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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE9
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA
OIMCTOR OF CENTRAL DTTELLIGEX(T
The foltewtno tnlriHgeaci crrgoxhatkmi ymrttesreOad ta the ortpsrotkm of this estimate: The Central intelligence Agency and tha mttlllgrmct eroamlsatkms ol tha Depart menti of Stall, theha Navy, the Atr Font, and Tha Joint Staff
Concarred in by tha WITID STATES IlfTtXIJOSMCl BOARD
on it March IIM Concur ring were Tha Director of Intent-genes and Research, Department ot State; the Auutant Chief of Staff for Intetitgtnce. Department of theheChief Of Nasal Gjwaitonj for IrdtUgencs, Department of the Navy; the Asttittmt Chttf ol Staff, itattttemct, VSAF; the Director for Inleihoxnce. The Joint StaB; the ArsUtant ta the secretary of Detente, Special OpercUow; an* the Dtrte-tor of the NaUtnal Security Agency. The Atomic tnerpp Commutkmtoe to the OSIB end the AssUlanlederal Burem* af tnsestkpatton. thetrontd. tht noieat being outside of their fteradtetten.
CENTRAL INTELLIOENCE AGENCY
hU estimate iu duuawnlnated by the Central InteUlgence Agency True copy Li for the tnlonnation and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and ofunder his lurBdicLtoneed to know basis. Additional essential dieearmnatlon may be authorized by the following offklaat wtthln their respective departmente.
of intelUeence and Research, for the Department of State
Chief of Staff far intelligence, Department of tht Array
a Assistant Chief of Naval Operations far Intelligence, far the Dopartinont of the Navy
d. Director ofF. for tbe Department af the Air Force s. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, ABC. for the Atomic Energyssistant Director. KB I. for tbe Federal Bureau of Investigation b. Assistant to the Secretary of Defease, Specialar of Defense
L Director of NSA for the National Security Agancy
ssistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA
To assess Communist China's capabilities, intentions, and probable courses of action with respect to the Taiwan Strait area over the next year,
believe Ihat Communist China broke oil the Taiwan Strait crisis last October primarily because it believed that to increase military pressures to the point necessaryuccessful Interdiction effort against Chinmen carriedrisk of hostilities with the US.relations between the US and the Government of the Republic of China (GK.C) had not been impaired,morale remained high, and thecreated by Peiping's actions were proving damaging to Communist China's tatemational prestige. Peiping was also concerned over moves by some Asian countries toward compromise proposals it considered unacceptable. 1 i)
There has actually been little change since last October in the military picture in the Taiwan Strait area. The Chinese Communists do not have the capability to prevent resupply of the Matsus or Big and Little Chinmen by artillery fire alone. They could at any time creategreater havoc on the Chinmen group than they did during the previous crisis should they choose to exercise their full artillery capability. Moreover, byartillery bombardment with attacks by aircraft and motor torpedo boats, possibly along with offensive mine-warfare, they could make resupply and reinforcement of the Chinmen and Matsu garrisons virtually impossible unless US air and naval forces were committed to keeping the supply lines open. TheCommunist forces remain capable of taking any of the smaller coastal Islands quickly and with little or no warning. Barring US intervention, they also could seize the larger coastal Islands.
here are presently no indications of any Chinese Communist preparations for increased military pressures in theStrait. There is no firm evidence that additional troops, heavier artillery, missiles, additional aircraft, additional motor torpedo boats, or minecraft have been moved into the Strait area.Communist forces could be quickly and heavily reinforced, and quitewithout detection prior to their employment
Tbe Chinese Communists will almost certainly seek to avoid hostilities with the US. We believe that they will notto seise Chlnman or undertake an all-out effort to prevent Its reeupply. We also believe such actions unlikely against tbe Matsus, though the Chinesemay in this case be sornerwhat lees certain of OS Intentions and possibleHowever, we believe that the Chinese Communists will continue tomilitary pressures In support of their essentially political and psychological campaign In the Ta'-jan strait They will probably attempt to keep the Strait issueand probably will not relax their rnilitary pressures toegree as to permit the situation to becameover an extended period of time.
Thereumber of nvhtaryopen to the Chineae Communists. They may engage In periodic heavyand limited air and/or sea operations to harass the Nationalists in the Chin-men and Matau areas; if the CCAFits proficiency, It might moreengage the CAT. The Chinese Communists might attempt to seize one or more of the small, lightly-heldIslands, particularly TB-tan and Srh-tan, which could probably be takenurprise operation before effective counteraction could be mounted. (Paras.
n the course of the Berlin crisis the Chinese Communists may exercise their ability to heighten tensions in theStrait, eitherart ofBloc strategy or in furtherance of their own objectives In the Far East. We believe that the Ounces Communists would not heighten tenairrn without prior consultation with the Soviets. In either case, the Soviet position wouldcertainly depend on the course of the negotiations or on events in thecrisis Itself. The Soviets willdesire to keep tensions In tbe Far Bast about as they are at present so long as they Judge that the Berlin situation is progressing according to their liking. Should the Soviets estimate that thesituation Is going badly for them, they may advise the Chinese Communists to increase tensions in the Far East The Chinese Communist response to suchadvice would be Influenced not only by the Berlin situation and Soviet desires but also by Pelplng's own estimate of the advantages or disadvantages oftensions In the Taiwan Strait orelsewhere in the Far East. Any moves to heighten tension ln the Taiwan Strait, however, would almost certainly be calculated to fall short of provoklng major futilities.
