SNIE 100-9-58 - PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA

Created: 8/26/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

KATE: MAY JiOO'l

8

342

special

national intelligence estimate8

probable developments in the taiwan strait area

Submitted bp Ike DIEECrOtt OP CENTRAL KTELLIQEVCE The toUr/ntng Intelligence orgeauaticiu participated in the preparation ot Mil etttmate: The Centralnd the inJtUlffenc* organliattoa* ol the Department* ol

State, the Arms, ththe Airnd The Joint Staff.

LVTELUOENCE aDTISORS COMMITTEEugust MS. Conemrtna were The Director otout Reteareh, Department ol State: tee Assistant Chief ol Staff tor inUUigence, Department of the Arme; theof Atoa! tnteUtgenee: the AuUtant Chief of StafJ, IntetU-genct. VSAf; and the Deputy Director for inuataenoe. The Joint Stag. The Atomic Snergn CovmUston Reprttentativc to th* IAC and the Astiitant Director, reitral Bureau of in-vetUgattoa, abstained, the subject being outside of their

iuristiclion

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title of this citirrm to, when used separately from the text, should beOFFICIAL

DISTTtTBDTION:

wait* Hout

KaUnas] Security Council Deraruaeat ofrtra*nt of Defense

ederal Bureau of mmUgntloo

probable developments in the taiwan strait area

the problem

To estimate probable developments in the Taiwan Strait area over the next few months, with particular reference to (a) Chinese Cornmunist capabilities,ommunist courses of action, (c) Chinese Nationalist courses of action, and (d) Chinese Communist reactions to Chinese Nationalist and/or US measures to maintain control of the Nationalist-held offshore Islands.

conclusions

believe that Communist China's principal purpose in stepping up Itspressures in the Taiwan Strait area is to test the Intentions of the US and of the Republic of China (GRC) with respect to tne offshore islands.China probably expects that theincrease In tensions will alsopressures for its participation in world decisions, arrest any drift toward acceptancee facto "two Chinas" situation, and, especially if the US should seem reluctant to take strong measures to hold the offshore islands, accelerate the erosion of Nationalist morale.)

In view of US commitments to defend Taiwan and our estimate that neither Communist China nor the USSR istoajor war at present, wethat Communist China will notto seize Taiwan or the Penghus during the next six months at least.

lthough Communist China mightudden assault upon the major offshore islands, we believe it more likely tnat it will not attempt to do so in thefuture, because of its fear ofUS Intervention. Communist China will probably continue to exert military pressures against the Chin-men (Que-moy) and Matsu groups, seeking tolear point of military showdown.on US reactions, these pressures could include intensive and sustained artillery harassment of Chin-menggressive air and naval action in the Strait area, provocative overflights of Taiwan, seizure of lightly-defendedislands,erious effort tosupply of the Chin-mens and Mat-sus. If US reactions to these pressures should lead the Chinese Communists to believe that the US would notthey would probably then attempt to seize Chin-men or Matsu, or both.)

If opposed only by Chinese Nationalist forces, the Chinese Communists have the capability to deny the Taiwan Strait to the Chinese Nationalist air force,supply of the offshore islands, or seize these Islands, Timelymight not be available that preparations had been completed for an assault on either the Chin-men or the Matsu groups.

We believe that the Chinesewin not be deterred from Increasing their military pressures by US moves which stop short of either an explicit guarantee of the offshore islands or the commitment of US air or naval farces at least to the protection of the supply of these Islands. However, II the US gare an explicit guarantee or committed its forces to the defense of the major offshore Islands, the Chinese Communists would probably not attempt to seise thoseor interdict their supply.)

Nevertheless, Communist China'sof its coastal airfields andattempts to deny Its airspace toare probably here to slay,of Chinese Nationalist andomewhat lesser degree, so are Chinese Communist air sorties and other probing actions in the Taiwan Strait area.

