet leaders were determined to learn from Stalin's mistake8 and avoidartyr of Tito. Soviet-Yugoslav relations were towith correct but cool formality until some Yugoslavshould present tho Soviet leadersuitableto make an open break.
The Yugoslav Party Congress: Tbe party congress and par-ticularly its preliminary draft program provided the chance for which the Soviet leaders had been waiting. Moscow could not Ignore the congress; lt was forced to eitherelegation or boycott it. Moreover, if it decidedoycott, other members of tbe bloc must be prevented from attending in order to maintain bloc unity. Moscow therefore criticized thedraft party program, not only because it challenged the Soviet gospel butublic Justification of the boycott was required.
Yugoslavia released the party program onarch. pril Moscow privately informed Belgrade that no Sovietwould attend the party congress, but not untilpril did the Soviet Kommunist article criticizing the Yugoslav party program appear. Prior to that date there was no public Soviet comment. in the Interim, however, Moscow, and some of tbe Eastern European parties engaged in private negotiationsaimed'at obtaining modifications ln tbe Yugoslav program. Khrushchev met with the Yugoslav ambassador onprilto discuss the program. Onpril tho Yugoslavs announced some modifications, apparently intendod to meet some of the Soviet party's objections and perhaps those of other Communist parties, particularly in tbe area of foreign policy and In references to the Soviet and Western blocs. Some of the points Kommunist criticized had been revised by the Yugoslavs on the previous day. Kommunlst had gone to press onpril. Possibly the Yugoslavs had already offered these revisions in private talks with the Russians, only to have them rejected as inadequate The Kommunist article did include expressions of hope that the Yugoslav congress would make changes in the program, but itJs unlikely that Moscow at that point expected Belgrade to retreat.
Intensification of the Controversy; In order to estimate the present objectives of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia, it Is necessary to survey briefly tbe developments following the Belgrade congress in ay the Chinese Communist party newspaper, Poople's Daily,harp personal attack on Tito, echoed verbatim the following day in Pravda, that labeled the Yugoslavs reactionaries and calledesolution basically correct. The Soviet party central committee probably discussed Yugoslavialenary meetingay, although this was never ndmltted publicly. ay Pravda sharpened the attack, clearly threatening to stop aid to Yugoslavia and warning that state relations could notif party relations deteriorated. The Sovietetter to tbe Yugoslav party stating that it was up to Yugoslavia to change its independent policies If relations wore to be Improved. Onay Belgrade announced thathadreviously scheduled visit to Yugoslavia, and onay tbe USSRive-year postponement of its program of credits for Yugoslavia.
unepeech to the Bulgarian party congress Khrushchev broke his curiously long silonce on the Yugoslav dispute and for the first time savagely attacked the Yugoslav regime. Seeking to overcome any impressions of intrablocon Yugoslav policy, he called the Chinese and other
bloc criticisms of Yugoslavia fully justified. He echoeds description of8 Cominform resolution ascorrect and maintained that the Yugoslav party platformundamental revision of Marxist-Leninist theory containing Insulting appraisals of bloc parties. Khrushchev asserted, hovever, Moscow's continued interest in party contacts vith Belgrade if the Yugoslavs yielded on points of ideology, and If party relations vere impossible, the USSR vould still "develop normal relations vitb Yugoslavia on tbe state plane."
In speeches onnduly ln Berlin and Moscov,again emphasized that the dispute vith Yugoslavia vas an Ideological one involving Belgrade's attempt to split "thecamp" vith its "revisionist" theories. He avoided any threat of breaking state relations and tried to rebut the charge tbat Moscov had used the withdrawal of aid as pressure on He insistod that the suspension of aid followed naturally and necessarily from what was in effect Yugoslavia's formalfrom "tbe socialist camp." Except for certainareas, the USSR could not afford to aid nonblocalthough lt always welcomed mutually profitable trade.
In the light of the evidence of the Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia, Soviet sensitivity to the Yugoslav party platform, which was ln effect an indictment of much of Soviet policy and practice, Is not difficult to explain, particularly when the Soviet party had failed to come upew program of its own The Kremlin's Initial criticism was much more restrained, however, than what subsequently appeared in the USSR and other bloc countries, and it avoided threats to damage state relations. Moreover, Moscow had originally announced Voroshilov's visit to Yugoslavia, apparently as evidence of its desire to maintain good state relations, shortly after informing Belgrade privately that it could not send delegations to the Yugoslav party congress. Many theories have been developed to explain why later bloc attacks on Yugoslavia became so intense andand why Moscov then extended tbe party dispute into the area of stato relations. While these theories have been and may yet be extensivelyev observations here may be pertinent.