The past few months havehift in the apparent mood of Chinese Communist foreign policy. During mostover-ail conduct of foreign policy was marked by truculcnce and toughness, and in August Communist China suddenlythe most aggressive action in the Taiwan Straiteiping has let up on its military pressures in the Strait since last October, however, and has softened thetone of Its foreign policy
Nevertheless, the issues Involved in the Taiwan Strait crisis have not been resolved. Communist China's basiche Taiwan Strait area remain unchanged: to eliminate US influence and power, to destroy the ORC, and to assume control of all Matton-aliat-held territories. The purpose of this paper is to examine the initiation and the course of8 Strait crisis, the Chinese Communist breaking off of the crisis, and the developments which have occurred since that time to see what light they throw onChina's probable courses of action in the Strait area over the next year.
AIWAN STRAIT CRISIS
believeumber ofbehind the Chinese Communiststep up their military activity In theStrait Inn the mostsense, the operation reflected theconfidence with whi**'- the regimeexternal situationImpact of Soviet progress in rocketry,leaders appeared to haveecisive shift in the worldof power had occurred in thePeiping's propaganda appeared tosome impatience to move moreto exploit the Bloc's favorableIt'scoexistence" lineto advance Communist China'sIn the Taiwan Strait; this line hadcontributedenseendency In world opinion toe facto "two Chinas" situation.
In this general atmosphere Peiping's leaders probably believed that the time was ripeew blow at the ORC. Ccmmunist China probably estimated that the US would be diplomatically Isolated on the onshorequestion, and that the USSR's progress in advanced weapons might deter the US from accepting great risks in local war situations. Accordingly, Peiping probably believed that the US, already comrrdtted at the time in the Middle East, might be unwilling or unable to prevent the loss of the onshore islands. Peiping apparently set out to test thisby probing US reactions. In thethat if the US did not Intervene, the offshore Islands could be gained throughevacuation,haps, massThe fall of these Islands, Peipingwould seriously undermine the morale and staying power of the ORC on Taiwan,edge between the US and the ORC, and cause the US toajor loss of prestige and influence In Asia.
Peiping probably anticipated that it could not lose Inrobing action, believing that even If the US didirm stand In the Strait, the resulting tension would create serious problems for the US in its relations with its allies and with the neutral nations of Asia, Increase pressures for worldof Communist China, and halt any tendency toward world acceptancee facto "two Chinas'" situation.
nvent. Communist China's leaders probably did not Intend to take measures which would seriously risk US counterattack against the mainland. Intense artillerywas probably considered to be the principal arm which could be safely employed. The extent to which other military means would be committed was probably contingent upon US and ORC responses.
e continue to believe that foreign and Bloc policy consideiattons were primary in
China's decision to Initiate hot-UllUrs ln Um Taiwan Strait. However, tbe regime must have considered theilitary crisis and ite domestic "leap forward" and eomtnnne programs In Its planning Tha Strait venture proved ainstrument in pressing for acceleratedefforts and in oiganmng the populace into communes. The regime probably had planned to take advantage of the Strait action to push these domestic programs, but we do not believe that this action was undertaken because of any compelling Internal need
role of the USSR ins still not clear, though webehave lhat the USSR did notcrisis by encouraging the Chineae,acquiesced in and supportedWe are confident that thetha thrust In the Strait was Chinese,had been in the process of planningluring for some time, and that sometimetable existed for Us activation.that Khrushchev left Moscow for aPeiping at the height of the Middleseems to Indicate lhal the twoa need at the time for closer over-allof Slno-Sovlet policies Theevents of August suggest thatagreement with the USSR on thethe Strait venture and on the extentIt would be pushed. Themecllng may also have includedlhal diversionary pressures Incould advance Bloc interests inEast, andigh stale ofbe maintained simultaneously onEar East and Middle East
HI. COMMUNIST CHINA'S BREAKING Off OF IKE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS
AiMtsmetU of tht Crisis.that Communist China broke offlast October primarily because Itthat to Increase military pressurespoint necessaryucceaafuleffort carried unacceptable risks ofwtth the US. Furthermore,the US and the ORC had notand the tenstons created bywere proving damaging to Communist
China's lntc mar lone! prestige. In turn,china? leaders had found theirin the Strait pcaiUcaliy and militarily unrewarding, and the problem at band had become one of how to disengage aa gracefully as possible and lo find new ways and means of advancing their alms tn the Taiwan Strait area.
ommunist China's leaders wereimpressed with the rapidity, scale, and natura of Uie US rnUitary response. Where the US Intentions with respect lo theIslands probably had earlier seemedto Peiping'a feeders. It probably now locked to them as If the US would Intervene rather than permit Chin men lo be captured or starved out. Only with respect to the Matsut and same of the lesser offshore islands were US Intentions not clearly manifested.