Tbe Chinese Nationalists will probablyresort to unilateral action against the mainland so long as Chinese Communist pressures stop shorteavy andair or artillery bombardment of the offshore Islands,eterminedto interdict supply of Chin-men or Matsu. Should the Chinese Communists take such steps, the chances are better than even that the Nationalists would lake whatever military action they could against the mainland. They might then bomb mainland targets, even in the face of explicit US objections )

DISCUSSION1

INTTIOOUCTION

n recent weeks. Van Chinese Communists have suddenly flipped up military pressures in the Taiwan Strait area alter men lhan two years cf relaUva qiuWcenee. PoDowtng aburst of propaganda during the latter part at July retmphaaalng Ihe liberal*theme, they progressively activated six ot the seven Jet airfields In the Foochow-

Swatow area wlilcll were rushed to completionut not made operational until now. At present approximatelyet fighters arc bated on these fields. Several airwith Chinese Nationalist aircraft have followed Jroro the increased frequency and strength of Cocununlit air patrols along the coastal ana. In the last fe* days, there have been iiijjimIh Chinese Communist navalIn the Strait. Intensive artilleryof the Chin-men (Querooy) group, and air action in the immediate vicinity of Chinmen. Chinese Nationalist officials,over tbe possible threat these actions pose to the security and position of the Republic of Chinare seeking additional US rammiUrLcnts,

_

The heightened tension In thecoincided with the Middle East crisis

the recent meeting in Peiping between

Khrushchev and Mao and their delenseFurthermore, Communist China'sIn the Strait must bo considered against the background of the belligerent tone of its statements during the past year concerning world policy in general. These developments present major questions, discussed below,Chinese Communist intentions,Nationalist Intentions, and the likelihood of expanded hostilities in the Taiwan Strait area.

II. CHINESE COMMUNISTituation in which the Ka* Uonalists continue to receive OS military(possibly in increasedut have the responsibility for the delivery of sup-piles and reinforcements to the offshore islands and for their actual defense, theCommunists have the following

The Chinese Communist Air Force

could establish and maintain air

superiority over the Nationalist sir force in

,area of the Taiwan Strait. Through the

combined use of artillery, air, and naval forces, the Communists could Interdict the

of Nationalist garrisons on the offshore

The Chinese Communists could seize any of the smaller, lightly-defended offshore islands with the forces they now have in place. An assault on these islands could be launched quickly and probably without prior detection.

The Chinese Communists have had for several years sufficient ground forces In the

areao selie

Matsu. Little redeployment of naval forces would be required to support such anuccessful assault on Chin-meninimumroops.0 are estimated to be In the Arnoy aim opposite Chin-men, and additional troops

'Seeor Chinese Ccaunurilit sod Chinee jraUonalUt luUHajj strength* and capabilities In tbe Taiwan Strait area.

could be moved ln quickly, possibly without detection. Considerable artillery to provide cover for an assault Is already cmplaccd.ny, further aircraft redeployment would bo necessary lo make possible bombing operations with fighter cover, or Jet closeSufficient improvised lift could readily be assembled for an assault against either Island group. Timely warning might not be available that final preparations for either operation had been completed.

Chinese Communists have theorganize, launch, and supportlarge-scale assault against Taiwan orBefore undertaking such anthey would have to stockpilein the vicinity of embarkationadditional troops to East China,most of the required troopsvicinity of the embarkation points.have to concentrate the bulk ofand amphibious strength In theShanghai and Canton. Activationairfields near tha coast wouldnecessary. The initial bombing ofan assault would probablywithout redeployingajor assault oncould be identified, at least instages. In view of the USdefend Taiwan and the Penghus, weattempted an assessment of thesuch an assault.

III. PROBABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

A. Chinese Communis! Motives

part of their basic and continuingthe Chinese Communist* seekthe GItCival and extendto Taiwan- Their efforts tothis objective In the past havepressures against the offshorepsychological pressures directed atTo date these efforts have beenUS commllmonta to the GRCimplicithave faced thewith unacceptable risks infield and which have served to main-

jtet

tain Nationalist tnoialo and will to resistaracieotly high level to unUt the impact ot Chinese Communist threats and Inducement*

Chinese Communists probablymore Impatient and frustrated asof time has failed to visiblytoward their goal of ending theof the ORC. Over the past twotactics liave railed to simulateTaiwan, or to prevente facto "two China"They have also failed to displaceas the representatlvt of China in theto gain the participation oi Pelping in

the Chineseeeled of tension In thewould be useful ln reminding thePeiping's strength and determinationIta objectives. Beyond this, theybelieve that world trends and thetime have brought sometnmorale and determination, andhope that the US has become lessto assist ia the defense of theThey have probably set out topropositions and may view Uieof the coastal airfields as astep, since the Katkrcalltts6 to retaliate II such, aplace.

