Created: 11/14/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



memorandum for: director of central intelligence

of dci ad hoc panel on status of the

soviet icbm program

il panel, consisting of the belov membership and meeting at your

request, has reviewed available evidence relating to the sovietntelligence committee (cmc) report

>ave discussed their

mr. l. a. hyland, chainmui

dr. james w. mcroe

dr. jack e. froehlich

dr. reuben f. kettler

mr. charles r. irvine

brig. gen. ocnond j. ritland

2. based on the foregoing, this panel has concluded that:

sovietsigh priority icbm program initiatedago. their teat program currently appears to bef the us icbm test program. for want of hard facts onof this test program into operational capability. itsafe to assume that this inequity will carry forward forfew years.

ghic report. including th* footnotes, is, ingood an overall estimate of the situation as can be made atin view of the quality and quantity of the availablea few remarks are warranted.

gmc report, including the footnotes, sets forthviewpoint regarding the date of the icbm ioc, {initialranging from the latter part8 to the latter port

while neither extreme can, at this tiae, be ruled out as being incorrect, the panel believes that currently available evidence will support no moretatement than the following:


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"The Soviet IOC will probably occur sometimeWhile we cennot discount the possibility that this IOC night yet be establishede believe this possibility degraded by reason of tbe small number of test firings to date."

important date to be established is not considered toIOC (for in terms of militaryew missilebimportant) but rather the date when the Soviets have inoperational force armed with atundred ICBMs. Inintelligence is almost completely non-existent. such associated evidence as does exist, and on the basis of toe

camplexlties of the task to be accomplished, we believe the Soviets could buildeapons system capability withlsollee bylthough, with over-riding priority and success in their test and production program, such might be accomplished as early as Assuming tbeate as their goal for this particular number of weapons, an operational force witheapons could probably be in existence by0 or

view of the significance which the status of theprogram has to the national security of tbe United States,tbe quantity and quality of the total evidence available tounsatisfactory. In particular, is the situationevidence on production facilities, training andstatement alao applies with equal validity to evidence0f ballistic missiles, whichnow be employed to tbe great disadvantage of ourselvesthroughout Europe, England, North Africa and Asia.

3. This Panel recommends that all practicable actions be taken on an urgent basis to improve the intelligence collection system to where it can supply adequate amounts of data relating to the Soviet ICBM program. In particular, means must be found to obtain evidence on Soviet production facilities, training and deployment actions.

a. All collection concepts should be vigorously pushed for example: The use of high altitude rockets on the USSR periphery equipped to observe powered flight telemetry and other performance parameters; exploitation of satellite collection methods on an expedited basis; continued development of acoustic and infrared devices; acre carefully developed high altitude balloons; vigorous research and development to overcome the increasing difficulty of collection.

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the difficulties in covert operations, thesuggests that sure of such activities beon the task of obtaining evidence on long rangetraining activities, and deployment activities,strong support be given to new covert techniqueo.

recommendations will ba supplied to youdiscussion.

1*. On balance the Panel believes that collection must be more vigorously pushed, that the risks to US security of not obtaining adequate information on the Soviet ICBM program exceed the current risks inherent ln utilization of certain collection techniques. We believe that it is becoming increasingly harder to obtain evidence and all methods should be exploited while still usable.

. KilA Chairman

cc ddc;

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