1 The China* OoaiaianlsU roundrUMerj Are cook be effective tor tcraperarv aeutranaa-ikn only and ceaid not be decisive urJeat era-pterrd In conjunction with other means, that Communist Hie direction maana end pm-redores were Inadequate tor tbe reduction ot MaUonailst nwufteauoa* und counter batter? ca-pabullr: lhat indirect fire tmnnlqeca wereto interdict dcUmnlned amphlblooi resap-ply operations eaaeated vKb leitrnand that CVawraaritrJ roTOneaUons cTereC tnadeqaaU protecUce aaalmt aeeeraleceunurbattery are.
IT. Pelping also found thai It hadNaUbnalltt nerve, morale, andcapabilities. The CCAF was no match for the greater skul of CAP pilots, who. after the beginning of the intensive Chinese Communist bom bard merit, shot downommunist MIGS with the rose of only one or possiblyfli. The CAPwas increased with the Introduction of Sidewinders. The Chinese Communkts alro found that artillery bombardment alone could neither eUclt Nationalist defections norreiupply of Chmrncn against the supped measures which the US/QRC had brought tohere were no detections from the offshore island garrisons or on Taiwan, and tn fact Nationalist morale seemed tohe Chinese Communists were probably surprised to leantumber of Asian
leaders condoned the US counteractions and considered ule onus ol aggression to be on Communist China. Felplng was concerned over moves by some Asian countries towards compromise proposals it consideredIts leaders also found that Itsactivities In tlie Strait wereamaging effect on Its influence In Asia,since its aggressive action occurredime when Its commune revolution and its generally tough foreign policy wereadverse reactions in Asia.
id. Pctpfno's Tactics since the Criils.China's retreat from ils earlierand psychological warfare pressures has almost restored the general pattern ol pre-crlsls activity. The principal differences are that the coastal airfields are now occupied and that the level of artillery effort isgreater than that In the weekspreceding the crisis.
The principal Chinese Communist effort with respect to the Strait since October lias been the attempt to undermine Nationalist morale and to induce Nationalist defections, through sporadic sheUings, propagandanegotiation offers, and the covertof letters to contacts and old friends In Taiwan. The present campaign, like similar ones in the past, seeks: (a) to separate by any means the close alliance and defensebetween the US and Nationalistby Implying that each Is being undercut or sold out by the other; (b) to weaken popular confidence in Nationalist long-term ability to survive as contrasted to Communist China's growing might andvictory; (c) lo convince officials and technicians on Taiwan that therelace for them In the "Newnd (d) to convince the world that Communist China will nevertwo Chinas" solution and that Communist China's growing strength dictates acceptance of the Communistfar ending the continuing crisis: USfrom Ihe Taiwan area and no outside Interference in the "domestic" strugglePeiping and Taipei.
We have no evidence that the Nationalists are receptive to these Communist overtures or have made clandestine responses to them. We do not believe that the Communist campaign has in fact made much headway. Theare aware of the many unattractiveof communal life on the mainland, the limited role permitted ram-Communists there, the greater freedom and the higher standard of life on Taiwan, and the continuing support which Taiwan la receiving from the US. It is possible, however, that some two-way coramu-nKstion. between individuals, nay be going on unknown to us
continuing the WarsawCommunist China has almostanticipated that tbey would lead to aof the offshore Islands. It hascontinued these talks to create thethat It Is willing to negotiateissues, and to avoid tne onus otoff the talks. It probably also hopesdoubts about the US In the mind? ofNationalists, and to extractvalue there may be In holdingwith the US.
IV. CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPACITIES'
'Sea Military Annex and
For details concemina; Uio various offsboresee maps and paragraph At ol theAnnex.
There haa actually been llttie change since last October in tha military picture In theStrait area. Both the Communists and the Nationalists have increased their air strength sllghUy, and tha Nationalists have relnlorced their artillery on Chirimen. but the balance of fcress remains about the same as It was tn August-September Perhaps the most Important change has been an Improve-ment in Chinese Communist resupply andcapabilities opposite the Melsusesult of the completion of the rail line toFoochow.