IB. Broader consider*liana may also beLhe Chinese Communists In the present situation. In recent months Chineseleaders and their propaganda havtimpatience with same of the result- of the general Bloc line of peaceful coearstcriee The Chinese Communists have argued lhat the present world balance of power is highly favorable to tha Bloc, that the Westpaperhat the Bloc could destroy the West in nuclear warfare without receiving mortal damage, and that the present world situation la one of "revolutknaryfor the expansion of Bloc Influence. We do not suggest that the Chineseare now prepared to push the Bloc Into general war or that theornrnu-nlste are urging this policy on Moscow.we do believe that the Chinesenow rate the risks Involved In local wars to be soraewhat less than they cadprior to trie sputnik era. We alsothat they are lens sensitive man prevl-oualy to opinion in tne Free Wold, less corvcernod toeaceful pose, and more Inclined to seek lo gain their ends by remlndas of their grrwing power.

esire to discuss Taiwan Straitwas probably responsible in part tor the recent meeting of Khrushchev end Mao. in addition. Chinese Communist uneasinessKhrushchev's last footworkummit meeting may also haveactor, lo any event. It is almost certain that both partners felt that tbe pace of worldrequired closer coordination of their policies. Moreover, they probably reached new agreements concerning tht nature and extent of future military cooperation, pass!-bly including missiles and nuclear weapons.

he USSR probably has no objection to tha heightening of Umaion in lhe Taiwan Strait; Indeed It may consider thisas serving itse believe lhat the USSR and Communist China are Inagreement on policy In tht Taiwan Strait. However, if the Chinese Communists were to adopt courses of action involving substantial riskajor military clash with US forces, tbe USSR would ahaost certainly seek toPeiping.

e believe that Pelping will continue for some tone to teat US and GRC intentions and to malntsln an atmosphere of tension.Communist leaders will noi expect to quickly achieve their basic objectives by this coons of action. However, theyemonstration of their power will serve to undermine Nationalist morale,talkctam lo thend make aome NationEusts more receptive toel pressures and Inducements,If the US should fall to give strongto the Nationalist* Moreover, theyhope that Increased tensions in theStrait will generate pressures formeetings in which Communist Cliin* would be an indispensable participant.

SBC

Possible Chinese Communist Courses of Action

n flew of US cgrnmltraenbi to defend Taiwan and our estimate that neitherChina not the USSR Is willing toajor war at present, we believe thatChina will not attempt to seise Taiwan or the Penghus during the next six montiis at least

he Chinese Communlsls might assault Chin-men or Matsu. or both, within the near future. They have the capability to setae the Islands but are probably deterred because of their fear of posafble US intervention If the Chinese Communists were to attempt to setse these Islands, they would probably striveuick military victory. This. Ihey would probably estimate, would' give the US tooeriod for political countermeasurcs or for effective military intervention by non-nuclear means. The decision to launch such anwould probably be based on an estimate that the U8 would not use nuclear weapons in defense of the offshore Islands. Moreover, the Ciunese Communists probably wouldthat, even St th* US employed nuclear weapons. It would so soimited scale, sndie adverse international political and psychological consequences of any use ofweapons would seriously damage the position of the US and work to the long-run advantage of Communist China.

However, we believe It more likely that the Chinese Communist plan ts toread range of military and psychological pressures, designed so as tolear point ofahowoowrt These pressures will beU> Intensify the war of nerves In the Tarwan Strait and to test US Intentions with respect to the offshore islands. If the US reaction to these presumes should lead the Chinese Communists to believe that the US would not Intervene, they would probably then attempt to seise Chin-men or Matsu, or both.

