Created: 12/18/1958

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While attempting to create an appearance of somethis week, the Sovietto thetalks in Geneva remained adamantly opposed to basicviewpoints on how toa reliable inspection system. Moscow continues to insist on retaining the power to frustrate any actontrolwhich might reduce Soviet freedom of action. The Soviet delegation has balked at any Anglo-American proposals which would have the effect ofthe need for further three-power political decisions after initial agreement.

Moscow is particularlyto activating an inspection team in the event of anuclear explosion without the unanimous agreement of the three "founding" powers. The Soviet delegation Insists on vetofor the three nuclear states In the central control organ, on primarily indigenous staffing of control posts in each country, on inspection by ad hoc teams created after suspectedwith concurrence by the government concerned, and on curtailing the duties of the "chief executive officer" or "administrator" of the control organ.

Prior toecember,may have believed it could split the Western delegations on the issue of majority London had advised its delegation that pressure in the House of Commons madehite Paper on the conference be Issued for use in parliamentary debate. The US delegation reported on 7that its Britishin its desire to create the Impression of substantial

progress before the Christmas recess, had blurred the issue of majority control to someby talking of theof unanimity on some

However, the introduction onecember of additional US draft articles which provideomparatively automatic control mechanism that could notuspected violator and which were obviously approved by the British delegationintroduction, has probably dispelled any Soviet hopesestern split.

The Soviet delegation promptly rejected the American proposal which would authorize the administrator to proceed with inspectionuspected violationours after having notified the commission unless the latter,wo-thirds vote, were to decide against the Soviet delegate Tsarapkin alleged that too many of the powers and functions which should belong to theission were given to the "all-powerful" administrator In the Western draft. He also stated that the commission shouldupon on-the-sitein every case on the basis of concrete circumstances. He warned against attempts toa control system which would encroach on state secur-ity.

The Soviet delegation onecember approved article three of the draft treaty. This article identifies principal components of the international control organ, includingchief executive officer to be >nown as "the administrator." :vcr agreement was reached only after the Western delegates assured Tsarapkin that thewould be responsible to the



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thus leaving theof voting procedures open.

Onecember the Soviet delegationritish draft proposal callingeven-member control commission on which the three nuclearwould have permanent seats.

Tsarapkin suggestedthat the commission be composed of three froa each "side"and one neutral. Wadsworth suggests that Soviet interest in composition of the commission may indicate that Moscow isove away from its insistenceeto.

Onecember, tbe Soviet delegate proposed that control provisions of the draft treaty be turned overorking group while the conferencediscussion of thedraft articles. probably Intends to point to Western rejection of theproposal as furtherof Western "stalling" to avoid agreeaent.

An analysis of Sovietunderlines the fact that Moscow will be unwilling toon the majority control issue. After having switchedecemberoreline in view ofon the first two draftSoviet propaganda became more pessimistic again onecember, attacking Western "evaslona" at the talks.

A Pravda editorial on that day criticizes thene-year ban, voting in the control organ, and the mobile inspection concept. Prav-da alleged tbat "to insist on ftfese conditions means to bring the natter to the collapse of negotiations." Moscow radio

has alsoore critical attitude toward the Westernat the talks, although it has not suggested theof break-off.

Surprise-Attack Talks

Onecemberhief Communist delegate to the talks,engthy proposal intended to appear to be addressed to the technical aspects of the surprise-attack problem but which is in fact an of the omnibus plan previously rejected by the West linking surprise-attack measures to specific disarmament steps. Withholding the move until after thethe talks was agreedwaa probably calculated to enable the bloc to avoid serious discussion of the proposal. Moscow probably hopes thiswill complete andthe record of the Sovietln tbe talks and will counter Western charges that the Communist delegation refused to discuss the technical aspects of the problem.

Onecember KuznetsovUS delegate Foster that

Moscow now Insists on Includinginal communique a

specific date forearlier informal to omitate. probably calculatedrejection of thiswould strengthen Itsposition for placingfor breakdown on thepropaganda media arealleging that Westernon breaking offwithout provisionarticularbe an attempt "tototal collapse ot

Original document.

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