Assuming no US Intervention, we believe that theommunists could seise the Matsus or thelthoughuccessful assault against the Matsu Islands could be mounted with the troops already stationed In the Foochow area (ane estimate that the
dine* Communists would consideroin bat troop* would be requireduccessful attack on tbe Chlnmens. Although this would necessitate tha movement of more than ICO1 groand force troops into the Araoy area,oveaent could be made quickly and quit* possibly withoutThe degree and nature of USInvolvement would be the decisive factor in the outcomeattle for the larger coastal islands.
he Chinese Communists do not have the capability to prevent resupply of Big and Little Chinmen by artillery fire alone.'the Chinese Communists could makemuch more difficult and could create considerably greater havoc on the Chinmen group than at any time In th* previous crisis should they choose to widertak* th* intensive and all-urget bombardments of which they were and arc capable. There are no major logistic limitations lo effective resupply of the Communist artillery In the Amoy area.
he Chinee* Communists do not have the capability to prevent resupply of the Hatsus by artillery fire alone. Although the Chinese CcmmunisU have an estimatedrtillery pieces capable of reaching Ihe three northern-raost islands, limited observation even during periods of good visibility would precludetaterdfcteoo.
he Chinese Communists could scire any of theed offshore islands quickly andt* or no warning: specifically, Tung-tmg, trc Wu-chlu"s, and the Tung-yms. Although the Nationalists could sursport the defense of the Tan Islands (in the Cbirrrnen complex) more effectively than In the case of the more isolated Islands, th* Chinese Commu-
Dlsts could seise the Tans and deny them to Nationalist recapture. Should Peiping decide to garrison the Tan islands, the NatioruUlsts could seriously harass tbe defenders.
Otven the demonstrated superiority of the CAP fighter units, Peiping would here to be prepared to accept disproportionate losses in any air eruragements with the Nationaliststhe quality of the Communist fighter units had Improved. These losses could become very costly If the battle were prolonged.that qualitative difference, the greatadvantage of the Chinese Communists over thr ORC in aircraft, along with the large number of airfields fc dose proximity to the offshore islands, gave the CCAF the capability to effectively attack Nationalist resupplyIn th* offshore Island area. TheCommunists also have the capability to protect their own surface operaUons In the area from decisive interference by theAlt force The introduction of Soviet alr-to-alr missiles and appropriate training would lessen tha qualitative difference
By supplementing artillery bombardment wtth attacks by aircraft and motor torpedo boats, possibly along with offensiveth* Chinese Communists could makeand reirdorcement of the offshoregarrisons virtually Impossible unless US air and naval forces were committed totha supply lines open.
The Chinese Communists have th*to launch an air or amphibious attack against Taiwan or the Penghusut could not neutralise or seise these Wands against US resistance,
There are presently no Indications of any Chinese Communist preparations for increased military pressures In the Taiwan Strait. There la no firm evidence that additional troops, heavier artillery, missiles, additional aircraft, additional motor torpedo boats, or miiKcraft have been moved Into the Strait area. However, troops, ships, and aircraft could at any time be committed quickly to operations against the offshore Islands, quite possibly without prior detection.
V. PROBABIE CHINESE COMMUNIS! COURSES Of ACTION
A. General Contkferatrons
e believe that Communist China's basic objectives ln the Taiwan Strait area willunchanged. After the experience of last year's crisis, however, Communist China'smay well estimate that no feasible course of action is likely to lead to an earlyof their principal objectives. Yet they almost certainly believe that Ume Is on their side and that they win be able to exploit new opportunities which may arise in the Taiwan Strait area In the normal course of events or whkh may result from their continued
Meanwhile, the present situation mutt seem to them to offer at least some advantages. Tbey can increase or decrease tension in the Strait area to capitalize on internationalor to serve domestic needs. Their post-October insistence that the offshoreand Taiwaningle problem which must be solved at one Ume Is probably designed in pert to rationalize their inability to capture the islands; clearly they areto the charge that they backed downlast years crisis. Nevertheless, theyalso believe, as they have stated, that as long as the Nationalists hold the offshorethe Taiwan Strait does not form adividing line which might appeal to world sentimentasistwo Chinas"They may also consider tbat theituation contains some opportunities for un-derminlng Nationalist morale and forUS-GRC relations.
In the course of the Berlin crisis theCommunists may exercise their ability to heighten tensions In the Taiwan Strait, eitherart of co-ordinated Bloc strategy or tn furtherance of their own objectives in the Far Bast. We believe tbat the Chinesewould not heighten tensions without prior consultation with the Soviets. In either case, tho Soviet position would almostdepend on Uie course of theor on events in the Berlin crisisSoviets will probably desire to keepin the Far East about aa they are otso long as they Judge that the BerlinIs progressing according to theirthe Soviets estimate that theis going badly for them, theythe Chinese Communists toIn the Far East. The Chineseresponse to such Soviet adviceInfluenced not only by the BerlinSoviet desires but also by Fciping'sof the advantages orheightening tensions In the Taiwanpossibly elsewhere in tbe Far East.to heighten tensions in thehowever, would almost certainly beto fall short of provoking majort
We do not beueve that domesticwould by themselves cause Communist China to go so far as toajor military effort In the Strait area during the next year. However, Pelping could create greater tension in the Strait area at any timeeans of raUying greater publicand enthusiasm for its domestic programs of rapid, forced economic developrnent and the communal teat km of society.