Although the Chines- Communists may temporarily revert to lower levees of military pressures, we behove that they Intend totheir present level of military activity. They could do this by aggressive air action seeking to deny the Strait area to Nationalist aircraft, by increased naval activity, and by intensive and sustained artillery harassment of the Chin-men bland group. In this case, theould probably Interceptpatrols over the Taiwan Strait and conduct air raids on the offshore islands- They might conduct provocative overflights ofThese operations could result In accl-dsntal clashes with US aircraft operating In the area. Such levels of activity could lead to numerous air engagements with thewhich, if continued, would cause serious attrition of the Nationalist air force, andconsiderably tha sense of Insecurity and uncertainty among Nationalist leaders and armed forces. The Communists might nope that the lends of activity would discourage the Nationalists and perhaps even lead them to evacuate the onshore Wands.

Concurrent with such Increased activity, andrther step to test US Intentions, the Chinese Communists might seise one or mote of the lightly-defended offshore islands. This could be done quickly and with little or no prior warning.evelopment would have serious adverse psychological Impact on the Nationalists generally, and especially those on the major offshore Islands of Chin-men and Matsu. In determining the degree of risk In Tarred, tha Chinese Communis ta mightistinction between those small islands oftenart of the Chin-men and Mataund the core isolated islands

Tbe Chinese Communists mighterious effort to Interdict supply of the major offshore islands. If the Communists took this course of action they would probably estimate that they were running serious risk of USeven though there had been no prior Indications of explicit US intentions. The isolation of the offshore Wanes could be accomplishedom bt nation of air.and naval action. AitiHery action alone could seriously hamper resupply of Chin-men. However, it would probably take two or three months of Intensive effort to Interdict supply of the offshore Islands to the point where reserve slocks on these islands became crill-

SKC

SEC

low. In the event that the Chinese Com-munlsU had conducted interdictionagainst Chin-men and Matsuetted o* time withoutlear indicationntention to defend these islands, we believe that thr/ would probably then Invadeurrender did not seem imminent. The Nationalists do not have the capability lo evacuate their garrisons in the face ol Communist opposition.

IV. PROBABLE CHINES NATIONAilST COURSES Of ACTION

Thus far. the Nationalist fraction toCommunist pressures has beenThe Nationalists have reemphasired their determination to hold Chin-men and Matsu. They have challenged someaircraft over the coastal area and have continued their reconnaissance effort-they have refrained from bombing the newly activated cormrnnust airfields. They have Increased their efforts tc securemilitary aid and firmer defensefrom the US.

The Chln-mi iand Mataui have immense Importance to the GRC About one third of lis combat troops are committed to theirThese Islandsital element in ihe Taiwan early warning system. They areymbol ol ORG prestige. They sustain the hopeeturn to the mainland, and some Nationalist officials may consider them Instruments which might be used to embroil the US In war with Communist China. The GRC is probably convinced at present that it must bold Chin-men and Matsu in order to beep al; ve the hopeeturn to thetoisastrous blow to morale, to preclude any further decline In the prestige and International position of theirand to assist In the defense of Taiwan.

We believe, therefore, that the loss of the offshore Islands would under any dream-stancesevere effect on Nationalist morale- The Impact ofoss would be of the greatest severity if the US withheld its support and the Chinese Nationalist troops stationed on tha Wanda were defeatedhinese Communist assault. The Impact of the loss would be of less severity if the troops were evacuated with US assistance. In any case, the Nationalist government, if it Is to survive, would recuirc new and convincing desnonslrmttom that the US was rtillto protect Taiwan and to preserve tho ORCs International position.

The major courses of action open to the Nationalists, without US participation, are very limited. The most Important would be to launch air attacks against mainland targets. In view of Taiwan's vulnerabilitylaha-tlon, and In the absence of US approval, the Nationalist leaders probably will noi resort to this course of action so long as Communist military pressures stop shorteavy and sustained air or artillery bombardment of the offshore Ulands oretermined esTort to in If relict supply of Chin-men or Matsu

However, should the Chinese Communists take such steps, we believe that the chances are better than even that the Nationalistwould take whatever military action they could against the mainland. They might bomb the mainlandhe face ofUS objections, wilh the expectation that the resulting situation would force the US to Intervene.