It is possible, although extremely unlikely in viov ofevents, that Moscov felt its public and private criticisms vould loadoversal of Yugoslav policy at the partyWhon this did not occur, Moscow abandoned Its restraint. It may have been that the initial restraint vasactical pose of reasonableness and that Moscov Intended to intensify the attack later. The USSR could have been vaiting for other bloc
members, such as China, to take the lead in order to avoid the impression that this wasilateral dispute. It may, in addition, have anticipated the sharp Yugoslav reaction at the party congress and felt that this would thentronger Soviet line of attack. It is also possible that this dispute began to snowballajor breakore violentreaction materialized than Moscow had anticipated.
These explanatlonsiall contain some logic. While Moscow may have believed that its original criticisms would be sufficient to discredit Yugoslavia in Communist eyes and to isolate it from the satellites, there are other possible explanations for the Intensification of the dispute that could have far-reaching
One possibility is that Khrushchev was under pressure from other Soviet leaders to break more completely with Tito. was personally associated with the policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia from the boginning. It seems likely that this fact accounts in large part for the persistence of Soviet attempts to salvage the rapprochement even after the Hungarian revolt and repeated Yugoslav refusals to join the bloc had demonstrated the failure of Khrushchev's policy. This paper has also sought to demonstrate, however, that Khrushchev's views on Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc were sharply at variance with Tito's and that Khrushchev became Increasingly disillusioned with Yugoslav policies. It seems probable, and his subsequent statementstbe view, tbat Khrushchev himself considered it necessary to attack the Yugoslav, party platform and to brand Tito as an ideological heretic. He may have been reluctant to make ashift in his policy, however, and to force any morereak with Yugoslavia than was necessary to save the satellites from contamination by Belgrade. Some of the shifts in Moscow's tactics during this period could have resulted from differences inside the Kremlin, not over the basic direction of policyBelgrade but over how far it should be carried. Khrushchev's more recent speeches, which have avoided some of thereak in state relations evident earlier, may mean that Khrushchevictoryompromise position. It certainly appears that, whatever disagreements he may have encountered over Yugoslav policy, Khrushchev maintainedauthority in Moscow.
The harshness of Chinese attacks on Yugoslavia and the fact that several specific charges against Belgrade were made byonly after they had been made by Peiping have led tothat Chinese pressure resulted in the intensification of the Soviet attack on Belgrade. Here again, there Is so much evidence
of growing Soviet disillusionment with Yugoslavia tbat Chinese pressure is not necessary to explain the original Soviet decision to attack the Yugoslav party platform. It can be argued tbat the promptness with which Moscow reprinted Chinese criticisms of Tito, and Khrushchev's public endorsement of the Chinese attacks as just, indicate some coordination of Slno-Sovietbe dispute with Tito. It is possible,that Moscow preferred to have tho sharpest attacks come from other members of the bloc. the Soviet loaders may not have anticipated the degree of savagery of the Chinese attack, which seems most plausibly prompted by Peiping's own domestic concern since the springith the dangers of "revisionism.** To preserve appearances of unity.then, the Kremlin may have bad to intensify its own position but, after the point had been made and lt was possible to discuss the situation at length and with calmness, againagreement for its more restrained line.
Even though some such Chinese pressure is plausible it does not seem reasonable to assign toajor role In changing Soviet policy in this area of concern. Even less likelyombination of thoories ln reports emanating largely from tbat Chinese leaders plotted jointly with Khrushchev's opponents ln the Soviet leadership tohange ln his policy toward Yugoslavia. The Chinese went out of their way ln7 toluster of Khrushchev's policies, and in the following May to approve his past efforts (with which they had been associated) toapprochement with
One further explanation is that tbo reluctance of some East European parties, particularly the Polish and to some extent Hungarian parties, to join in the attack on Yugoslavia led Khrushchev to believe tbat he must intensify his attack onin order to accomplish his purposes In the satellites. This paper has sought to demonstrate that Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia Is inextricably tied to Soviet policy toward the satellites and that the decision to condemn the Yugoslav party platform was originally taken to undermine Tito's standing ln Eastern Europe and to assure that the satellite parties would boycott the Yugoslav congress as well as cut party ties with Belgrade. The condomnatlon of Yugoslavia represented, above all, an increase in pressure on Poland. Poland was slow and cautious in joining the criticism of Yugoslavia. Moscow andmay both havo felt that,esult, lt was neceHsary toore rigid stand, and to make tho condemnation ofso strong that Poland would not dare to try toiddle ground on which to stand.