Several other factors may influencecourse of action In the Taiwan area. Despite some moderation In recent months of tbe bellicose tenor of Pelplng's general foreign policy statements, some of the asserUveness which characterised its outlook8 Is still present. The Taiwan Strait situation provides the easiest outlet for this aasertive-ness, but if the Chinese Communists saw such opportunities elsewhere, they might feel less inclined lo increase pressure in the Strait area. Pelplng's action would of course also beby any developments which might lead It to see an Increased likelihoodhange In US or GRC policies. Continuation of thetalks might inhibit but will not prevent the Chinese Communists from taking more forceful actions should they so choose.
B. Proboble Couna* ofhe Chinese Communists will almostseek to avoid hostilitice with the OS. We believe tbat they win not attempt to seize Chnunen oc undertake aa all-out effort toIts resupply. We also believe such ec-tsorn unlikely against tbe Mateus,oe Chinese Communists may In ihk case be soene-what lesa certain of US intentions and possible However, we betltve that theill conUnue lo employpressures in support of their essentially political and psychological campaign In the Taiwan Strait. These pressures will probably not repeal the pattern of last year'smlliUry acllrities. However. Pelping win probably attempt to keep the Straite, and will probably not relax its mUltary pressures toegree as to permit the situation to become quiescent over an extended period of time.
hereumber of mililary pressures open to the Chinese Communista They may engage in periodic heavy shelling and limited air and/or tea operations to harass thetn the Chinmen and Matsu areas. They might attempt to setae one or more of the smaU. lightly-held offshore islands,Ta-tan and Err:-tan Pelping might execute such an assault toolitical move or to provide specific evidence of progress for domestic political and propaganda pur-
hough we believe it unlikely. It Isthat the Chinese Communists mayintensive and sustained artUlcry bomb-bardment of the major offshore Islands,using heavier guns. They might Initiate eggressive aerial activity over the offshorearea and, possibly, the Strait Wehowever, that they would be reluctant to expose their air force to the possibility of another humiliating defeat by the CAF, and hence we think them unlikely lo Initiate such air activity until they have considerablythe proficiency of their pilotsimprovement might be accomplishedew CCAF regiments with present equipment auring ths next few months. Moreover,the period of this estimate the CCAF wm probably have more advanced aircraft and may also acqulro alr-lo-eir missiles.
elping will probably intensity Its political and psychological warfare campaign against the GRC. Thii can be done with little risk and with minimum demands uponChina's leadership or resources. InPelping might increase Its campaign of rum on regarding secret neguuatlons with ORG leaden, il might renew the offtr toin formal and concrete terms which might win support from somecountries.
elping might renew Its demand thai the US discuss Ihe Taiwan problem and other questions at the ministerial level, perhapsthe lack of progress in the Warsawtalks lo Demonstrate the need tor higher-level discussions. Peiping wouldcertainly rebuff any overallof Taiwan Strait questions by angroup, particularly by the UN.
lthough we believe that the Chineseare not likely during the period of Uus estimate to undertake actions which theywould run great risks of in vol vementwith US forces, they almost certainly will not change their basic objectives in the area. Over the longer run. as Cornmunlst China's economic and military strength grows. Its leaders win probably become IncreasinglyIn pursuing those objectives.
O-miie* wide Taiwan Strait separates the Island of Taiwan from the mainland orhe Penghusnofslands, lie aboutiles west of Taiwan, and like the main Island, receive the protective benefits of the relatively wide strait. The offshore islands arc not sogeographically speaking, from astandpoint. These islands consist of two major groups and three lesser groups. The largest is the Chinmen (Quemoy)hinmen (Quemoy) Island,quare miles, garrisoned by five divisions plus supportingittle Chinmen (Little Quemoy, or Llchquare miles, garrisoned by one division and supporting troops;he eight small, reeky Tan Islets, three of which are garrisoned with lightly armed troops of the Chinmen forces,nr Brh-tan, and perhapsn Hu-Uu Hsu. The militaryof the Tans (aside from moraleis confined to their usefulness as posts for observation of the Amoy port area. The other major group consists of the Matsu complex, including the Pal-ch'uan or White Dog islands. The largest Island, Matsu. about four square miles. Is garrisoned with0 well-armed regular army troops; Chang-hsu. three square miles,egulars; and Kao-teng, about one square mile and northernmost of the Matsus,The southern Islands of the complex, the Pal-ch'uans (Whiletill have some guerrilla forces, but are mainly manned byn the one square mile of HSI-ch'uann the slightly smaller Tung-ch'uan. The other Islands of the Matsu complex are not regularly garrisoned.