V. PROBABLE CHINESE COMMUNISTTO CHINESE NATIONALIST AND/ OR US MEASURES TO MAINTAINOf THE Of FSHORE ISlANOS

Chinese Communists probablytheir military Initiative In thecan be conducted Inay asthe onus of aggressor on the US orfor any counteraction they take.China's leaders probably estimatetheir increased pressures willworld sympathy to develop for 'hethe beleaguered offshore islands, theworld reaction will be fear ofa desire that the US take steps toandhreat to peace.Moscow prebably conclude that anymoves by the US to maintaincontrol of the offshore Islands willIsolate the US diplomatically on thisIt should bo anticipated that Bloc dlplo-

macy ind propaganda will seek International political gains from any such US mows; the greater tne US commitment, the more vtg-crous the Carnrouruat political effort.

Communist China's activation of Ita co'JStal airfields and aggressive attempts to deny Its air space to overflights are probably here to stay, regardless of Chineseand US actions.omewhat lesser degree, ao are Chinese Corrimcrnrt tlx sorties and other probing actions bt the Taiwan Strait area. Thus, even though certain US/ GRC reactions may cause the Chineseto refrain from attempting to setae the onshore islands or Interdict their supply, soma Communist pressure will continue.

The Chinese Communists will probably not bo deterred from Increasing militaryagainst the Nationalists by US moves which atop short of either an explicitof the offshore islands or the activeof US air or naval forces toof the supply of these islands. Although the Chinese Communist* might become amore cautious, we do not believe that they would abandon their program of pressuresesult of lesser measures such as tha more frequent appearance of US ships andn the area, the provision of improvedto the GRC, or the Issuing of warnings in general terms to the Chinese Communists.

owever, the Chinese Communists would probably not attempt to setae the majorIslands or interdict their supply rn the face ol an explicit US guarantee or the active participation ot US naval and air forces In the protection of these islands or their supply. We still think that the Chinese CornmunlaU wish to avoid large-scale clashes with US forces. Moreover. Moscow would probably be urging restraint on the Chinese Communists at this point Nevertheless, there would berisk of occasional clashes between US and Chinese Communist ships and aircraft. The possibility should not bt excluded thai such clashes might be invited In order to create an Incident which could be brought before the UN or some other International forum.

SECMfT

ANNEX

CHINESE COMMUNIST AND CHINESE NATIONAIIST MILITARY STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA

Commun'm Ground Forcei

ne Chlneee ComrnurusU haveround troop* organized lowniuea and supporting unite In tbeFoochow, and canton military districts. Of these armies, all of wttich are probaWy first class units, three are stationed in the tmme-dlate Taiwan Straithe vicinity of Swatow. Amoy, aod Foocbow. Tho estimated strength of these armies0 each. Within the Fcochow Military Ftcfton there are

divisionsotal strengthIn addition, theren Nanking Military Regionndombat drrtstonsMilitary RegiontrengthWo have no erauJrrned reportsunits are being moved toareas. However, such troopcould take place rapidly anddetection.

he reorganisation of the ChineseArmy, which haa occurredas prartore balanced force which Is better ablo to carryoordinatedassault. In any amphibious assault against the effsnore Used* it La beueved that tbe Chinese Communist* would be capable of attaining athree to one numerical superiority, although they would notemploy all such forces. The actual numerical arse of the astault force would, of course, depend upon the particular objective attacked. The Communist* would probably employ na moreeinforced regimentightly defended Island such as0 men). They would undoubtedlyen for an attack an Chln-menuch forces would beof successful assault operations provided the Communists also had air and navaltn the area.

Communists are estimatedield artillery pieces In thernctoding at leastS2-mmgun/howitacrsmhowlteers. These weapons cancover Chin-men Island fromArnoy Harbor. EffectiveLs restricted by the extremethe Umlted number of pieces thatall targets on the island.Communists probably could notoperations without effective

are anhinesefield artillery pieces in them guns and/orrelatively small number ofthat can reach the Matsu Island*effectiveness of Interdiction In this area.

