NUCLEAR TEST TALKS
Soviet delegation at the nuclear test-cessation talks in Geneva onanuarya draft article on the key question of voting
in the control commis-
The Soviet delegation had promised that, when the Western
FOR HElLltsf'TES AND COMMENTS DATE:?
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delegations presented their article on duration of the treaty, it wouldist of subjects on whichfeels decisions mustaninous among the threepowers. Presentation of this list before the West introduced ita duration article was apparently designed both to strengthen Moscow's charge that the United States and Britain are blocking agreement by withholding their "long-promised" draft and also to support Moscow's campaign to impress public opinion with its serious negotiating posture. Moscow probably now hopes to focus debate on the question of durationest cessation, which it believes Is the most vulnerable point ln the Western position.
The Soviet article would make decisions on specified natters subject to thevote of not less than four members of tho seven-mancommission, including "the initial parties to thethe USSR, tbe United States, and the United Klngdon."
The natters listed were: revisions of the treaty;and definition of the powers of the administrator; recruitment of higher level personnel; dispatching of an
Inspection group for an on-the-spot investigation, and action based on such investigation; revision of observation methods; determination of locations of control posts and of aircraft flight routes; and budgetary, financial, administrative and logistic questions. On 2Soviet delegate Tsarapkin, defending this veto-powerwarned that Westernon any other approach to the voting question could cause the collapse of the.
Tsarapkinebruraryfamiliar arguments in defense of tbe veto right. He accused the West of putting forth proposals designed tofrequent unjustified ln the USSR for purposes of espionage. He argued that the power of the controltoarty of treaty violation could be abused, leadingreakdown of the treaty itself and to increased International tension. He said "there can be no agreement" not founded on unanimity of the three original parties, since theorganization would be "stillborn" if not based on the principle of "cooperation ."
This warningossible breakdown on this issue contrasts with Tsarapkin's protestations in an Informal talk with the Western delegates onanuary that he and his governmentdesire nor intend a break-off. The Soviet delegate'saction onanuarythe USSR's over-all position at the talks, however, suggests that he may have been preparinghowdown.
In an apparent attempt to preserve the impression that Moscow is still anxious toan agreement, however, Tsarapkinritish proposalorking group on the technical aspects of control post staffing. Although, ln the first meetingebruary, the Soviet representative attempted repeatedly to induce the British and American negotiators tothe validity of the USSR's concern over tbe threat to its national security posed bystaffing, for the most part he confined his remarks to technical questions on theand qualifications of the control post staffs.
fact tbat Moscow's firm stand against tbe concept of truly International staffing bas not changed was reaffirmed ln plenary session later the same day when Tsarapkina "chart" on staffingypical control post, the activities of which would be closely controlled by the host country.
Khrushchev in bis final speech to the party congressebruary reaffirmed the USSR's desire for agreement and charged that the United States and were out to prevent such agreement by putting forthproposals which would providefull-scale intelligence network." Ho warned that "we shall never agree" to allowing the Western powers, under cover of control, tothe sovereignty of the USSR. Heomparison between tbe surprise-attack talks and tbe present negotiations, charging tbat Just as in tbe former they hindered any solution of theln the latter tbey apparently Intend to "drag things out" while they prepare public opinion disruption of negotiations.]
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