Largest of the somewhat Isolated lesser groups Is the Tung-yin group. Lying about
iles1 KNE of the nearest Islandby Nationalist regulars (Qiang-hsu, in thehe two rugged small8quare miles) comprising the group are held byightly armed guerrillas. Lying about halfway between Chlrunen and Matsu and aboutiles SE of the mainland are the two Wo-chiu islands, the larger cf whichcres.ightly-armed guerrillas hold this group. Tiny Tung-ting (Chapel) Wand, aboutiles south of Chinmen and eight miles off the mainland Is held by aboutegularshinmen division.
n the Foochow area the Chinesehave an0 troops facing0 ORC troops In the Matsu Islandhe Amoy area ihey have anB6ground force troops facing0 ORC troops on the Chinmen Island group. The ORC garrisons on the Cbinmens and the Matsus are now at or about optimum strength. Artillery strength In the Chinmen and Matsu areas is approximately as follows:
ISS-rnsaIDS nch 11
un i; u lOS-rnm mm Hows .
'AU over-water distances In this note are glntn In Hoahce! miles.
' All butf the Communist aruUery pieces in the Chinmen area are believed to be within range of Katkmalittddition to the pieces listed thereovered positions In the area, the occupancy ol which cnnr.ot be determined. (Seend 8)
revailing weather conditions In theStrait determinereat extent the NaUcnallxt capability for resupply andof any of the onshore Islands, and alsorniungny attempted invasion of Taiwan and tbe Pengjbuj by the CommunUts. The gentle, variable winds and light seas of spring (April through June)optimum conditions for movement across the Taiwan Strait. During tne summer (July throughhen the typhoon risk Is high, traffic from Taiwan to the offshore islands may be completely disrupted forlong periods. Tbe strong northeasterly winds tn the fall and winter caeriod of heavy sees which also restrict moremenl and confine offloadingew especially favorable, leeward beach sites- Seasonalin weather are of far leas significance for amphibious operations from the mainland against th* offshore islands.
B. THE CHINESEoftsltcal Considerattorii The Communal interdiction of the Chinese Nationalist efforts to resupply the Chinmen garrison created the outstanding problem of the Taiwan Strait crisis. However, the supply situation on(Quemoy) never degenerated to astag* during tbe Taiwan Strait crisis. The Communists' Interdiction of the resupply effort influenced the extent of thecounterbaUery artillery ftre,eneral austere supply consurnpuon program However,M (whan the Communists announced their unilateralational inhadoint where adequatewere being delivered despite the inter-dleUCn effort The amount of resupply to support the Chinmen garrison was computed by HAAO Taiwan toaily averageons, whichounds ofcar, fry artillery ammunition. For the four days tmrneenately prior to tb* esase-ftrr, air deliveries akntons dally. For theeptember, despiteand bad weather, dally dell reviveapproximately ITS tons. Individual day's effortsepiember)onsctober) were rerxvdad. During the two-week period Immediately following th*otal cf0 tons of supplies was delivered
he valuable experience gained Into resupply the Island despite theartillery fire has greatly improved the amphibious and aerial delivery capabilities Of the ORC. The supply stslus of both Chin-men and Matsu as of0 Indicated that the garrisons bare stocks of supplies on hand sufficient for approximately three
l SepFab as
STATUS OT SUPPLY OH CmHiODJ IN DATS OF
chutson btock8 OT AJtTJU-SHY AMMUNITION
BT HOUND ASTBBVAKY
B8-mm Chraa 11
be amphibious craft of the Nationalist Navy, supplemented by the BARCs (barge, amphibious, resupply cargo) assigned the Array, can transport more than the minimal levelons dally to resupply the offshore islands. The Chinese Narsorialist Air Force has the capability of deUvertngons of supplies dally to tha offshore
aval Force i. The naval losses sustained by the ORC during8 hostilities have been partially replaced, and additional us ships are programmed for tbe next six months reosabncT one natal rosacea
SO SOD peraeeiMl. Inclodln* is.BM avartnes
Start veutle 18 esell SI
Ulnelaytrt S Anslllariee and
'Prior to receipt of reapply.
Although ORG ship strength is slightly below the8 level, losses have not been major, and wUl be exceeded by replacements. There have been no significant changes in deployment. The amphibious capability of the GRC Marine Corps continues to improve as newer equipment la received, particularly tanks, and more landing exercises areIt Is now considered capable of mounting raiding operations against the mainland,
Forces. The decisiveF's over Communistthe August-October air battles clearlytbe high level of training andcaliber of CAF fighter units.fighter squadrons must bethe world's finest air combat unitsoperations. This excellentIs being improved asof Nationalist pilots are beingthe use of the Sidewinder air-to-airthe easing of tensions in the Strait,has also attempted to improve Itssupport capability throughThe CAF? transport andforrned well tnduring the recent crisis andtraining Is being achieved as thesupplies and personnel to ChinmenLastly, training hi pnratroopalso been extensive in the past
over-all capability of the CAFImproved in recent months by theof iwtw equipment from theInstallation of Sidewinderadditional fighters has Increased thecapability; It Is expected5 Nationalist fighters will bethese missiles by the end ofcapabilities are also beingthe moreeplacesfn Nationalist's will probablyhe loann mdennite period has augmentedairlift capabilities.
ha GRC's present total aircraft inventory in operational units Is as follows: 0
Jet Fighters (Rccc^meisaancel
jet light Bombers (Reconnaissance) 3
Other Piston 10
tssfles. The GRC antiaircraft strength has been enhanced by the movementS Nike Hercules battalion Into the Taipei area. This has allowed the redeployment of theAAA units which formerly defended Taipei to other strategic areas. There IsS Matador squadron on Taiwan.