II. Chines* Nationalist Ground Forces

ourth of Nationalistman Army lone third of Its combat strength) ta deployed on theo the Chin-men group0 on the Matsu group. Of the0 are on the Penghus (Pescadores)n Taiwan itself.

he defensive position of Nationalist forces Is good- Minn have been laid In the waters off Chtn-men. Beaches on both island groups are protected by multiple belts of barb wire and concrete and steel hedge-hogs and by land mine Holds. Dug In petitions along and behind tbe beaches are mutually supporting. Both island groups probably have SO days of all supplies except ammunition. There leday stock of ammunition on tbe Ctun-rnensday stock on the MaUus. Moreover, the state of training and morale of Nationalist forces on the offshore

Islands is good. Tbey possess the will to fight, ud In the event of attack win undoubtedly receive the strongest support from Taiwan which tbe GRC it capable of giTing.

here are serious weakneasei in theposition, however. On Chtn-men, defensive positions are concentratedrust along the beaches; the interior of tht Island Is only lightly head- The southeast portion cf tht island is relatively weakly dtftnded, and the excellent beach in that area Is used for off-loading supplies. Nationalist forces are out-gunned by theeld artillery pieces (estimatedbasedfcan be positioned to cover port or all of the area of the Chin-men group. The Nationalists havtrtillery pieces. On the Matsu Island group, also, theists are out-gunned. As shown above, the Communists have an estimated (based onield artUlny pieces,f which can reach Kaotcng and Pafkan. In addition, there art an unknown quantity of artillery pieces capable of ruing co Nankan. Of the Nationalists'rtillery pieces,m guns can reach Communist positions. With the Islands of tht Mateu groupby from three to eight miles.position* on cne island cannot befrom another. For these reasons, and because of the proximity of the Islands to the mainland, theithout air and naval superiority, could not hold them for moreew daysetermined Ccrnmunist assault.

B. Chinese Nationalist strength figures on the offshore Islands occupied by regularforces are as follows:

c Cbln-nwo

Chin-men

Brh-tan2*0

g. Nankano.

Hslchuaa

III. Chinese Communist Navy

he personnel strength of the Chinese Communist Navyncludingin naval aviation. Its operational units include the following:

4

Destroyers

Submarines:range . rarare

kscert Vessels (DEI

Patrol Vessels

PfttlQl

1PFI

aV OPT)".

4

as

si

ODeswteper (MST)

landine Ships

pprax)

'Submarinein*t" car.strucuen at ihe rattear.

The naval air armombat aircraft

The navy has growing capahlBHea forshort and long range submarineand for surftoe activity in coaslal waters. It has au extensive capability for both oOtnarn and otftntive miningCoupled with Ccrcmucat air power, the navyignificant capability against Chinese Nationalist forces In coastal wateis.

With aerial support in the Taiwan Strait, the navy has the capability for operations ln the Matsu and Crrtn-rneo areas. We beam thatouthward deployment of units currently assigned to the Yellow Sea Fleet, it could effectively inteidlct the supply lines to tha offshore Islands.

Io an amphibious assault against Chin-men or Matsu it is unlikely that largerunitsLSM) would be employed due to the extremely adverse beachingThe Communists hare the capability, however, oftrong assaultUtter amphibious units (ICC. LCM) and such non-naval craft as might beNaval combat units (Dl. Oun Boats, etc) would probably be employed off theside of Chin-men. Tbe deep, leas ra-

^SJBC-rtET

waters off Matsu wouldreer employment of such combat units in support of an assault particularly after tne heavier Nationalist shore battenes were reduced

n an amphibious operation against tho Pcnghus and Taiwan with relativelywaters and more extensive beaches, all available strength afloat could beUsing available amphibious shipping, including merchant landing ship types, aforce of approximately three riflecould be lifted in such an assaolt

IV. Chinese Notionalisthe personnel strength of the Nationalist Navy (ORCN)00ha navy, scheduled toDST within the next year, consists of the following:

CwU-Qjer (DO)

Escaet Vtawl

i^iro*PI*)

Escort OPCBQ

Sub-ehasar

ncoil (POMI

Motor Torpedo Boat

eawa

Minelayer Ooastal <MMOleet Mlceswrcpcr> Coustal MinesweeperI Miscellaneous

ArophlbloDs vessels

4ox and Service Craft

lfl. The general elate of training is good.