In this connection, too, tbe harsher line adopted by tbe Chinese against Tito would demonstrate once and for all to the Poles that they could not hope to play off China against the USSR in order to get support for their own position within "the socialist camp."
The USSR did not begin to break with Tugoslavia until it was evident that the policy of winning tbat country back into the bloc had failed. The criticisms of Tugoslavia wore not made with tbe primary hope of winning Tugoslavia back, therefore, nor ln the hope of crushing the Tugoslav party. Rather they wereto preserve Intact what Moscow still had in the bloc. There were probably private debates between Moscow and Warsaw that revealed more clearly to Khrushchev than any publichow necessary it had become to tighten discipline in tho bloc. (Tbe substance of his talks with Gomulka ln January are still not known.) The Hungarian executions are the strongest proof that such discipline seemed necessary to Moscow. If the Yugoslav situation is placed in proper perspective as part of the broader satellite problem, and the dangers of Polishare kept in mind, the intensification of the attacks on Yugoslavia appears to have been motivated primarily by an increasing struggle to assert Soviet authority over tbe satel-
At tho end of July Khrushchev traveled to PeipiDg for talks with Mao Tse-tung aod8 the twooint communique which proclaimed that
The unshakable unity of the two Marxist-Leninist parties will forever be theguarantee of the triumph of our common cause.
The Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist party of China will unflaggingly guard this sacred unity, will fight for the purity of Marxism-Leninism, will uphold the principles of tbe Moscow Declaration of the Communist and Yorkers' Parties and will wage an irreconcilable struggle against the chief danger of the Communist movement, revisionism. This revisionism has found clear expression In the program of the League of Communists of Tugoslavia.
Following this statement of common purpose by the leading members, and despite its emphasis onbloc policy toward Tito soon began to shift fromattack to criticism in general of Tugoslavia and its policies. By the end of the summer8 the Sino-Soviet leaders may well have felt that their ideological attacks were becoming counterproductive. Rather than direct attention specifically to Yugoslav theory, they decided to move into the next phase of the campaign: coordinated political and economic pressure on Tito for the purpose of further weakening hisand influence at home and abroad.
The USSR, Communist China, and Albania undertook themoves. Moscow restricted the distribution of Yugoslav publications in the USSR, vacillated regarding promisedof wheat and coal to Yugoslavia, and attacked Belgrade for alleged discrimination against Soviet citizens in customs procedures. The Chinese "relieved" their ambassador in Belgrade, and, according to the Yugoslavs, began to boycott Yugoslav ships and ports. Albania renewed its old tactics of diplomaticand retaliation for alleged mistreatment of its nationals in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria joined Albania by reopening attacks on Yugoslavia's "chauvinistic" policy in Macedonia. The other satellites, except for Poland which was relatively inactive, have contributed varyingly to the anti-Yugoslav campaign.
Thus the lines were drawn again for Isolating Yugoslavia from any participation in the affairs of "the socialist camp:" But8 there was to be none of8 Stalinist heavyhandedness. Khrushchev had told the East German party congress in Berlin onuly that "we must not devote more attention to Yugoslavthan they areut he wished to "preserve some spark of hope and to search for acceptable forms of makingon certain questions" with the Yugoslavs. Subsequently, however, while maintaining that they wished to conduct correct state relations with Belgrade, the USSR and other bloc countries were trying to impose an effective quarantine on Tito by aof harassment and irritation.
The Yugoslavs, in the meantime, sought to giveeasonable attitude, commenting publicly and quickly on bloc discriminatory practices and stoutly asserting theof their own policies.
By the end of8 it appeared that this stalemate could continue indefinitely. Each side had its own reasons for avoiding an open break; Uoscow and Peiping wished to destroy the influence of Tltoism In the satellites but did not care to makeartyr again; Tito did not wish to lose whatever influence
he still had in Eastern Europe and,ommunist, was not
anxious to cut himself off from the bloc.Original document.