IS. Offshore Islands Defense. Majorhas been given to improving the National. 1st counterbattery artillery capability of the offshore Islands during and following theStrait crisis:
a. Cninmen: At the beginning of the crisis inhe Nationalist artillery units assigned lo the Chinmen Defense Command consisted largely of tbe light artillery organic to the six infantry divisions of the Command, totalling SOS pieces. Of these, only theun5 and howiUera were capable of delivering effective counterbattery fire against the moreornmunlst artillery pieces being employed against the island complex.owever, GRC artillery on Chinmen and Little Chinmen capable of counterbattery fire had been about doubled. This had been accomplishedhift Infrom light to medium and heavyeven though the total number of guns bad increased by only nine during this period. In addition,m howltxers are now being readied on Taiwan for Nationalist use on Chinmen; however, date of deployment la uncertain. Further, the Nationalists aretheir observation capability withalready underway to provide equipment
'There Is no GRC naval air force.
* In addition there arcircraft In nor.operaUonal status: training, storage, or
and training for sound and Hash bases, and electronic meteorological sections (or theislands. (Seend 4)
b. Main: The artillery Inventory In the Matsu Oelenseugust totaled
and howitzers, and hasince that date. The Communistsanatio ofweapons compared to thethe Matsu area, while the ratio in thearea Isohe Matsus havetower priority than the Chinmenhowever, plans call for anthe heavy artillery. (See Figure 3)
he military poalUon of the ORC on the offshore Islands, particularly the main Island of Chinmen, baa shown substantialsince the Taiwan Strait crisis in the fallhe Nationalist troops on Chinmen still numberowever, the ORC has agreed "In principle"eduction of0 men. The agreed reduction In personnel Is to be offset by Increases inand automatic weapons, so that thedefensive capability of the islands will be strengthened. If this were accomplished, the number of divisions deployed on the Cblnmens would be reduced from six to five. TheChinese Nationalist infantry division has approximatelyercent of the personnel,
cf the vehicles, and less thanot the artillery and crew-servedof tbe US World War II typenewly adopted "Forward Look"of the ORC (seven divisionsre scheduled to be reorganisedill have aboutercentpersonnel,ercent of the vehiclesweapons, and the same artilleryUS Worldype division. Oneof these new divisions will probablyto Chinmenthe ORC type divisions has organic armor
Morale of troops on the offshore Is-Irtcladlng the small Tan Islands, isas excellent.
ationalist capabilities for defease of the offshore islands could probably not beImpaired by local subversion orWilh full US support brought to bear in time, Chinese Nationalist forces probably could hold the major offshore Wandswithout such support. Ihey probably could not Jang withstand an all-out attack.
C. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
Logutkai Crmftaereitdnt AJlhougb the Taiwan Straitubstantial barrier afford-Ing protecuon to Taiwan and to the Pengnus, there are no significant logistical difficulties In operations against the of! ill ore Islands, except, probably, in the supply of POI. Tbesurface UanaportaUon system willa maitmurnons per day Into tbe Arra^Fcoehow area. The two dues share theens) and rivereo)In addition, thereoad capacityons per day. An Indication of theof this transportation capacity Is seen In the estimated weight of artilleryexpended during the flnt sl* weeks of tbe bombardment af Chinmen.he average dally expenditure of artillery ammunitionons and the total expended wasrom anon stockpile and an annual production rate by Communist China of0 tons. Tbe daily supply requirementshinese Communist Army In combatons, again indicating the adequacy of the mainland transportation system In the Foochow-Arooy area to support military operation! Interior bottlenecks, an over-all shortage of rolling stock, and POL shortages, however, wouldduring an extended operation
.vsmi Forres. The ovwr-ell naval strength of th* Chines* oraruniuustt has Improved sligbUy during the past several moo the, but thas rrapievonent as believed part of tha pro-gramrosd naval buildup thai has taken place over the past several years and la not related directly to th* Taiwan strait crisis.
nutsarrr CHixisa communist naval forcessrioniurl, not inchidlra in0 laaUon
Destroyers . 4 Patrol veatela In* IMenela 4 pedoveneb 13 Lauding ahlpgera ItCO
the offshore islands area, the strength cf Chinese Communist Naval Forces appears to be about the same as at the climax of thecrisis, no known permanent deployments of submarine, major surface or landing ship units Into the Strait having taken place. The relatively shallow water In the Taiwan Strait makes the effective use of submarines more difficult, and greatly Increases theirto ASW operations.