Logistical support of the onshore islands Is adequate for present requirements. Over-all combat cfiecUvaness has continued towith operational availability on thedue to Improvements In maintenance and supply, overhaul and Improved operating procedures,

he navy isefensive force with limited capabilities. It cannd mine warfare It can provide lift for amphibious counteriandlng* on the offshore Islands In strength up to one division. However, the ORCN would be unable tosuccessfully the relatively large force of Chinese Communist PT boats andwhich is capable of operating in the Taiwan Strait, Lac* of cooperative airby the Nationalist air force has hampered the navy in operations requiring such support la the light of Chinese Communist air

strength in the Taiwan Strait, this delVlency

could become critical.

Marine Corps with0 has the men.skill to make It capable of executingsunpbibsous operations. Thecontinues to have the capabilityand executing an amphibiousat division or brigade level againstmoderate resistance providingand air support hi available.

V. Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) and Naval Air Force (CNAF)

Ccmmunlst Chinas air forcestrong, modern tactical force Theirtraining and deployment are oriented toward air defense and tactical support opera-lions. Theyucleus of battlefighter pilots who gained experience against TJS air tactics in the Jf^rean War.

Chinese Communal air defenseood early warning system,ood ground control InterceptIn daylight and clear air. The CCAP night snd bad weather Intercept capability Is limited somewhathortage ofsirborne intercept equipmentoor height finding capability et higherIn the coastal aivu between Hong Kong and Shanghai, their ground controlled Intercept capability probably would be good.

The combined Chinese Communist air forceset aim raft ofre fightersre high bombers. In the coastal area opposite Taiwan, there are seven airfields that could sustain jet operations Of these, six are presently operational and the other could qrncKy become operational. There are no bomber aircraft operating from airfields directly opposite Taiwan However, Taiwan is well within range of Chinese Communist Jet light bombers stationed at airfields outside the immediate area. The redeployment of some piston and light bomber forces to rear areas directly behind the coastal airfields Is expected.

here can be little doubt that the vastly outnumbered Chinese Nationalist Alrfoicc would be quickly overcome by Chineseair power In any decisive contest,the Nationalist forces were supported by US air power.

OCAPCNAF (Total Inrtxlory)

JeiIfm

PIllOD Flutter

Jut Light

PlstOD Tactical

Land Butd

puton Ucoiuni Boraber

Platen

Other Jet

Other

Total

VI, Chinese Nationalist Air Force A. CURRENT STRENGTH

he Chinese Nationalist Air Forceeparate servicear with the otherChinese military aervkes, Is tht strongest Indigenous non-Communist air force In Asia.

car rroau tavntorv)

Jetl

jet light

piston Tactual Air act

Und BetKl ASW

Flaion*

Othtr

he CAP haa an Inventory ofircraft, of which almost two-thirds are ln operational units; of these aircraft- an excessombat type permits faQy equipped combat units. Personnel strength totals0 and Includesdined pilots (there are. In addition,rained pSots occupying command and staff positions not requiring frequentnilots are In training.

URRENThe principal tactical capability ot the CAF at present Is photo reconnaissanceile range of Tartan, and limited night rwoonnajsaarxt upUc range.are currently regularly flown over the Communist Chinese mainland by thendircraft (and occasionally by) of the CAFs two tacticalsquadrons.

airly good organization for the control and functioning of air-ground support, mod-tied after that of the USAF, has recently been activated. Considerable practice wQl beto Insure technical effectiveness ol this system and Its components

the existenceellwarnlng/groundSF squadrons withcapability, the CAP could beoffer only delaying action against anby Communist China. Thisbe limited to daylight hours andot* short duration, pending the arrivalsupport

The CAF has no strategic air capability nor are any aircraft programmed through MAP that wouldapability. Tht CAP would be capable of givingap-port to amphibious landings or to defense against such landings, as well as harassing hostile shipping within the Taiwan Strait. The capability ofomb's) ia limited to petrol activities om the Taiwan Strait.

The air transport capability of tht CAP has been enhanced considerably over the last two years. Airdrop techniques have improved with the training derived in Joint operations and ta pamphlet and food airdrops in South China. Tbe two air transport groupsone specializing In air transport and the other In troop carriercapable ofrear area air supply, supportingamphibious operatitoiithand paratroop operations, and assisting in psychological warfare operations through food and pamphlet drops on the Chinese

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