is. It bt dlthcult to fix the number of small Chinese Communist vessels in the area atBased on the demonstrated ease with which motor torpedo boats can be introduced undetected, the strength of small patrol and landing craft types could beelatively short period of time. Moreover, in view of the relatively shortinvolved, the bulk of major naval strength could be deployed into Ihe straitsour period with little or no prior indication. There have been noinstances of the employment of mine-warfare by the Chinese Communists; neither have there been positive Indications of mine stockpiles along the Strait. However, thewhich the Chinese Corrvmunlst Navy la known to place on such doctrine, coupled with an appreciable capability for mine delivery front all lypes of vessels, makes the occurrence of offensiveossibility to be reckoned wllh in the eventenewal of hostilities.
IB, Air Forces, With the possible exceptionmall Increase In fighter strengths, Chi. nese Communist Air Force levels haveabout the same hi the Taiwan Strait arcs as they were duringt present, there areet fighters based on the airfields in the Foo-chow-Swatow area. While there are no bomber aircraft operating from these fields, Ibe Chinese Communists continue to hare jet tight bombers based at airfields well within strlldng range of Taiwan. It is possible that the Chinese Communisls have some bomber forces In areas directly behind Uie coastal
he Chinese Communists must have been highly displeased Willi the perfoimance of their fighter pilots during the crisis, and we consequently believe that they must bean intensive training effort to rectify this weakness. However, wc have no direct evidence of any such effort. It is estimated that it would take about four months oftraining toCAF regiment combat proficient (with existing equipment).
t is possible that tbe Chinesehave received9rom the Soviet Union; several months wouldbe required, however, before Chinese pilots would be capable of effectively using this aircraft in combat.
Wc consider it likely that the embarrassing air losses suffered by the Chinese Communists last foil, along with the glimpse they had ol the effectiveness of the Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, have led the Chinese Communists to press the USSR for similar weapons. We have estimated that the Soviets have developedtypes of short-range air-to-air missiles, equipped with HE warheads. These could be made available for use by Chinese Communist jet fighters; we have no evidence, however, to confirm or deny the existence oi such weapons In mainland China.
The combined Chinese Communist Air Force and Naval Air ForceJet aircraft, ofre fightersre lighthe present total aircraft inventory in operational unils Isto be:
fn addition there are abortaircraft lo non-apersUonsl status: naming, storage, or ooeo-iescent
einforcement Capability. Withinays the forces tn the Amoy-Foochow area can be reinforced byroops, including three airborne divisions
troopsuite possibly without detection by GRC or US force* WlUilnays antroops could be deployed to the Arrroy-ltocbow area, making an estimated total force ofnfantry divisions assembled there. These LWts would not involve anyof those coastal units nowoutside of the immediate Amoy and fOcchow areas (which presumably would be kept in position against the possibilityationalistomparedorld War if type US Infantry division, the Chinese Communist infantry division has ap-proximately the same personnel strength, but only DO percent as much artillery, andercent of the tanks and motor vehicles. Morale of the Chineseforces Is considered good,
Hit CapabiMUs. In in amphibiousagainst Chinmen or Matsu It Is unlikely that larger amphibious units (LST, LSM) would be employed due to the extremelybeaching conditions However, bylesser amphibious units (LCU, LCM) and readily available native craft, inwaves, the Chinese Ccanmunlsts have the capability of Unn^htng assaults with forces numerically superior to the defenders en either the Chlnnvna or tbe Matsus. Timely warning might not be available that final preparaUons for either operation bad been completed.
Utilising assigned transport aircraft,with available dvtl transport, andnormal maintenance and opera-Uonal attrition, as well as combat attrition, it is possibleaximum Chineseairborne force of up0 men could be dropped on the offshorewo liftsay. followedenay. and theen of the threedlvuaonsays This airborne force Is essentially light infantry, since the Chinese Coramunlsta do not hare the aireraft or the capability to drop vehicles, or artillery larger than tbemm howltaer.airfields are available ln southeast China to mount such an operation within close range of the Nationalist positions. The use of helicopters to move personnel from theto the Chinmen or Matsu Islands could increase the total force available by anumber, oVpendlng on the number of lifts flown. The Chinese Communists have an estimatedelicopters capableroops each.
issiles. These Is no present evidence to corroborate recent low-level reports that the USSR has supplied short-range ballisticto Communist China, and there are no confirmed Indications that the Chinesehave any type of missile In theStrait area. The absence of firmdoes not, of course, preclude thethat the Chinese Communists may have received Soviet missiles and may havesome to the Taiwan Strait area, though we believe it unlikely.
^MAXIMUM FIELD ARTILLERY RANGES
J6.lv Diiiionot! OO
N Emitted byton